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REROUTED ON THE WAY TO APPRENDI-LAND:
BOOKER, RITA, AND THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION
SAM KAMIN
t
Just five years ago, Justice Antonin Scalia could barely contain his
giddiness at the ascendance of the Apprendi revolution that he had
helped lead. That revolution had begun in 2000 in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey' with the Court's landmark Sixth Amendment holding that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."Q Two years later, the
Court decided in Ring v. Arizona3 that the Sixth Amendment, as inter-
preted by Apprendi, required the overturning of capital sentences that
relied upon judicial fact-finding.4 The argument at which Justice Scalia
had first hinted in his 1998 Almendarez-Torres v. United States5 dissent
had become the law of the land, and there seemed to be no logical stop-
ping point to the revolution's scope.
Writing separately in concurrence with the result in Ring, Scalia
chastised those who had not yet appreciated the extent of this reshaping
of how criminals are sentenced in the United States. He singled out for
his scorn Justice Breyer, who had concurred in the Ring result on sepa-
rate grounds,6 informing his Brother that there was only one legitimate
way to arrive at the appropriate result in the case:
There is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with the
happy band that reaches today's result unless he says yes to Ap-
prendi. Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he
t Associate Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver; B.A., Amherst Col-
lege, 1992; J.D., University of California-Berkeley, 1996; Ph.D., University of California-Berkeley,
2000. 1 would like to thank the organizers of this survey for the opportunity to participate and the
authors who agreed to contribute articles.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id.
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4. Id.
5. 523 U.S. 224, 258 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the end, the Court cannot credibly
argue that the question whether a fact which increases maximum permissible punishment must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is an easy one.").
6. Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Given my views in Apprendi v. New
Jersey... I cannot join the Court's opinion. I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe
that jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment.").
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should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Ap-
prendi-land.
7
Scalia's tone was that of the dissident finally come to power; his views,
once eccentric, had become ascendant.
When the Supreme Court overturned Washington state's sentencing
guidelines in 2004 in Blakely v. Washington,8 the flight to Apprendi-land
was nearing its destination. It now seemed only a matter of time before
the Supreme Court completed its undoing of modem sentencing regimes
by invalidating the granddaddy of those regimes: the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. In her Blakely dissent, Justice O'Connor anticipated this
result, her tone nearly as despondent as Scalia's was celebratory in Ring:
"What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judg-
ments are in jeopardy." 9
However, it now seems quite possible that those without tickets to
Apprendi-land will have the last laugh. As expected, the Supreme Court
decided in United States v. Booker 0 in 2005 that the view of the Sixth
Amendment adopted in Apprendi and Blakely required the invalidation
of the federal Guidelines as written."1 However a separate majority of
five Justices crafted a remedy for the constitutional infirmity of the
Guidelines that threatened to undo much of what Justice Scalia and his
fellow-travelers had so carefully crafted.
12
Writing for this remedial majority, Justice Breyer defined the ques-
tion for the Court as one of congressional intent: What would Congress
want done if it knew that its sentencing scheme based on judges finding
facts and then sentencing within fixed ranges based upon those facts
were found unconstitutional? He concluded that Congress's preference
would be to keep the Guidelines in place as written and make them advi-
sory rather than mandatory.' 3 Furthermore, Justice Breyer acknowledged
that making the Guidelines merely advisory would necessitate the crea-
tion of a new standard of appellate review of criminal sentences. 14 He
7. Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
9. Id. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
11. Id. at 226-27.
12. Id. at 245, 259. Justice Ginsburg changed sides, forming the fifth vote for both the consti-
tutional majority and the remedial majority. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83
DENV. U.L. REV. 665, 678 (2006).
13. In doing so, Justice Breyer rejected the possibility of invalidating the Guidelines in their
entirety (and allowing judges to sentence within the minima and maxima set by federal statute) and
maintaining the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but engrafting Apprendi's jury fact finding
requirement to them (the approach preferred by Justice Stevens's opinion).
14. Prior to Booker, sentences within the Guidelines were evaluated for correctness; those
outside the guideline range were reviewed to determine whether the sentence "is unreasonable."
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
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concluded for the remedial majority that the sentences that trial judges
impose under the newly advisory Guidelines ought to be reviewed for
reasonableness. 15
Thus, Booker was clearly a change in the Court's direction; Ap-
prendi, Ring, and Blakely all trumpeted the role of the jury in sentencing,
while the juror is strangely missing from the remedial opinion in Booker.
What was far less clear after Booker was where sentencing in the United
States was headed. Would Booker mark the return of the judge as sen-
tencer, freeing trial judges from the yoke of the Guidelines so many of
them found so oppressive? Or would Justice Breyer's solution merely
become the Guidelines by another name: Would the new "advisory"
Guidelines become mandatory in practice? Would Congress step in to
correct the remedial majority's assumption regarding its intent? To vali-
date that assumption? Furthermore, how would reasonableness review
work in practice? What weight would be placed on the "advisory"
guideline range in determining whether a particular sentence was reason-
able? Would the same weight be placed on the guideline range if the
sentence was within the "advisory" range as if it was outside of that
range? Would reasonableness depend on proximity to the "advisory"
range?
This confusion was essentially the state of the law at the time Rita v.
United States was decided on June 21st of this year.' 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Rita in order to determine whether an appel-
late presumption of reasonableness (which had been adopted by several
of the circuits and rejected by others) was consistent with the remedial
opinion in Booker.17  The Court, with only Justice Souter dissenting,
concluded that such an appellate presumption was permissible. Writing
for the majority once again, Justice Breyer reasoned that Congress had
instructed both the Sentencing Commission and the federal district courts
to weigh a number of factors in determining the appropriate sentence for
particular conduct. Where both the Commission and the trial judge agree
on a sentence-that is, where the judge sentences within the suggested
sentencing range-it is permissible for an appellate court to presume that
the sentence is a reasonable one.
15. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). Justice Breyer's remedial decision in
Booker has not proven popular in the two years since it was issued. In this survey, Professor Doug-
las Berman states: "Justice Breyer created this remedy in Booker out of whole cloth with only a nod
to applicable constitutional, statutory and administrative laws." Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned
Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 7, 10 (2007). Others have been less
charitable: See, e.g., Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State
of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625 (2007); McConnell, supra note
12, at 666.
16. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456. Rita's companion case, Claiborne v. United States, was dis-
missed as moot after the defendant died following oral argument. 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007).
17. 177 Fed. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3 2006).
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In this symposium we have five different perspectives on the state
of federal sentencing after Rita. Professor Douglas Berman leads off
with a taxonomy of the legal issues raised by the opinions in Booker and
how those issues stand post-Rita. Berman writes that in Rita, "the Su-
preme Court was genuinely eager to provide [] guidance to lower courts
about how they should administer an advisory federal guideline sentenc-
ing system. Unfortunately [] various passages throughout the Rita opin-
ions raise new questions about the major federal sentencing issues that
the Booker remedy stirred up."' 8 Berman concludes that, however the
Supreme Court resolves the various and sundry questions remaining after
Booker and Rita, "the history of modem sentencing reforms demon-
strates that changes in legal doctrines have become revolutionary only
when they ultimately transformed the legal cultures in which these doc-
trines operate."'
' 9
Following this recognition that it is actual outcomes that ultimately
matter, Paul J. Hofer, the former Senior Research Associate at the United
States Sentencing Commission, provides us with a wealth of data on an
important empirical question raised by Rita: "Does an appellate pre-
sumption of reasonableness for sentences within the guideline range have
an effect on the outcomes of appeals or on sentences imposed by the
district courts? '20 Although Hofer concedes that the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the legal import of this empirical question,2' it remains
crucial both in understanding the impact (or lack of impact) that Booker
and Rita will have on actual federal sentencing outcomes and in crafting
doctrine to govern that sentencing. While the Supreme Court largely
ignored the "daunting" statistical briefing in Rita, Hofer remains optimis-
tic about the role that empirical research can play in this process.
Could it be that the Rita Court is inviting the lower courts to hear
evidence that particular Guidelines are not working to achieve the
statutory purposes? Only time, and perhaps the upcoming opinion in
Kimbrough, will tell. If it turns out the Court is now open to categori-
cal challenges of the type many commentators have long encouraged,
Rita may be just the beginning of empirical evidence on sentencing
questions presented to the Court.
22
We turn then from these academic analyses of the state of sentenc-
ing to the views of those actually engaged in the practice. First, a federal
district judge and his clerk "urge district courts to exercise the discretion
18. Berman, supra note 15, at 15.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 27, 28 (2007).
21. Id. at 30 ("[T]he [appellate presumption of reasonableness], even if it increases the likeli-
hood that the judge, not the jury, will find 'sentencing facts,' does not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment.") (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465).
22. Id. at 50 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), cert. granted, 60
U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-6330)).
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[Rita] reaffirms. 23 While some might read Booker and Rita as at least
implicitly re-imposing the Guidelines on trial judges, the Hon. Lynn
Adelman and Jon Deitrich argue in their essay that Rita in fact encour-
ages trial judges to use their discretion to determine the appropriate sen-
tence. They argue that the Court went out of its way in Rita to limit its
holding and to avoid re-instituting the Guidelines on trial judges: The
Court held that circuits may, but are not required to, adopt the presump-
tion of reasonableness for sentences within the guideline range; that cir-
cuits may not adopt a presumption of unreasonableness for out-of-range
sentences; and that the reasonableness presumption that it approved is an
appellate presumption, not a trial one.24 Adelman and Deitrich remind us
that most federal judges on the bench today "have little or no sentencing
experience except under mandatory Guidelines," 25 and that the present
circumstances create the first real opportunity in a generation for trial
judges to create a "common law of sentencing": "[Federal trial judges]
can only do this by exercising their discretion to impose non-guideline
sentences and by explaining their reasons for doing so."'26 Such discre-
tion, the authors argue, has the power to overcome many of the injustices
so often associated with the Guidelines.
The other sentencing judge in our symposium views the future far
less optimistically than does Judge Adelman. For Judge Nancy Gertner,
the fear is that "'presumptive' will, once again, slide to 'mandatory,' or
something short of that, namely, 'Guidelines-Lite. ' ' 27  Judge Gertner
worries that the gravitational pull of the reasonableness presumption
approved by the Rita Court will discourage trial courts from thinking
beyond the parameters of the Guidelines. Using the facts of Rita itself,
she critiques the Supreme Court's assertion that the reasonableness pre-
sumption is appropriate for a sentence within the guideline range because
in such a case the Sentencing Commission and the trial court have agreed
on the appropriate sentence. More likely, Judge Gertner argues, when a
judge sentences within the guideline range, she has merely acquiesced to
the guideline sentence without independently examining it.
[T]he fact that a district court's sentence is aligned with that of the
Commission does not necessarily indicate that there was careful re-
flection about what the appropriate sentence should have been, but
may simply reflect a judge's good faith effort to comply with the
Guidelines (knowing their traction even post-Booker) or the failure of
effective advocacy at sentencing .... The "gravitational pull" of the
Guidelines, particularly in a circuit that is amenable to the "Guide-
23. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal
Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 51 (2007).
24. Id. at 52-53.
25. Id. at 54.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 63, 71 (2007).
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lines as presumptive" approach, limits sentencing arguments, stops
meaningful critique of the Guidelines, and encourages cursory treat-
ment of the sentence on all levels, at trial and on appeal.28
Finally, we get the perspective of a federal appellate judge on a Su-
preme Court opinion that the Court emphasized was entirely about appel-
late presumptions rather than trial ones. Judge Jeffrey Sutton ends this
survey on an optimistic note. He argues that "if an utterly indeterminate
sentencing regime slights consistency and if an overly determinate sen-
tencing regime slights individualized sentencing, it may be that Booker
and Rita present an opportunity to thread the sentencing needle., 29 This
needle-threading, he argues, will require collaboration between trial and
appellate judges within the federal system; trial judges have been en-
trusted by Congress with the task of determining appropriate sentences in
individual cases, and appellate judges, by virtue of their smaller number
and supervisory position, are well-situated to prevent extreme disparities
in like cases.
What the contributions to this volume emphasize is the triumph of
legal realism. The authors focus not so much on doctrine as on how that
doctrine will be applied by the actors who actually make the decisions
about the futures of criminal defendants. For all of Justice Scalia's en-
thusiasm for the Apprendi revolution, that revolution will not fail be-
cause Justice Ginsburg changed her vote in Booker to join Justice
Breyer's remedial majority. Rather, the flight to Apprendi-land was re-
routed because the Supreme Court, for all of its power to say what the
law is, has very little power to change what happens in individual court-
rooms every day. It is the collective efforts of all of the various players
in the sentencing puzzle-trial judges, appellate judges, Congress, the
Sentencing Commission-rather than any edict from the Supreme Court
that will ultimately determine the future direction of sentencing in the
federal courts.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita,
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 81 (2007).
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Federal judges have struggled mightily to comprehend the meaning
and impact of the Supreme Court's landmark sentencing decision in
United States v. Booker.1 In Booker, the Court remedied Sixth Amend-
ment problems with judicial fact-finding under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines by making the Guidelines "effectively advisory" and fash-
ioned a new "reasonableness" standard for appellate review of sen-
tences.2 But, as documented by conflicting lower court opinions, few
judges or practitioners could be sure whether the Booker remedy should
significantly change or only slightly alter the operational realities of the
federal sentencing system.3
The Supreme Court seemed poised to provide needed guidance on
Booker's meaning and application when, in late 2006, the Court granted
certiorari in Claiborne v. United States4 and Rita v. United States.5 In
Claiborne, the Court was to examine circuit court approaches to judging
the reasonableness of below-guideline sentences imposed by district
courts; in Rita, the Court was to examine approaches being used to judge
within-guideline sentences. But the sudden death of petitioner Mario
Claiborne required the Supreme Court to vacate the Claiborne case after
oral argument.6 The Court took up two new cases, Kimbrough v. United
States7 and Gall v. United States,8 in order to address below-guideline
sentences, but they are not to be heard until the Court's October 2007
Term.
t William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University; A.B., Princeton University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 245-46, 260-65.
3. See generally NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY ch.3 (2d ed.
2007) (reviewing post-Booker uncertainties).
4. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-
5618).
5. 177 Fed. App'x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006)
(No. 06-5754).
6. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007).
7. 174 Fed. App'x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007)
(No. 06-6330).
8. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-
7949).
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Left only with a within-guideline case to resolve, the Justices in
Rita v. United States9 issued four opinions that raise more questions than
they answered. The opinions in Rita revealed not only that the Court is
still struggling with its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but also that the
Justices have divergent views on the many other dynamic issues raised
by the Booker remedy of an advisory guideline system.
As explained in Part I below, the Booker remedy transformed a con-
stitutional debate into a multi-dimensional cacophony of sentencing is-
sues that Rita could only begin to address. Moreover, as detailed in Part
II, though Rita does answer a few key post-Booker questions, the opin-
ions in Rita have passages that present new puzzles for anyone trying to
sort through the post-Booker world of federal sentencing. Finally, as
discussed in Part III, Rita and lower courts' early reactions to the deci-
sion ultimately reveal, yet again, that dramatic legal changes face resis-
tance from sentencing actors who become acclimated to the status quo.
Indeed, the history of modem federal sentencing reforms demonstrates
that changes in legal doctrines become revolutionary only when they
ultimately transform the legal cultures in which these doctrines operate.
This lesson should be heeded not only by the Supreme Court as it con-
siders another set of sentencing cases, but also by all would-be legal re-
formers in the field of sentencing and beyond.
I. THE MANY ISSUES RAISED-BUT NOT RESOLVED-BY BOOKER
Though implicating other issues,' ° the Supreme Court's numerous
divided sentencing rulings over the last decade-including the merits
opinion in Booker-have been principally focused on the meaning and
application of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision." But the re-
medial opinion in Booker converted a constitutional debate into a confus-
ing battle royale over a wide array of modem federal sentencing laws and
practices. 12 Specifically, Booker's advisory guideline remedy brought at
least six dynamic and challenging legal issues into play for lower courts
9. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
10. In another article, I have highlighted that the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment
rulings implicate and reflect, both expressly and implicitly, an array of constitutional provisions and
principles beyond the right to a jury trial. See Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker:
Pondering Modem Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 653, 653 (2005); see also
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A Provisional Theory of the Constitutional Law
of Crime and Punishment, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 5-12 (2004) (assailing the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence while suggesting new approaches to interpretations of the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to address sentencing issues).
11. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
12. The start of Justice Souter's dissent in Rita captures this reality in one simple sentence:
"Applying the Sixth Amendment to current sentencing law has gotten complicated, and someone




involved in sentencing decision making. Even an abridged account of
these multiple and often cross-cutting legal issues raised-but not re-
solved-by the Booker remedy highlights why so much doctrinal and
practical uncertainty has followed in the wake of the Supreme Court's
creation of an advisory federal guideline sentencing system.
A. Issue #1: The Import of Constitutional Jurisprudence
The merits ruling in Booker declared unconstitutional judicial fact-
finding to enhance sentencing ranges within a mandatory guideline sys-
tem. 1 3 But, as many have noted, because judges still engage in extensive
judicial fact-finding within an advisory guideline scheme, the Booker
remedy arguably undermines the very jury trial concerns that seemed to
animate the Court's modem Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 14 Conse-
quently, as a matter of constitutional law after Booker, lower courts have
struggled to figure out if the Sixth Amendment is to have real substantive
bite or is only to be given lip-service in the application of an advisory
guideline system.
B. Issue #2: The Meaning of Statutory Provisions
The specific remedy adopted in Booker was purportedly driven by
statutory law: Justice Breyer emphasized Congress's intent in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act (SRA) to justify making the Guidelines advisory, 5
and the Booker remedy championed the SRA's detailed sentencing in-
structions in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as still controlling law for both district
and circuit judges.16 But the Booker remedy said very little about how
lower courts are to assess and balance the numerous (and vague) sentenc-
ing factors set out in § 3553(a), and Booker never even mentioned
§ 3553(a)'s command that courts "impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of punishment set
out by Congress.' 7  Consequently, as a matter of statutory law after
Booker, lower courts have struggled to give effect to the express text of
the SRA and the perceived goals of Congress in the application of an
advisory guideline system.
13. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-59.
14. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 679-80
(2006); see also Kevin R. Rcitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at
Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113 (2005).
15. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 249-58.
16. See id. at 259-61, 268-70.
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007); see also Posting of Douglas A. Berman to Sentencing Law
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C. Issue #3: The Force ofAdministrative Regulations
The Booker remedy extolled the Guidelines and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's efforts to promote "better sentencing practices,"1 8 and
stressed that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) still requires judges to "consider" the
Guidelines and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's policy statements. 19
In turn, many post-Booker lower court rulings emphasize the importance
and value of the Guidelines as the considered work of an expert agency
seeking to achieve congressional sentencing goals.20  But, even when
lauding the Guidelines, lower courts acknowledge that the Commission's
Guidelines cannot be given binding force without creating the constitu-
tional problems that led to the Booker ruling.21 Moreover, the Commis-
sion's own research and analysis has spotlighted that certain Guide-
lines-such as the hundred-to-one ratio in calculating crack-to-powder
cocaine sentences, and the severe career-offender enhancement-
undermine the sentencing goals set forth by Congress in the SRA.22
Consequently, as a matter of administrative law after Booker, lower
courts have struggled to determine exactly how much emphasis can and
should be given to the Guidelines and the Sentencing Commission's
other work product in the application of an advisory guideline system.
D. Issue #4: The Development of Common Law Standards
The Booker remedy's conversion of the Guidelines to be "effec-
tively advisory" and its creation of a new reasonableness standard of
appellate review was ultimately a tour-de-force of judicial lawmaking.
Justice Breyer crafted this remedy in Booker out of whole cloth with only
a nod to applicable constitutional, statutory and administrative laws.
Perhaps inspired (or even required) by Booker's creation of a new com-
mon-law federal sentencing framework, lower courts have developed
common-law standards for sorting through various recurring post-Booker
issues; the most prominent such creation is the appellate "presumption of
reasonableness" for within-guideline sentences, which was at issue in
Rita.23 But, because common-law doctrines in the federal criminal jus-
tice system are not common, the legal foundation and the evolution of
post-Booker judge-made sentencing doctrines have been confounding
18. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-65.
19. Id. at 259-60.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ministrio-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir.
2006).
22. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 131-34 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/Chap4.pdf, see also
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY passim (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.htm.
23. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
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and sometimes convoluted. Consequently, as a matter of common law
after Booker, lower courts have struggled to decide whether and how to
craft new sentencing doctrines in the application of an advisory guideline
system.
E. Issue #5: The Scope of Judicial Sentencing Discretion
Congress passed the SRA to limit and guide, but not eliminate, the
discretion that district judges had traditionally exercised at sentencing.24
Thus, long before the Supreme Court's modem Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence, the scope of judicial discretion within the federal guideline
sentencing system was a fundamental concern and a matter of extensive
debate.25 Moreover, though the Supreme Court in its Sixth Amendment
rulings has sought to distinguish mandatory judicial fact-finding from
traditional judicial discretion, these issues are readily conflated because
both relate to judges' overall power and authority at sentencing. The
Booker decision further clouded these issues by declaring unconstitu-
tional certain judicial fact-finding in a mandatory guideline system, but
then crafting a remedy which permits similar fact-finding within a sen-
tencing system that enhances traditional judicial discretion. Conse-
quently, when seeking to define the scope of judicial sentencing discre-
tion after Booker, lower courts have struggled to figure out whether they
should embrace and encourage further expansion of judicial sentencing
discretion or instead should now try to place whatever limits on this dis-
cretion that the Constitution might permit in the application of an advi-
sory guideline system.26
24. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence
that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 37-41 (2000)
(discussing the SRA's interest in achieving a healthy balance of judicial sentencing discretion).
Notably, roughly a decade after the SRA's enactment and a decade before Booker, a unanimous
Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), asserted that Congress in the SRA
sought to ensure "that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion" by giving
judges statutory authority to depart from the Guidelines. Id. at 97. As commentators have noted,
however, this assertion may have been more wishful thinking than a statement of actual fact by the
Court. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Mark Harris, The Koon Case: Departures and Discretion, 9
FED. SENT'G REP. 4 (1996) (questioning the Supreme Court's various assertions in Koon about
judicial sentencing discretion).
25. See generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unaccept-
able Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Charles J. Ogletree, The
Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938,
1944 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year ofJubilee.. . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System after Booker, 43 Hous. L. REV.
279 (2006); Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived
in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 616 (2006); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal
Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693 (2005).
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F. Issue #6: The Reality of Sentencing Outcomes (and Reactions
Thereto)
Legal doctrines and highfalutin constitutional and sentencing theory
notwithstanding, the rubber always hits the road in the criminal justice
system, for defendants and society, in terms of concrete sentencing out-
comes. Debates over sentencing law, policy, and practice typically take
place in the shadow of concerns about particular substantive offenses and
particular individual offenders; principle necessarily gives way to out-
come-oriented pragmatism when judges and others have to make case-
specific sentencing choices. Consequently, within any sentencing struc-
ture, lower courts will always struggle to decide what is a fair, effective,
and appropriate sentencing outcome for a particular defendant. Further,
as the Booker opinion itself emphasized, Congress always retains author-
ity to revise or restructure the basic framework and ground rules of fed-
eral sentencing law and procedure. 27 In the period after Booker, sentenc-
ing decisions were being made in the shadow of concerns about how
Congress might respond to certain outcomes or particular sentencing
patterns. Consequently, when imposing sentences after Booker, lower
courts have struggled to balance case-specific justice and broader sys-
tem-wide interests in the application of an advisory guideline system.
This brief taxonomy of six dynamic and challenging issues that the
Booker remedy brought into play for lower courts does not comprehen-
sively canvass all the important policy concerns and legal questions
raised by Booker and the major rulings that preceded it.28 Nevertheless,
this taxonomy still highlights how the Booker remedy transformed what
had primarily been a constitutional debate into a cacophony of sentenc-
ing issues that no single subsequent ruling could seriously hope to re-
solve. Moreover, as detailed in the next Part, though Rita does usefully
illuminate a few key post-Booker issues, mysterious passages in all the
Rita opinions present new puzzles for those seeking greater clarity about
the application of an advisory guideline system after Booker.
II. WHAT RITA CLEARS UP AND WHAT RITA CONFOUNDS
Though many hoped that Rita would help straighten out
post-Booker sentencing realities, the wide array of challenging issues
raised by the Booker remedy ensured that Rita could not conclusively
settle exactly how advisory guidelines in the federal system are to oper-
ate. Moreover, because the opinions in Rita revealed that the Court is
fractured on an array of constitutional and non-constitutional sentencing
27. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
28. See generally Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2006) (discussing broader theoretical issues raised by the Supreme Court's
modem sentencing rulings); Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1; Berman, supra note 10 (discussing broader constitutional concerns raised by the Su-
preme Court's modem sentencing rulings).
[Vol. 85:1
REASONED SENTENCING
issues, perhaps the Justices should be lauded for delivering an opinion in
Rita that settles at least a few post-Booker issues. Nevertheless, as the
next two sections highlight, a close review of the Rita opinions can leave
a reader feeling more befuddled than enlightened.
A. What Seems Clear After Rita
A few aspects of constitutional jurisprudence and post-Booker sen-
tencing realities are settled by Rita. For example, the Court expressly
held that the Sixth Amendment does not preclude a circuit court from
applying a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a within-
guideline sentence imposed by the district court.29 Critically, though,
such a presumption apparently is not an essential aspect of the common
law of post-Booker sentencing: none of the opinions in Rita hold or even
suggest that those circuits which have resisted this presumption ought
now to adopt it. Nevertheless, by extensively praising the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission's "serious, sometimes controversial, effort to carry out"
congressional sentencing reform goals,30 the majority opinion in Rita
suggests that adopting the presumption is a wise circuit choice.
The majority opinion in Rita further clarifies what this (permissible
but not essential) presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline
sentences is not: (1) it is "not binding"; 3' (2) it "does not, like a
trial-related evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other,
shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their
case"; 32 and (3) it does not "reflect strong judicial deference of the kind
that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert
agency than to a district judge."33 Though before Rita no circuit clearly
approached the presumption in these now verboten ways, the Supreme
Court's numerous assertions about what the presumption isn't apparently
are meant to indicate that the presumption must be genuinely rebut-
table.34
Fortunately, the majority opinion does provide some helpful guid-
ance about what the presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline
sentences actually is: "the presumption before us is an appellate court
presumption," 35 which means that it "applies only on appellate review,"
36
which further means that at initial sentencing a district court "does not
29. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-66 (2007).
30. Id. at 2463-65.
31. Id. at 2463.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his Rita concurrence, Justice Stevens cites to
the majority's (anti-)explanatory statements about the presumption of reasonableness to support his
assertion that "the Court acknowledges moreover [that] presumptively reasonable does not mean
always reasonable; the presumption, of course, must be genuinely rebuttable." Id. (emphasis in
original).
35. Id. at 2465.
36. Id.
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enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guideline sentence
should apply., 37 This point about the presumption's inapplicability at
initial sentencing is perhaps the most significant and consequential as-
pect of the Rita decision. More than a few district courts, sometimes on
their own and sometimes influenced by the adoption of a presumption of
reasonableness in their circuits, have indicated to defendants and litigants
that they planned to impose a within-guideline sentence unless and until
a party presented a potent justification for a non-guideline sentence.38
Rita suggests that it is inappropriate-and, one would think, reversible
error-for a district judge to look to the Guidelines as providing a default
sentencing range at initial sentencing.
The majority opinion in Rita also clarifies that some doctrines are
off-limits to circuit courts after Booker. The opinion explains that the
"fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reason-
ableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unrea-
sonableness" for certain types of sentences. 39 The opinion further notes
that "[e]ven the Government concedes that appellate courts may not pre-
sume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreason-
able." 40 Circuits that had adopted a presumption of reasonableness be-
fore Rita typically made similar points; 41 but the frequent reversal of
below-guideline sentences could justify a conclusion that some circuits
have been applying, de facto if not de jure, a presumption of unreason-
ableness when reviewing sentences imposed below the applicable guide-
line range.42
Last but not least, the majority opinion in Rita discusses at length
the procedures that district courts apparently should follow when impos-
ing sentences within an advisory guideline system after Booker. This
nuanced (and dicta-filled) treatment of post-Booker sentencing practices
indicates that a "sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally
begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of the
Guidelines,"43 and then "may hear arguments by prosecution or defense
that the Guidelines sentence should not apply."44 This process, suggests
the Rita Court, "subjects the defendant's sentence to the thorough adver-
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005); see also
United States v. Ross, No. 07-1215, 2007 WL 2593509 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (vacating sentence
and remanding for resentencing because "it appears from the record that the district court improperly
applied a presumption of reasonableness for a within-guidelines sentence").
39. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 642 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1239
(10th Cir. 2006).
42. Of course, the appellate approach to below-guideline sentences was to be examined in the
dismissed Claiborne case, and will be addressed by the Court in the now-pending Kimbrough and
Gall cases. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.




sarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure, ' 5 and en-
ables a district judge to exercise "his reasoned sentencing judgment, rest-
ing upon an effort to filter the Guidelines' general advice through
§ 3553(a)'s list of factors." 6
Upon reaching a sentencing decision, explains the Rita majority,
"[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough [sentencing reasons] to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority. '47 A decision to impose a within-guideline sentence "will not
necessarily require lengthy explanation,"48 although when a party pre-
sents a viable argument for a different sentence "the judge will normally
... explain why he has rejected those arguments., 49 And when deciding
to impose "a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why
he has done so.
'5°
In this discussion of the sentencing process, the Rita majority
stresses that "[j]udicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a
judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institu-
tion. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with
the assurance that creates that trust."'51 But the Court further indicates
that the "appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when
to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances .... Sometimes the
circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call
for a lengthier explanation."
52
B. What Seems More Puzzling After Rita
The extensive dicta in Rita-about the Guidelines in general and
about the post-Booker sentencing process in particular-suggests that the
Supreme Court was genuinely eager to provide more guidance to lower
courts about how they should administer an advisory federal guideline
sentencing system. Unfortunately, as detailed below, various passages
throughout the Rita opinions raise new questions about the array of fed-
eral sentencing issues that the Booker remedy stirred up.
1. Issue #1: The Import of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Though Rita settles that there are no constitutional problems with
the general application of an appellate presumption of reasonableness,
Justice Scalia reads the majority opinion as leaving open the prospect of
45. Id
46. Id. at 2469.
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defendants raising (and sometimes succeeding with) "as-applied Sixth
Amendment challenges" to certain within-guideline sentences. 3 But
neither Justice Scalia's concurrence nor any other opinion in Rita pro-
vides any guidance as to exactly when a particular within-guideline sen-
tence based on judicial fact-finding could or would transgress the Sixth
Amendment. 4 Consequently, as a matter of constitutional law after Rita,
lower courts still cannot be sure if the Sixth Amendment is to have some
real substantive bite or is only to be given lip-service in the application
of an advisory guideline system.
2. Issue #2: The Meaning of Statutory Provisions
The majority opinion in Rita says surprisingly little about the ex-
press text of § 3553(a), even though the Court reaffirms Booker's deter-
mination that this statutory provision now controls federal sentencing
decision making. Moreover, what little the majority opinion does say
about § 3553(a) is more mysterious than meaningful: the Court says that
a district judge should make "an effort to filter the Guidelines' general
advice through § 3553(a)'s list of factors, 55 but it never explains what
this means in practical terms; the Court indicates a party can argue that a
"Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considera-
tions, 56 but it never explains when this type of argument could support
or even require a sentence outside the Guidelines. Justice Stevens' con-
currence in Rita further asserts "that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing
judge to consider" many individual characteristics that "are not ordinar-
ily considered under the Guidelines, 5 7 but he too fails to articulate with
particularity what this entails for sentencing decision making by district
and circuit judges. Consequently, as a matter of statutory law after Rita,
lower courts still cannot be confident about how they are supposed to
give effect to the express text of the SRA and the perceived goals of
Congress in the application of an advisory guideline system.
53. Id. at 2479 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. Justice Scalia's opinion in Rita seems to suggest that a within-guideline sentence depend-
ing too much on judicially found facts would trigger "as-applied" Sixth Amendment concerns even
within an advisory guideline scheme. See id. But Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Blakely
argued for a "bright-line" approach to what types of judicial fact-finding violates the Sixth Amend-
ment because of the "need to give intelligible content to the right ofjury trial." Blakely v. Washing-
ton, 542 U.S. 296, 305-08 (2004). It is ironic and surprising that Justice Scalia in Rita now seems to
be advocating a vague, judicial-administered, not-yet-very-intelligible standard for applying the
Sixth Amendment in the context of advisory guideline systems.
55. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469.
56. Id. at 2465; see also id. at 2468 (discussing the possibility of a litigant "contest[ing] the
Guidelines sentence generally under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)"); id at 2470 (asserting that the defen-
dant failed to press in the lower courts the "claim that the Guidelines sentence is not reasonable
under § 3553(a) because it expressly declines to consider various personal characteristics of the
defendant").
57. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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3. Issue #3: The Force of Administrative Regulations
The majority opinion in Rita lauds the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's construction of "a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the
§ 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice., 58 Yet the
same opinion also suggests that there may be cases-perhaps many
cases-in which a "Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect §
3553(a) considerations. 59 Similarly, Justice Stevens' concurrence as-
serts a district court's sentencing choice merits "added respect"60 when
consistent with the Guidelines, even though his opinion stresses that the
Court's work in Rita clarifies that "the Guidelines are truly advisory."
6'
Consequently, as a matter of administrative law after Rita, lower courts
still cannot be confident about exactly how much emphasis can and
should be given to the Guidelines in the application of an advisory guide-
line system.
4. Issue #4: The Development of Common Law Standards
As noted before, the Court in Rita approved the circuit courts' crea-
tion of a presumption of reasonableness for reviewing within-guideline
sentences,62 but it did not command or even directly encourage all the
circuits to adopt this presumption. Meanwhile, Justice Stevens' concur-
rence emphasizes that the presumption "must be genuinely rebuttable, 63
but he provides no insights or suggestions about when and how the pre-
sumption is to be rebutted. Relatedly, the majority seems untroubled
with the prospect that the "presumption will encourage sentencing judges
to impose Guidelines sentences," 64 while the opinions of both Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter express great concern with the creation of
appellate doctrines that could unduly push district judges toward follow-
ing the Guidelines. Moreover, when discussing judicial sentencing prac-
tices, the Rita majority suggests that cases raising "conceptually simple"
issues may generally require only a "brief' statement of reasons; 65 but
the Court does not indicate how lower courts should determine or police
when conceptually challenging issues require "the judge to write more
,66extensively." Consequently, as a matter of common law after Rita,
lower courts cannot be sure whether and how they should craft common-
law sentencing doctrines in the application of an advisory guideline sys-
tem.
58. Id. at 2464.
59. Id. at 2465; see also id. at 2468, 2470.
60. Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 2465-66 (majority opinion).
63. Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
66. Id.
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5. Issue #5: The Scope of Judicial Sentencing Discretion
The majority opinion in Rita devotes far more energy to extolling
the Guidelines and the pursuit of "increased uniformity" than to promot-
ing discretionary judgments by district courts. 6 7 Nevertheless, the Rita
Court does suggest the importance of "the sentencing court's judgment
as to what is an appropriate sentence for a given offender., 68 Mean-
while, Justice Stevens' concurrence exalts the unique information and
insights of district courts and the importance of an appellate court defer-
ring to a district court's "individualized sentencing determination."
6 9
Indeed, Justice Stevens' final sentence stresses "the importance of paying
appropriate respect to the exercise of a sentencing judge's discretion.,
70
Consequently, when seeking to define the scope of judicial sentencing
discretion after Rita, lower courts still cannot be sure if they should em-
brace further expansion of judicial sentencing discretion or seek to judi-
cially regulate this discretion in the application of an advisory guideline
system.
6. Issue #6: The Reality of Sentencing Outcomes (and Reactions
Thereto)
Perhaps because the Court focused on broader post-Booker consid-
erations, its brief discussion of Victor Rita's specific sentencing claims
had the feel of an afterthought. The Supreme Court can simply deny
review of the thousands of sentences appealed in the federal system
every year, and thus the Justices in Rita perhaps unsurprisingly invested
great energy and devoted nearly all their opinions to an extended discus-
sion of system-wide sentencing concerns. Nevertheless, neither district
courts nor circuit courts have the luxury of ignoring case-specific reali-
ties at sentencing: district judges have an obligation to unpack and assess
the factual and legal issues raised by each individual case; circuit judges
must be concerned with examining and correcting claimed errors in the
appeal at hand before worrying about developing legal standards for fu-
ture cases. Consequently, when deciding upon specific sentencing out-
comes after Rita, lower courts are still faced with the special challenges
of balancing case-specific justice and broader system-wide interests in
the application of an advisory guideline system.7'
This brief post-Rita review of six dynamic and challenging issues
that the Booker remedy brought into play for lower courts surely has the
feel, in the memorable words of Yogi Berra, of dj vu all over again.
Though Rita does usefully illuminate a few key post-Booker issues, it
67. See id. at 2463-67.
68. Id. at 2465.
69. Id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 2474.
71. Cf Jeffrey S. Sutton, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 79, 79-81 (2007) (explaining dilernma of
balancing individual sentencing and system-wide consistency).
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does not even begin to quell the cacophony of sentencing issues that have
necessarily arisen in Booker's wake as lower courts try to make sense of
an advisory federal guideline sentencing system. In short, doctrinal mys-
teries still abound after Rita. And yet, as the concluding Part of this arti-
cle explains, the post-Rita sentencing landscape may be more predictable
than this Part's legal analysis might suggest.
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
(A/K/A THE NEED TO CHANGE PERSPECTIVES ALONG WITH DOCTRINE)
Part I highlighted the many challenging issues raised-but not re-
solved-by the Booker remedy, and Part II highlighted that these issues
remain muzzy after Rita. Nevertheless, doctrinal and practical uncertain-
ties notwithstanding, the federal sentencing system keeps humming
along, sentencing more than 5000 federal defendants each and every
month.72 Moreover, and more importantly, even a cursory review of
federal sentencing realities in lower courts after Booker and now after
Rita reveals a sentencing system that is still extraordinarily similar in
operation and appearance to the federal sentencing system before Booker
and Rita.
Lower courts' general responses to Booker and their early reactions
to Rita document, yet again, that dramatic legal changes face resistance
from sentencing actors who have become acclimated to the status quo.
Indeed, as highlighted briefly below, the history of modem federal sen-
tencing reforms demonstrates that changes in legal doctrines have be-
come revolutionary only when they ultimately transformed the legal cul-
tures in which these doctrines operate. This is a broad lesson that should
be heeded not only by the Supreme Court as it considers another set of
sentencing cases, but also by all would-be legal reformers in the field of
sentencing and beyond.
A. The (Inevitable?) History of Resistance to Sentencing Change
Social scientists have long noted the realities (and potential prob-
lems) of status quo biases-that is, the natural tendency of people to
generally prefer things to stay relatively the same.73 Legal theorists have
come to recognize the import and impact of these biases in the arena of
legal reform.74 Significantly, the modem history of federal sentencing
72. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
(2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm.
73. See William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988); see also Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991).
74. See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119 (2006); Raquel
Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individ-
ual-Specific Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1146 (1991)
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reforms provides interesting and diverse examples of status quo biases at
work in many different legal settings.
Status quo biases were evident in the early development of modem
sentencing reforms. Many leading academics, policy advocates, and
politicians were talking serious about the need for federal sentencing
reforms by the mid-1970s.75 But, surely influenced by a kind of status
quo bias, Congress took nearly a decade to finally pass the landmark
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.76 That Act created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to develop guidelines for federal sentencing. But, surely
influenced by a kind of status quo bias, that Commission was unable to
chart a new conceptual path for federal sentencing, and ultimately devel-
oped a set of guidelines that were premised largely on past sentencing
practices.77 These Guidelines for federal sentencing were due to take
effect in 1987. But, surely influenced by a kind of status quo bias, many
lower federal courts initially declared the federal sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable.78 Tellingly, the Supreme
Court in Mistretta v. United States79 ultimately upheld the constitutional-
ity of aspects of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 by asserting, some-
what inaccurately, that the SRA really did not radically change the status
quo traditions of the federal sentencing system.8 °
Since the Guidelines were in place and received an initial constitu-
tional blessing from the Supreme Court, status quo biases have been evi-
dent in the application and continued development of modem sentencing
reforms. Both the U.S. Sentencing Commission and federal judges have
focused virtually all their sentencing decision making on the basic struc-
ture and particularized regulations set forth in the Guidelines. Despite
long-standing and widespread criticisms of the Guidelines from federal
75. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER ix (1973);
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3 (1976); Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208,
209 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, Foreward to PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM xiii (1977); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37
MD. L. REV. 267, 267 (1977).
76. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 991
(2007)); see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 229 (1993) (reviewing the
long congressional debates over the process of enacting a federal sentencing reform bill).
77. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 24 (1988) (discussing the challenges and choices sur-
rounding the development of the initial Guidelines).
78. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 73-74 (1996) (discussing arguments made
against the SRA's constitutionality). Professor Michael Tonry sensibly suggests that many of these
rulings, "though necessarily couched in constitutional terms... [revealed] judges' deep antipathy to
the guidelines themselves." Id. at 73.
79. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
80. Id. at 406-08; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) (asserting curiously
that Congress in the SRA sought to ensure "that district courts retain much of their traditional sen-
tencing discretion" by giving judges statutory authority to depart from the Guidelines).
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judges, academics, defense attorneys, and even many prosecutors,8 ' the
U.S. Sentencing Commission has never seriously considered any sizeable
or systemic change to the Guidelines' structure or basic operations.
Similarly, even though many federal judges have often vocally com-
plained about the Guidelines, the federal judiciary had generally failed to
contribute to the development of federal sentencing law within a guide-
line system.82 Moreover, though the SRA radically transformed the na-
ture, inputs, and import of the traditional sentencing process, nearly all
courts have continued to rely upon informal procedures for sentencing
decision making under the Guidelines, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed
pre-reform holdings about defendants' limited procedural rights at sen-
tencing.8
3
Of course, the Booker decision seemed to mark an extraordinary
break from the stories of status quo bias in the federal sentencing system.
Despite nearly two decades of judicial fact-finding under mandatory
Guidelines, the Supreme Court in Booker concluded that the system vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment and it crafted a novel and unexpected set of
sentencing standards for both district courts and circuit courts. 8 4  And
yet, lower court opinions and cumulative post-Booker data reveal that the
Booker remedy has been applied, especially by circuit courts, to preserve
the pre-Booker status quo. 5 Soon after Booker, circuit courts were quick
to hold that district judges still must properly calculate guideline sentenc-
ing ranges and must still provide a reasoned justification for any decision
to deviate from the Guidelines. 6 Other players in the federal sentencing
system also appeared highly disinclined to change their standard operat-
ing procedures in response to Booker: probation officers kept preparing
presentence reports relying on the same sources of information as before
Booker; prosecutors and defendants kept on dickering over guideline
application issues in plea negotiations and before sentencing courts; dis-
81. See Berman, supra note 28, at 42-62 (detailing criticism of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines).
82. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The Oppor-
tunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 93 (1999) (discussing the
federal judiciary's failure to help shape federal sentencing doctrines).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-53 (1997) (per curiam) (relying heav-
ily on pre-Guideline jurisprudence to permit enhancements based on acquitted conduct); cf id. at
162 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that pre-guideline sentencing jurisprudence should not be
directly applied to a structure sentencing system). See generally Berman, supra note 10, at 669-79
(discussing the failure to update modem sentencing procedures in light of the new substance of
sentencing structures).
84. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
85. See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43
HOus. L. REV. 341 (2006); Douglas A. Booker, Perspectives on Booker's Potential, 18 FED. SENT'G
REP. 79, 79 (2005).
86. One of the first major circuit court decisions about Booker stressed these points, United
States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005), and other circuit court rulings have seemed
eager to reiterate and reinforce these points. See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519
(5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dean,
414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11 th Cir. 2005).
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
trict courts kept on relying on uncharged conduct in calculating the (now
advisory) guideline sentencing ranges; and appellate courts kept being
primarily concerned with whether guideline ranges had been properly
calculated.87
Indeed, the post-Booker era has revealed that the legal and political
culture has made the federal sentencing system almost impervious to
dramatic doctrinal change in the status of the Guidelines. Booker's
muted impact on federal sentencing practices and outcomes highlights
that the pre-Booker legal culture acclimated case-level sentencing deci-
sion-makers-judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation offi-
cers-to a rule-bound sentencing process that, through judicial fact-
finding, resulted in significant terms of imprisonment for most federal
offenders. In addition, the pre-Booker political culture was marked by
systemwide sentencing decision-makers--Congress, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, the Department of Justice-becoming astute at enforcing
compliance with a rule-bound sentencing process. Consequently, years
after Booker, we still observe (1) a federal sentencing process that re-
mains exceedingly focused on guideline calculations based on judicial
fact-finding, and (2) federal sentencing outcomes in which most sen-
tences are still imposed within the (now advisory) guideline ranges and
include significant terms of imprisonment. In short, providing another
example of status quo bias in the operation of modern sentencing sys-
tems, a culture of guideline compliance has persisted after Booker.
The Rita decision enters into the post-Booker universe appearing
almost designed to preserve the status quo. As noted before, the Rita
decision approved circuit court use of a presumption of reasonableness,
but also indirectly approved of other circuits' choice not to adopt this
presumption. 88 The Rita decision encourages a statement of reasons in
support of sentencing determinations in an advisory guideline system,
but it also holds that judges need not say much when they follow the
(status quo) Guidelines and notes that judges are naturally inclined to
state reasons for their sentencing choices in any event.89 With the Rita
decision appearing to bless the existing post-Booker universe, it is hardly
surprising that nearly every major circuit decision after Rita concludes
that the Supreme Court's work is a ratification of that circuit's pre-Rita
jurisprudence. 90
87. See Berman, Tweaking, supra note 85; see also Neil Weinberg, Lock 'Em Up, FORBES,
Jan. 30, 2006 (noting that "not much has changed" since Booker); see generally David L. McColgin
& Brett G. Sweitzer, Grid & Bear It: Post-Booker Litigation Strategies (Part I), THE CHAMPION,
Nov. 2005, available at http://www.fd.org/pdf.lib/Grid%20Bear%20I.pdf (discussing "the early
trend toward business-as-usual sentencing after Booker").
88. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007).
89. Id. at 2468-69.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Conlan, No. 06-1510, 2007 WL 2538047, at *2 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Goff, No. 05-5524, 2007 WL 2445637, at *4 (3rd Cir. 2007); United States
v. Boleware, No. 06-4108, 2007 WL 2350180, at *1-2 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. D'Anico,
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B. The Need (and Means) to Change Sentencing Perspectives
Despite the force of status quo biases, legal and political cultures
can and do evolve. Over time, innovations and dramatic developments
that are at first resisted can become the prevailing status quo that thereaf-
ter becomes favored and defended by status quo biases. Indeed, as noted
above and as detailed more fully by others,91 the federal judiciary's ini-
tial resistance to the Guidelines ultimately transformed into a surprising
affinity for intricate sentencing rules. An evolution in judicial personnel
and attitudes over the past two decades has resulted in many more federal
judges feeling much more comfortable handing out long sentences and
having their sentencing choices micro managed by general Guidelines
and appellate court review. Critically, though, these realities help ex-
plain not only why the Guidelines are still being embraced like a security
blanket after Booker, but also why those eager for improved federal sen-
tencing justice should still have hope about the current development and
future status of the federal sentencing system.
To its credit, the Rita decision emphasized (though opaquely) the
importance of sentencing rulings as reasoned decisions. Disappointingly,
the decision did not rigorously question the reasoning behind the specific
Guidelines being applied to Victor Rita. Nevertheless, the ruling still
sent an important signal that district and circuit judges should-indeed,
must-explore and contemplate the reasons for specific sentencing out-
comes. An emphasis on reasons and reasoning at federal sentencing-
especially when combined with the Rita Court's admonition that a dis-
trict court "does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply" 92-should help ensure that, over time,
the post-Booker culture of excessive guideline compliance will change
for the better.
Over time, lawyers should become more adept at emphasizing pol-
icy and case-specific reasons based on § 3553(a)'s list of factors for sen-
tences outside the Guidelines in order to encourage judges to exercise the
expanded discretion Booker bestows. Sentencing judges should, in turn,
become more skeptical of the Guidelines' least reasoned provisions as
they become more comfortable viewing the Guidelines only as advice
and look deeper into the reasons supporting (or failing to support) the
Guidelines' recommendations. The articulation and reasoned assessment
of suggested reasons for deviating from the Guidelines can and should
provide meaningful feedback for the continuous evolution of sentencing
law and policy within the Guidelines system. Indeed, as I have stressed
Nos. 05-1468, 05-1573, 2007 WL 2253494, at *10 n.10 (lst Cir. 2007); United States v. Wa-
chowiak, No. 06-1643, 2007 WL 2189561, at *1 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d
334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1314 n.l 1 (1 th Cir. 2007).
91. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 523, 524 (2007).
92. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
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in prior work,93 early proponents of guideline sentencing systems viewed
reasoned departures from the guidelines' suggested sentences to play a
fundamental part in a guideline system's development of purposeful and
principled sentencing law. According to these reformers, judicial articu-
lation and review of the reasons for deviating from the guidelines would
contribute to the development of a "common law of sentencing" and
enable judges, informed by case-specific insights, to have their say in the
evolution of principled and purposeful sentencing law and policy.
94
In order to achieve the effective and wise development of a com-
mon law of sentencing after Booker, circuit courts need to encourage
reasoned sentencing decisions by district judges and also should issue
reasonableness rulings that contribute to the reasoned development of
principled and purposeful sentencing law and policy. Unfortunately, as
noted before, many post-Booker doctrines developed by the circuit courts
have shown an affinity for the pre-Booker status quo with its inevitable
emphasis on the Guidelines rather than on the broader sentencing consid-
erations reflected in § 3553(a)'s list of factors. Circuits have often sug-
gested that few reasons need be given to support a within-guideline sen-
tence, and they have also sometimes rejected as categorically inappropri-
ate many thoughtful policy-based reasons given by district judges for
non-guideline sentences.
Though the result and some rationales in Rita may be read to sup-
port the notion that few reasons need to be given to justify a within-
guideline sentence, the tone and some dicta in Rita also support the no-
tion that sound reasons may ultimately be more important than specific
results after Booker. Further, Rita suggests that district courts can justi-
fiably vary from the Guidelines based solely on policy disagreements
with the Guidelines. Indeed, the Government's briefs to the Supreme
Court in the Gall case indicate that it reads Rita for the proposition that
"sentencing courts may impose non-Guidelines sentences based on pol-
icy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission." 95 This is an impor-
tant-and very valuable-concession by the Government given that
many circuit courts have held that below-guideline sentences could not
be based solely on policy disagreements with the Guidelines. Helpfully,
the Government stresses the importance of policy-based decisions to
93. See Berman, supra note 24.
94. See LESLIE T. WILKINS ET AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL
DISCRETION xvii (1978) (discussing value of judicial departures from the guidelines to provide "an
informational feedback loop," which "inject[s] a continuous element of self-improvement and regen-
eration into the guidelines"); O'DONNELL, supra note 75, at 59-60 (asserting that requiring specific
reasons for decisions to deviate from the guidelines' presumptive ranges provides "an ideally suited
institutional mechanism to upgrade-through the gradual development of case law-the rationale
and rationality of sentencing"); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence
Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1455 (1997).
95. Brief for the United States, Gall v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (No. 06-7949),
2007 WL 2406805, at *37 n. 11; see also id. at *32 ("[V]ariances need not be justified solely on
factual grounds but may... be based on reasoned policy considerations.").
[Vol. 85:1
REASONED SENTENCING
vary from the Guidelines being based on "reasoned policy considera-
tions": in the Government's words, "[c]onsiderations of policy, as well as
facts, can support a variance; the test is the cogency and strength of the
rationale [for a variance], not whether it is fact-based.,
96
In the pending Gall and Kimbrough cases, the Supreme Court
should continue to emphasize the importance of reasons and reasoning at
federal sentencing after Booker. The Court should particularly focus its
discussion and analysis on the text that Congress set forth in § 3553(a).
The statutory text of § 3553(a), which now formally governs federal sen-
tencing, provides a useful script and virtuous agenda for reasoned post-
Booker sentencing decision-making. As noted before, the Court in both
Booker and Rita failed to seriously engage with the text of § 3553(a), and
this fact may in part account for the Guidelines unduly dominating post-
Booker sentencing practices. With the Supreme Court setting a poor
tone, many practitioners-and, in turn, many circuit and district judges-
have failed to recognize and explore the significant guidance and helpful
insights reflected in the explicit text that Congress enacted as specific
instructions to sentencing judges. Especially given that Congress has not
seen fit to alter this text in the nearly three years since Booker was de-
cided, the Justices ought in Gall and Kimbrough to emphasize and begin
to elaborate on the centrality of this statutory text to reasoned decision
making within an advisory guideline system.
CONCLUSION
The history of modem federal sentencing reforms highlights why
evolutions in the culture surrounding federal sentencing may prove more
critical to the future of the system than any doctrinal modifications com-
ing from Congress or the Sentencing Commission. But it also provides
an important lesson for the Supreme Court as it considers another set of
sentencing cases this coming Term.
Specifically, two forefathers of federal sentencing reform-Judge
Marvin Frankel and Professor Norval Morris-stressed the fundamental
importance of reasons in the development of any sound sentencing sys-
tem. Judge Frankel closed his seminal work, Criminal Sentences: Law
Without Order, with this sentiment: "It is our duty to see that the force of
the state, when it is brought to bear through the sentences of our courts,
is exerted with the maximum we can muster of rational thought, human-
ity, and compassion., 97 And Professor Morris emphasized similar points
a few years later in this way: "Principled sentencing lies at the heart of
an effective criminal justice system. It is obvious that sentencing in-
volves a heavy responsibility and raises issues of difficulty; it thus re-
quires reasons given, critical public consideration of those reasons, criti-
96. Id. at *32; *8.
97. FRANKEL, supra note 75, at 124 (final sentence).
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cal appellate review of those reasons."98 The Justices should take these
wise sentiments to heart by emphasizing that the touchstone and hall-
mark of federal sentencing should be judicial exercise of reasoned sen-
tencing judgment in response to unique case-specific factors and broader
norms set by the Constitution and Congress.
98. Morris, supra note 75, at 275-76.
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"Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts" ac-
cording to a popular saying, variously attributed to Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, James Schlessinger, or some unknown author. The line of
cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey' and continuing most re-
cently xWith Rita v. United States2 certainly confirms the first part of the
quote. The various majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
these cases express a wide range of theories regarding the roles of juries
and judges in fact-finding and the constitutional requirements for facts
used at sentencing. Perhaps the most extreme example of a split opinion,
one can hope, was the Court's bifurcated ruling in United States v.
Booker.3 Booker's remedial opinion, which made the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") "advisory" rather than "mandatory, 4 seems
strangely irrelevant to the constitutional values underlying the merits
opinion, which concerned the importance of the jury right in finding facts
that increase punishment . District and appellate courts are now engaged
in defining what "advisory" Guidelines mean, and what procedural and
substantive requirements still attend sentencing in the federal courts.
While opinions vary, facts have an independence and objectivity
that the right empirical methods promise to reveal. Of course, consensus
on the facts and what conclusions can safely be drawn from them is still
often elusive, particularly when the facts at issue require statistical analy-
sis and interpretation. Contrary to another popular saying, statistics are
neither lies nor damn lies, but they can be used improperly and they can
be too limited to reach certain conclusions. Fortunately for social and
behavioral scientists working in law and public policy, statistics can of-
ten provide sound answers to important empirical questions that would
otherwise be left to anecdote or opinion.
t Paul J. Hofer, B.A., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1980; J.D., University of Maryland
School of Law, 1986; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1987. This work was undertaken while the
author was Senior Research Associate at the United States Sentencing Commission. He currently
conducts independent research and teaches at Johns Hopkins University. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect any policies or positions of the
United States Sentencing Commission.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
3. 543 U.S. 220, 229 (2005).
4. Id. at 245.
5. Id. at 243-45.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Statistical data have been presented to the Supreme Court since the
introduction of the famous "Brandeis Brief' in 1908.6 In Rita, the re-
spondent Department of Justice and three amici curiae-the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission (USSC), the Federal Public and Community De-
fenders with the National Association of Federal Defenders (FPCD), and
the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL)-continued this
Legal Realist tradition by providing the Court with data on an empirical
question relevant to the case: Does an appellate presumption of reason-
ableness for sentences within the guideline range have an effect on the
outcomes of appeals or on sentences imposed by the district courts?
7
Although the Court reached no conclusion on the question and suggested
that its decision did not depend on any particular answer, the question is
interesting in its own right. Knowing the effects of a presumption of rea-
sonableness could help predict the consequences of the Supreme Court's
decision to permit the courts of appeals to adopt such a presumption.
While not the subject of original data presented to the Court, the
briefs in Rita also reviewed research relevant to other empirical issues.
Most important among these were the questions of the Guidelines' effect
on unwarranted disparity and whether the Guidelines have successfully
helped to achieve the statutory purposes of sentencing. In addition, the
decision itself makes a series of empirical claims and raises important
research questions for the future. This article briefly reviews these other
empirical questions after taking a closer look at the data presented to the
Court on the effects of an appellate presumption of reasonableness.
I. THE NON-EFFECT OF THE FACTS ON THE LAW
United States v. Booker held that to avoid impinging the Sixth
Amendment jury right, the Guidelines must be advisory, not mandatory.
8
This would appear to grant sentencing judges greater discretion, com-
pared to before the decision, to sentence within or outside the guideline
range. Booker also established a "reasonableness" standard of appellate
review for sentencing decisions, which is emerging as largely equivalent
to review for abuse of discretion and different from the de novo review
that had been established by the PROTECT Act of 2003. 9 Prior to the
6. Muller v. Georgia, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Justice Brandeis, who was then acting as a
litigator, provided the Court with data on the health effects of long working hours on women. See
Brief for Respondent, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605.
7. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Brief for Petitioner at *28, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3740371; Brief for the United States at *34-39, Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 186288; Brief for the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *15-16, Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 173622; Brief for the Federal Public and Community
Defenders & the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at *12-15, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3760844; Brief
for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *5-9, Rita
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2006 WL 3742254).
8. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
9. Id. at 261.
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PROTECT Act, appellate courts had applied the abuse of discretion
standard pursuant to the 1996 Supreme Court case Koon v. United
States. 0
Just how much discretion Booker actually returned to sentencing
judges will depend on the substance and rigor of these new standards,
and how they differ from those previously in effect." It is natural to
expect that the legal changes granting judges greater discretion would
have an effect on actual judicial behavior, as Booker indeed did. 12 Con-
versely, one might expect that data concerning actual judicial behavior
might have an effect on the Court as it gives definition to the new re-
gime.
The petitioner in Rita and several of his amici assumed that appel-
late review that tended to encourage sentences within the guideline range
would have the effect of decreasing the "advisory" quality of the Guide-
lines, potentially raising the same constitutional problems that had
plagued the former "mandatory" Guidelines.13 Standards of review and
review procedures that increased the likelihood that courts of appeals
would affirm within-range sentences would consequently increase the
likelihood that sentencing judges would sentence within the guideline
range.' 4  Because that range will often have been increased by facts
found by the judge, and not the jury, review that tended to increase sen-
tences within the guideline range could raise Sixth Amendment prob-
lems.15 One could thus assume that data showing that the presumption
had the effect of increasing within-range sentences, and affirmance of
those sentences on appeal, could be relevant to the constitutional analy-
sis.
10. 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
11. In Booker, the Court excised the previous statutory standard for departures outside the
guideline range, which required judges to identify an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC in formulating the guide-
lines that should result in a sentence different from that described [by the guidelines]." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(b)(1) (2007). This standard remains, however, in the USSC's policy statement in the U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2006), which sets out grounds for departure. After
Booker, a new type of outside-the-range sentence has been recognized-a "variance"-which is not
bound by this standard but only by the statutory provisions found at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) and
whatever substantive standards emerge from reasonableness review.
12. See generally Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 433 (2007).
13. Several commentators, including this author, have questioned the substance and accuracy
of these labels. See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L.
REv 155, 156 (2005) (describing the terms as "legal jargon" and "distorted terminology" holding
"talismanic power" for some justices, but having little inherent legal effect); see also Paul J. Hofer,
Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity, or
Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 437-38 (2006) (arguing that the Guidelines met
the usual definition for "presumptive" guidelines prior to Booker and remain "presumptive" after,
with the major difference being the standard for departure or "variance," which will emerge only as
reasonableness review is given substance).
14. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007) (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note
15. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
It turns out that, as a legal matter, this assumption was wrong. Jus-
tice Breyer's majority opinion in Rita makes clear that "the presumption,
even if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find
'sentencing facts,' does not violate the Sixth Amendment."' 16 The consti-
tutional question "is only whether the law forbids a judge to increase a
defendant's sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find
(and the offender did not concede)."' 7 The presumption does not require
a within-guideline sentence, nor does it "forbid the sentencing judge
from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the
jury-determined facts standing alone.' 18 The Guidelines are still legally
advisory, even if the presumption increases the frequency that they are
followed, perhaps even to rates similar to those found in some periods
under the previous "mandatory" system.' 9 "As far as the law is con-
cerned, the judge could disregard the Guidelines" and apply a longer
sentence.20
Justice Scalia and other dissenters have not been impressed with
these legalistic niceties since they were first introduced in Booker, and
they remained unimpressed in Rita.2' When engaging in reasonableness
review, they argue, the question is under what circumstances it is permis-
sible to sentence outside the guideline range. Justice Alito argued in
Cunningham v. California,22 an earlier 2007 case involving the Califor-
nia sentencing guidelines, that if reasonableness is to have any substance,
there must be some circumstances in which it would be unreasonable to
sentence above the guideline range without finding facts in addition to
those found by the jury or conceded by the defendant.23 Those facts
would then raise the constitutional problem identified in the Booker mer-
its opinion. Justice Scalia in Rita argued in dissent that, even though
such circumstances were not present in the instant case, any reasonable-
ness review with substance will necessarily raise lingering Sixth
Amendment issues and thus should not prevail.24 He proposed a purely
procedural form of review to avoid such problems.25
Justice Souter, in dissent, showed the greatest concern with what a
presumption of reasonableness means for actual judicial behavior, and
whether it "would tend to produce guidelines sentences almost as regu-
larly as the mandatory Guidelines had done., 26 He ultimately could not
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2466.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 2467.
20. Id. at 2466 (emphasis added).
21. See id. at 2474-77 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 2487-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
22. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
23. Id. at 880 (Alito, J., dissenting).
24. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2476, 2483.
26. Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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endorse the presumption because it would contribute "gravitational pull"
to the Guidelines and move the system back toward being mandatory."
Justice Stevens, in concurrence with the majority, accepted the pre-
sumption because he found it consistent with review for abuse of discre-
tion. 8 He shared Justice Souter's view that the guidelines should not be
treated as mandatory now as they were before Booker. He doubted,
however, Justice Souter's empirical prediction that the presumption
would affect judicial behavior by exerting "gravitational pull. '29 To help
weaken any possible pull, Justice Stevens emphasized the deference
owed to all individualized sentencing decisions, whether inside the
guideline range or outside it.30 He particularly encouraged sentencing
judges to consider individual characteristics that the USSC has deemed
"not ordinarily relevant," wryly re-christening them "not ordinarily con-
sidered" under the Guidelines.3 '
These concerns about gravitational effects notwithstanding, data
about the effect of the presumption on actual judicial behavior ultimately
had no impact on the decision. Justice Breyer and the majority con-
cluded that, even if the petitioner and the amici were correct that the pre-
sumption encourages judges to sentence within the Guidelines, "we do
not see how that fact could change the constitutional calculus.
'" 32
II. THE NON-EFFECT OF THE LAW ON THE FACTS
Legally, it didn't matter whether the presumption actually affects
judicial behavior. But factually, who was correct? Does an appellate
presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline sentences affect af-
firmance and reversal rates by the appellate courts, or use of the guide-
line range by sentencing judges? This empirical question was addressed
in the briefs and the amount of data concerning it that was presented to
the court was daunting. Moreover, the various parties made conflicting
claims about what the data showed. Both because the question itself is
interesting, and because it serves as an example of the difficulties in-
volved in drawing sound conclusions from statistics, close examination
of the data in the briefs is worthwhile.
A. Appellate Decision Making
Petitioner-Defendant Victor Rita and his amici pointed to some
striking facts. Data gathered by the NYCDL showed that, of 1,152 ap-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2473-74.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2473.
32. Id. at 2467 (majority opinion).
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peals of within-guideline sentences in the post-Booker period,33 only
sixteen had been vacated by appeals courts and only one of these was
because the sentence was found substantively unreasonable.34 Fifteen
were vacated for procedural unreasonableness, usually because the sen-
tencing court did not adequately explain its reasons.35 Rita argued that
the circuits seemed to be treating within-guideline sentences as per se
reasonable, which would encourage sentencing judges to seek the safe
haven of the Guidelines and discourage sentences outside the range.
36
Citing Sentencing Commission-sponsored reports, the NYCDL argued
that sentences recommended by the Guidelines "are often greater than
necessary" to achieve the § 3553(a) statutory purposes.3 7 Suspicion
should be raised, it argued, by a "pattern in which less than .08% of ap-
pealed within-guideline sentences are reversed as substantively unrea-
sonable.
38
1. Unusual Circumstances of the Sole Within-range Reversal-
United States v. Lazenby
39
The question of whether a presumption of reasonableness contrib-
utes to the high affirmance rate of within-guideline sentences was com-
plicated, however, by the fact that the only circuit which has reversed a
within-guideline sentence on substantive grounds4° -the Eighth-had
itself adopted a presumption of reasonableness several months earlier.
4 1
The unusual circumstances of this unique case, United States v. Lazenby,
merit study to explore what has been needed to rebut the presumption.
Two female co-defendants had been involved in a methampheta-
mine manufacturing and distribution conspiracy for which they pur-
chased precursor chemicals.42 Both had a romantic relationship with the
same, more culpable co-defendant, who was already serving a lengthy
prison term.4 3 They were sentenced one month apart by different
judges.44 One received a within-guideline sentence of 87 months;45 the
33. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, supra note 7, at *3. The NYCDL data were obtained through a keyword search of Westlaw.
The FPCD used a slightly different search. Each search returned a different number of cases, which
accounts for the differences in numbers in each category. Although no bias is obvious in any of the
search procedures, it is difficult to determine which returned the most representative and complete
results.
34. Id. at *5.
35. Id.
36. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *34.
37. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, supra note 7, at *5.
38. Id.
39. 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006).
40. id. at 933-34.
41. United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005)
42. Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 929-30.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 931.
45. Id.
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other a sentence of twelve months and one day,46 substantially below the
applicable guideline range of 70-87 months.47 The Eighth Circuit stated
that "[t]he notable aspect of these appeals is the extreme disparity in the
sentences imposed on two remarkably similar participants in the same
criminal conspiracy. Moreover, a number of factors suggest that sub-
stantially greater leniency was afforded the more culpable defendant.
' 8
The circuit reversed the below-range sentence as unreasonable, not-
ing its prior ruling that "an extraordinary reduction must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances," which it found lacking in this case.49 The
within-range sentence posed a more difficult question, since it was pre-
sumed reasonable and only "highly unusual circumstances will cause this
court to conclude that the presumption has been rebutted."50 The court
found that the case was highly unusual based on several facts.51
First, even the prosecutor had stated at the sentencing hearing that
the defendants were similar. 52 The difference in their guideline ranges
was the result of different quantities of drugs stipulated in their plea
agreements; according to the pre-sentence report, these different quanti-
ties did not reflect meaningful differences in their offense conduct.
53
The defendant receiving the guideline sentence was the first of the
co-defendants to plead guilty, and she agreed to cooperate with the gov-
ernment.54 However, her testimony was not needed and no motion for a
sentence reduction based on substantial assistance was made by the
prosecutor, even though the circuit inferred that her cooperation played a
role in the guilty pleas of others.55 The circuit believed the sentencing
judge had given "too much weight" to the prosecutor's statement that she
was not authorized to seek a below-range sentence.56 Most important,
the circuit found that too little weight had been given to the "extreme
disparity between the sentences imposed on two similarly situated con-
46. Id. at 930.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 932.
49. Id. (quoting United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)). The reason-
ableness of this standard is itself the subject of a pending appeal before the Supreme Court. See
United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June
11, 2007) (No. 06-7949).





55. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5KI.I (allowing
for a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based on a defendant's "substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense .....
56. Lazenby, 439 F.3d at 934.
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spirators." 57 It thus reversed both the below-range and the within-range
sentences and remanded for re-sentencing.5
This case shows that it is possible for within-range sentences to
overcome the presumption of reasonableness and be reversed. But the
highly unusual circumstances, with the two defendants treated in the
same appeal, is likely to give little solace to defendants. And a single
example cannot answer whether the presumption makes affirmance of
within-guideline sentences more likely than they would be without a pre-
sumption. To answer this we need statistical comparisons of large num-
bers of cases.
2. Comparisons of Circuits With and Without the Presumption
The natural comparisons needed to assess the causal effects of a
presumption of reasonableness are: (1) between circuits that do and do
not have the presumption; and (2) within circuits before and after adopt-
ing the presumption. "Causal effects" is social and behavioral science
lingo, and to some it may seem more appropriate for describing billiard
balls hitting than the legal consequences of a court decision. Philoso-
phers sometimes distinguish human reasons from physical causes, and
object to analyzing human decision making in mechanistic terms. More-
over, some arguments raised by the parties and amici did not necessarily
imply that the presumption caused judicial behavior, but instead cast the
presumption more as a symptom of "institutional resistance" to Booker59
or of a "culture of guideline compliance." 60 Nevertheless, an important
underlying empirical claim in Rita's argument was that judicial behavior
would be affected by the presumption, and this implies some type of
causation. Thus, any change in behavior caused by adoption of the pre-
sumption should be reflected in affirmance and reversal rates.
Clean comparisons to test this hypothesis were hard to find, how-
ever. Because all but sixteen within-range sentences had been af-
firmed,61 these numbers were too small for meaningful comparisons
across circuits or time. Analysts had to rely on affirmance and reversal
rates for outside-the-range sentences. 62 But for these, a factor more im-
portant than whether a presumption was applied is whether the sentence
was above or below the guideline range. Potentially complicating mat-
ters even further, the identity of the party filing the appeal might also
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at * 1.
60. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *29 (quoting Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:
Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HoUS. L. REV. 341,349 (2006)).
61. See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 7, at *5.
62. See id. at *5-6 (reviewing statistical analysis of affirmance and reversal rates for sentences
outside the Sentencing Guidelines).
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have an effect. Some below-range sentences are appealed by the de-
fense, although none of these proved successful at achieving a reversal.63
Despite these difficulties, the NYCDL argued that "formal adoption
of a presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences
seems to affect the review of even those sentences not within the guide-
lines."64 Its data showed that in circuits that had adopted the presump-
tion, 47 of 51 below-range sentences appealed by the government were
vacated as unreasonable, a reversal rate of 92 percent.65 In circuits not
adopting the presumption, 13 of 20 were vacated, a reversal rate of 65
percent.66 The FPCD data were slightly different, but with the same
overall pattern: 86.2 percent reversal in government-appealed below-
range sentences in presumption circuits and 60 percent in non-
67presumption circuits.
Lost in these comparisons, however, is whether the differences be-
tween these circuits were any less prior to adoption of the presumption
by some of them. Without these comparisons, the data do not reveal
whether the presumption itself was a contributing cause of the higher
reversal rate of below-range sentences or whether the differences pre-
existed adoption of the presumption, as was argued by the Department of
Justice.
3. Comparisons of Reversal Rates for Above- and Below-Range
Sentences
Rita also argued that, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Booker, the courts of appeals were not applying the same reasonableness
standard of review "across the board. 68 This was particularly so regard-
ing sentences above the guideline range appealed by the defense com-
pared to below the guideline range appealed by the government. The
NYCDL framed these data in a larger argument that courts were not
complying with the first statutory command at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
which directs courts to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary" to comply with the statutory purposes. 69 The sentencing lit-
erature calls this the "parsimony provision," and the NYCDL argued that
63. Id. at *6 n.6 (noting that 138 below-range sentences were appealed by defendants asking
for a greater reduction).
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id. app. at 5a.
66. Id. app. at 6a.
67. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Anicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at * 13.
68. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2488 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005)).
69. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, supra note 7, at *4.
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"empirical data revealed non-parsimonious patterns in the application of
reasonableness review.,
70
The NYCDL data showed that 78.3 percent of below-range sen-
tences appealed by the government were reversed, compared to 3.5 per-
cent of above-range sentences appealed by the defense. The FPCD re-
ported the same rates, and reviewed case law to argue that below-range
sentences receive review akin to de novo, while review of above-range
sentences is "perfunctory.",
71
The problem with the statistical comparisons is that not all outside-
the-range sentences are equally likely to be appealed, and the merits of
these appeals may not be equal. Different incentives bear on defense and
prosecuting attorneys and their selection criteria for appeals are very
different. Even though there are about seven and a half times more non-
government sponsored below-range sentences than above-range sen-
tences, Rita's data showed that government appeals of below-range sen-
tences are far less frequent-just slightly more than half- than defendant
appeals of above-range sentences. 72 In other words, a much smaller por-
tion of below-range sentences are appealed by the government, and they
are likely selected for merit as well as for policy considerations.73
The difficulty of making clean inferences from appellate affirmance
and reversal rates led the USSC to exclude any comparisons of these data
from its amicus brief.74 It simply wasn't clear that the data addressed the
empirical issue before the Court. The same was not true, however, of
rates of within and outside-the-range sentences imposed by district
judges.
B. District Court Decision Making
Petitioner Rita cited rates of within-, above-, and below-guideline
sentences to argue that "[a] culture of guideline compliance has persisted
after Booker."75 Data on these rates are released quarterly by the USSC
and have provided the key measure of Booker's effects on sentencing.76
Because of the large numbers of cases involved and the long time frame
70. Id. at *5-9.
71. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at * 13, * 16-19.
72. See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note *7, app. 5a-6a.
73. A more telling comparison would be the likelihood of reversal of all above and below-
range sentences. However, data to make this comparison is not available in either the data gathered
by the Rita amici or in the regular releases of the USSC.
74. See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Suppporting
Respondent, supra note *7.
75. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *29, (citing Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note
60, at 349).
76. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, supra note 7, at *18 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 38 (Dec. 2006)).
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for which data are available, these rates can be used to assess the causal
effects of court decisions, 77 legislation, 78 and other historical factors.
And they can be used to test the effects, if any, of the adoption of a pre-
sumption of reasonableness. Again, comparisons are needed across cir-
cuits that have or have not adopted the presumption and within a circuit
before and after adoption of the presumption. The amici briefs of the
FPCD and the USSC set out to directly test the effects of the presump-
tion on sentencing judges by making these comparisons. Both briefs
used USSC data, yet they drew very different conclusions.
1. Same Facts, Different Conclusions
The USSC brief first restated the petitioner's hypothesis-that a
presumption of reasonableness renders the Guidelines effectively manda-
tory-but concluded that "the Commission's data refute that argu-
ment."79 Indeed, the USSC noted, "[i]f petitioners' theory were correct,
one would expect to see over time a significant and widening gap be-
tween the rate of below-guideline sentences in circuits with a presump-
tion of reasonableness and the rate of such sentences in circuits without a
presumption. 80  The brief then switched to a comparison of within-
system8 l sentences, which are inversely related to below-range sentences,
stating: "On the contrary, the rate at which sentencing judges impose a
sentence [within the system] in circuits that apply the presumption is
quite close to the rate in circuits that apply no presumption .... And the
difference in those rates has remained virtually unchanged.
82
The FPCD brief concluded the opposite:
77. Hofer, supra note 12. See generally Paul J. Hofer ET AL., Departure Rates and Reasons
After Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 284 (1997).
78. Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices? The
Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Freeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005)
(exploring the empirical assumptions of the Freeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21 (codified at 117 Stat.
650 (2003))).
79. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, supra note 7, at * 16.
80. Id.
81. In post-Booker data releases and testimony, the USSC has described sentences within the
guideline range combined with government-sponsored sentences below the guideline range as "con-
formance with the guidelines." See Oversight Hearing on United States v. Booker: One Year Later
- Chaos or Status Quo? Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair,
United States Sentencing Commission). The government sponsors below-range sentences for of-
fenders who substantially assist in the prosecution of other persons, or participate in a fast-track
program by pleading guilty quickly, or otherwise reach a plea agreement for a below-range sentence.
82. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, supra note 7, at * 16. The Department of Justice also argued that differences among the
presumption and non-presumption circuits predate Booker. See Brief for the United States, supra
note 7, at *38. Limitations in the Commission's ability to distinguish government-sponsored from
other below range sentences make comparisons of rates prior to 2003 problematic, however.
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The gap between the rate of below-guideline sentences imposed by
district courts in circuits that have returned the Guidelines to their
presumptive status and that in circuits that have declined to do so has
steadily widened. As of November 27, 2006, the rate in non-
presumption circuits exceeded that in presumption by 34.2%.
83
Both the USSC and the FPCD included graphs in appendices to their
briefs. Figure 1 reproduces the FPCD graph displaying a widening in
below-range rates between presumption and non-presumption circuits.
Figure 2 shows the USSC's graph, with below-range rates in presump-
tion and non-presumption circuits at the bottom and within-range rates at
the top. No widening gap is apparent in either set of lines. It is embar-
rassing for social science when different empirical conclusions are drawn
from the same data, and it is worth trying to figure out why. As usual
with statistical evidence, the devil is in the details.
Figure 1: Data from FPCD Brief
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83. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at *12.
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Figure 2: Data from USSC Brief
FEDERAL WITHIN GUIDELINE RANG EGOVERNMENT SPONSORED SENTENCES
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2. Different Methods Lead to Different Conclusions
The differences between the two graphs, and in the conclusions
drawn from them, can be explained largely by differences in the methods
used to create them.84 The FPCD was burdened with several serious data
limitations that the USSC could avoid since the USSC collects the data
and has complete access. First, since the USSC's publicly-released data
is quarterly and not monthly, the FPCD could not provide monthly data
that could more precisely pinpoint possible effects. Second, the USSC's
quarterly data releases are cumulative, i.e., they do not break out the rates
in mutually exclusive time periods. Thus, there is overlap in the periods
on the FPCD graph that makes clean comparisons impossible.
Another methodological difference concerned how to classify cir-
cuits. Some circuits had a decision adopting the presumption of reason-
ableness, others had a decision explicitly declining to adopt such a pre-
sumption, and others (and all at the beginning) had no decision either
way. As reported in the footnote to its graph, the FPCD compared cir-
cuits that had adopted a presumption, represented by the lower line in the
graph, with all others. 85 As reported in the Methodology section of the
Appendix, the USSC compared circuits that had adopted the presumption
with circuits that had held that sentences within the guideline range are
84. One difference concerned the law. The FPCD found that the Fifth Circuit became a
presumptive circuit in the case United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005). The USSC did
not classify that circuit as presumptive until several months later in United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2006).
85. Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders & the National Association of
Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 7, at app. 1.
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not presumed reasonable.86 Circuits that had reached no conclusion were
excluded from the graph.87 It is not immediately obvious which com-
parison is superior. One might expect any effect of the presumption to
be strongest in a comparison among circuits that had explicitly chosen
one way or the other. Yet the Sentencing Commission's data, which
made that comparison, showed no effect.
Another methodological issue makes drawing conclusions from the
FPCD analysis difficult. The various circuits have markedly different
below-range rates, and have had these rates for a long time. These dif-
ferences predate the adoption of the presumption and reflect a myriad of
institutional, cultural, political, and other factors. The USSC graph
divides circuits according to whether they explicitly adopted or declined
to adopt the presumption at any time. The rates for these circuits are
then compared across the entire period. The same circuits are compared
in each month. The FPCD graph divides the circuits based on whether
they had adopted the presumption by that particular time. Thus different
circuits are compared at different times on the graph.
Whenever a circuit is added to the mix, it adds to the overall rate
both any influence of the presumption and also all the other influences
that make some circuits have higher rates than others. An extreme ex-
ample helps make this clear. If the most "conservative" circuits have the
lowest below-range rates and are also the most eager to declare within-
guideline sentences presumptively reasonable, the rates earliest on the
line representing presumptive circuits would be suppressed by those cir-
cuits' overall conservatism. If less conservative circuits adopt the pre-
sumption later, the overall rate could well go up, even if the presumption
does cause rates to be suppressed to some extent. If one accepts this
example as plausible, the method used by the FPCD actually stacked the
deck against supporting its claim. But in fact, the data do not fit this
extreme example. It is difficult, however, to decipher from the FPCD
chart how the timing of the circuit decisions may have influenced the
rates, and whether the presumption itself had an independent effect. In
short, and in social science lingo, the effects of other differences among
the circuits are confounded with any possible effects of the presumption.
3. Examining Individual Circuits
One way to avoid this problem is to look at each circuit individu-
ally. The USSC brief included separate graphs for each circuit, showing
their monthly within-system and below-range rates along with a horizon-
tal line indicating the month the circuit adopted the presumption or de-
86. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, supra note 7, at app. 14a.
87. Id. at app. 14 (including data from all circuits except for the Federal Circuit).
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clined to adopt the presumption.88 Two of these graphs are included
here: the Fourth Circuit (Figure 3), from which Rita was appealed and
consistent among the circuits as having the lowest below-range rate; and
the Second Circuit (Figure 4), which has the highest below-range-rate.
Examination of these graphs and those for the other circuits included in
the brief89 demonstrates that it remains difficult to draw clear conclusions
regarding the effects of a presumption.
Figure 3: Fourth Circuit
FEDERAL WITHIN RANGE/GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SENTENCES
AND BELOW RANGE SENTENCES BY CIRCUIT
(February 1, 2005, through September 30, 2006)
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88. Id. at app. 1-13.
89. The full set of graphs for each circuit, along with the rest of the USSC's brief, can be
found at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/USSC / 20Amicus / 2OBriefNos6-561806-5754.pdf.
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Figure 4: Second Circuit
FEEERAL WITHIN GUIDELINE RANGE/GOVERNMENT SPONSORED SENTENCES
AND BELOW RANGE SENTENCES BY CIRCUIT
(February 1, 2005, through September 30, 2006)
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In the Fourth Circuit, the rate declines after the presumption was
adopted.90 In the Second Circuit, it appears lower after the presumption
was rejected.91 In the Third Circuit, not shown here, there is a similar
counter-hypothesis trend.92 In others there is no obvious effect at all, or
the post-presumption rate appears to continue a pre-existing downward
trend, or the data are too few or too volatile to draw any conclusions.
The most precise thing one can say is that there is no obvious effect.
4. The Advantages of a More Rigorous Statistical Test
So-called "graphical analysis"-just looking at the graphs to see if
anything jumps out at you--can sometimes work to draw sound causal
conclusions.93 This is especially true if the effect one is looking for is
very strong and thus obvious. Where the effect is weak and different
circuits show different tendencies, any overall effect of the presumption
can easily be missed. It would be a more powerful test of the hypothesis
if data from all the circuits could somehow be examined at once.
90. See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 7, at app. 5.
91. Id. at app. 3.
92. Id. at app. 4.
93. See Hofer, supra note 12.
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The statistical method multivariate regression can disentangle any
effect of the presumption from other pre-existing differences between the
circuits and also from any unknown influences that may have affected
rates in all circuits month-to-month. It also compares all the circuits at
once, and tests whether any difference between presumption and non-
presumption circuits is sufficiently great to rule out chance as a possible
explanation. Unfortunately, from a scientific perspective, no party or
amici used this method in their submissions to the Court. From a legal
and practical perspective, this may be understandable because most law-
yers and judges are unfamiliar with the method and uncomfortable rely-
ing on its results. A knowledge gap exists between the statistical skills of
most lawyers and judges and the skills needed to apply and understand
the best methods for answering empirical questions embedded in the
law.
94
A multivariate analysis was not presented to the Supreme Court,
and the justices were left with competing claims and less-than-ideal data
and methods to resolve them. Perhaps it is best that the majority de-
cided, as discussed in Part I, that the actual effects on judicial behavior of
adoption of the presumption were of no constitutional significance.
Hopefully, the conflicting and complicated statistical findings on this
empirical issue did not themselves influence the Justices to reject the
significance of the question. Legal Realists, who pioneered empiricism
and the Brandeis Brief, have always believed that legal decisions are best
made in light of the facts.
5. The Effect and Non-Effect of Legal Doctrine on Sentencing Be-
havior
Some lawyers are reluctant to believe that Supreme Court decisions
on apparently important legal questions sometimes do not make any dif-
ference in practice. Such was the case with an earlier Supreme Court
decision that set a nationwide standard for review of sentences outside
the guideline range, Koon v. United States.95 Koon established the
"abuse-of-discretion" standard for appellate review of guideline depar-
96tures. Attorneys in the Department of Justice subsequently blamed
Koon for an increase in downward departures and argued that re-
establishment of a de novo standard-which was accomplished in the
PROTECT Act but undone by Booker-was needed to bring the non-
government sponsored below-range rate back down.97 In fact, although
94. For an early and comprehensive exploration of this issue, see generally John Monahan &
Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
95. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
96. Id. at 99-100.
97. Child Pornography & Abduction Prevention, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 17-18 (2003) (statement of
Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Att'y General). See generally William W. Mercer, Assessing
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the downward departure rate did increase after Koon, the data show that
the increase was the continuation of a long-term trend that predated Koon
and was likely based on a variety of factors and little influenced by Koon
itself.98
Looking at the history of below-range rates under the Guidelines, it
is apparent that sometimes legislation and court decisions have affected
below-range rates and sometimes they have not.99
There was a long-term and gradual increase in below-range sen-
tences for the first dozen years after implementation of the Guidelines.' 00
Then, remarkably, the trend was reversed around 2001.101 This reversal
took place before enactment of the PROTECT Act, the sentencing sec-
tions of which were specifically designed to decrease non-government
sponsored below-range sentences. The PROTECT Act doubtless con-
tributed to the downward trend in below-range sentences that continued
until the decision in Booker, but it was itself a reflection of an institu-
tional shift at the Department of Justice that occurred with the change in
presidential administrations. For better or worse, the Department of Jus-
tice and U.S. Attorneys around the country set out to enforce the guide-
line range more vigorously, and these efforts were reflected in the sen-
tencing data. 1
02
Unlike Koon, Booker had an immediate and dramatic effect on sen-
tences. The rate of both non-government sponsored below-range sen-
tences and above-range sentences approximately doubled compared to
the PROTECT Act era, restoring the below-range rate to a level similar
to earlier in the guideline era.'0 3 In the most recent quarters, the rate has
held steady been twelve percent. 1°4 The rate of above-range sentences in
the most recent quarters is 1.5 percent.1
0 5
Compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Significance of Improved Data Collection and
Reporting, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 43 (2003) (observing that non-substantial assistance downward
departures increased significantly after Koon).
98. Mark T. Bailey, Note, Feeney's Folly: Why Appellate Courts Should Review Departures
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Deference, 90 IOWA L. REV. 269, 295-300 (2004)
(noting that the government rarely appealed downward departures after Koon but was highly suc-
cessful when it did, and arguing that Koon had little effect on departure rates); Paul J. Hofer ET AL.,
supra note 77, at 284-86, 290.
99. See Hofer, supra note 13 at 427-29, 431-34 (for a graph and further discussion of long-
term trends).
100. Id. at 428-29 (including Figure 1: Monthly Rates of In-Range and Out-of-Range Sen-
tences).
101. Id.
102. For a discussion of the Department of Justice's institutional relationship with the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Sci-
ence of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005).
103. Hofer, supra note 13, at 433.
104. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (2ND
QUARTER RELEASE PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2007 DATA THROUGH MARCH 31, 2007) 1 (tbl. 1)
(2007), http://www.ussc.gov/sc cases/Quarter Report 2Qrt_07.pdf (last visited September 15,
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While Booker increased the rate of below-range sentences based on
mitigating factors identified by the sentencing judge, the most common
reasons for sentencing outside the guideline range have always been gov-
ernment-sponsored. In the early years of the Guidelines, this was due to
a government motion for a sentence reduction to reward an offender's
substantial assistance in the prosecution of other persons,10 6 or for other
reasons included as part of a plea agreement with the defendant. The
PROTECT Act added a new reason-the defendant's participation in an
"early disposition program," which rewards an offender for pleading
guilty quickly and foregoing other procedural rights. 0 7 In the most re-
cent quarter, 25.1 percent of offenders received a below-range sentence
for one of these government-sponsored reasons.10 8  Clearly, the most
important influences on within-range rates are not the legal standards
governing appellate review of judge-initiated departures, but the policies
and programs of the Department of Justice.
6. The Likely (Non-) Effect of Rita
Is the effect of Rita likely to be substantial like Booker or weak like
Koon? The best guess is weak. In part, this is supported by the absence
of an obvious effect of the presumption in the circuits. In part, it is be-
cause of the weakness of the decision itself. The court majority appeared
determined to underscore the unimportance of the presumption, describ-
ing it as "non-binding" and contrasting it with evidentiary presumptions
that shoulder one party with a burden of persuasion or proof. Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion also makes clear that he endorses the pre-
sumption because it is consistent with the deference owed to the deci-
sions of sentencing judges. He emphasizes, however, that similar defer-
ence is owed to their decisions to sentence outside the guideline range,
raising a question of what exactly the presumption means for substantive
review.
The decision in Rita seems weak and somewhat strange in another
way: While the petition for certiorari was granted in the face of a conflict
in the circuits, the decision doesn't appear to resolve the conflict. The
decision states that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of rea-
sonableness.'0 9 But the courts do not appear required to do so. One
commentator has noted that this lack of resolution of the circuit conflict
2007). The Commission releases new quarterly figures on its website, www.ussc.gov, as soon as
they become available.
105. Id.
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5KI.1; see also Stephanos
Bibas, Criminal Law: The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to
Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 299-300 (2004) (noting that the largest class of
downward departures consists of § 5K1.1 motions).
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § 5K3.1.
108. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note
104, at 1 tbl.l.
109. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
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the case was chosen to address seems unusual, if not unique, in the an-
nals of Supreme Court jurisprudence.1"0 It is even more odd given that
reducing unwarranted disparity is the primary goal of the sentencing
Guidelines. As it stands, Rita's effect is likely to be similar to Koon in
another way: it will perpetuate marked differences among the circuits in
their rates of below-range sentences.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to permit, but not require, a presumption of
reasonableness for a within-guideline sentence is likely to have little ef-
fect. But this is not to say there would have been no effect if the decision
had come out the other way. Indeed, the empirical question briefed in
Rita was in some respects beside the point. The important question was
not the effect of adopting the presumption in the circuits, but the effect of
the Supreme Court adopting or rejecting the presumption. The drug
would not have equal dosage regardless of the doctor, nor is its strength
necessarily equal whether it is given or taken away.
If the Court in Rita had rejected a presumption of reasonableness for
within-guideline sentences, it would have rejected the arguments the
government and the USSC had made in support of it. Chief among these
were that the Guidelines remain central in federal sentencing and that
they deserve substantial weight because they reflect the Sentencing Com-
mission's considered judgment of the best way to achieve the statutory
purposes of sentencing found in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)."' Included in this
general argument are a number of specific empirical questions that are
ultimately of far greater consequence than the effects of a presumption of
reasonableness because they concern the foundations of the Guidelines
and their success at achieving the purposes of sentencing and the goals of
sentencing reform.
A. Empirical Bases of Guideline Development and Amendment
One of these specific questions concerns the empirical basis for the
Guidelines. Justice Breyer was, of course, present at the creation as a
Sentencing Commissioner. In Rita he repeats his oft-told tale of the phi-
losophical dilemmas that caused problems for the original Sentencing
Commission until it turned to an "empirical approach" to Guideline de-
velopment. Based on a statistical analysis of 10,000 cases sentenced in
the years immediately preceding their work, the USSC set the initial
guideline ranges on the sentence that had been imposed for various cate-
gories of offenses and offenders."l 2 In this manner, they expected the
110. Posting of Peter Goldberger to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusbiog.com/movabletype/
archives/2007/06/anotherview_of.html (June 21, 2007, 08:48 PM).
111. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463.
112. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1988); see also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh,
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Guidelines to largely reflect average past practice. Though the goals of
uniformity and proportionality often conflict, the Sentencing Commis-
sion developed a practical system that it believed sensibly reconciled the
two ends. Because of this history, Justice Breyer writes in Rita that
"[t]he Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing Commis-
sion examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the help
of many others in the law enforcement community." 113  He goes on to
explain that the "Commission's work is ongoing," and that "[t]he statutes
and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by
the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process.""1 4  He de-
scribes how the amendment process will proceed through examination of
judges' stated reasons for departure, circuit court review of those rea-
sons, and through "advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement
groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others."
'"15
A lot has happened since Justice Breyer left the Sentencing Com-
mission. Absent from his description of the Commission's work is any
discussion of the role played by mandatory minimum penalty statutes,
specific directives from Congress to the Sentencing Commission to in-
crease penalties or set them at particular levels, or the many other ways
that Congress has shaped the present Guidelines. 16 This absence leaves
unanswered important questions about how judges are to treat guideline
ranges that do not reflect past practice or any of the laudatory guideline
The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 35-51 (2003) (discussing how the philosophy of the Guidelines was
shaped, and obscured, by the guideline development process).
113. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
114. Id.
115. Id. To support his account of the Guidelines' development and amendment process,
Justice Breyer cites § lB 1.10(c) of the Guidelines manual, which lists 24 amendments that the USSC
has chosen to apply retroactively. Id. To date, the USSC has promulgated over 700 amendments, a
large proportion in response to acts of Congress. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING (AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM) (2004) app. B (B-1
to B-9), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/1 5_year_studyfull.pdf. Justice Breyer also cites
§ 1 A 1.1, commentary, which contains an account of the empirical guideline development process
similar to that described by Justice Breyer in Rita. 127 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 11, § IA1.1). It is worth noting, however, that as part of the
amendments made pursuant to the PROTECT Act, this comment was moved to a unique new sec-
tion, "Historical Review of Original Introduction." This was done in part because the note no longer
reflected the realities of the present Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 11, § 1ALI..
116. Justice Breyer is consistent in neglecting the influence of Congress. His seminal article
on the development of the Guidelines devotes several pages to the USSC's decision to increase
penalties for white collar offenses above average past practice. See Breyer, supra note 112. These
levels have long since been increased further, most recently by Congressional directives in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act. But he mentions only in passing, and in a footnote, that the penalties for drug
trafficking offenses were set far above average past practice in order to incorporate the mandatory
minimum statutory penalties enacted by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See id. at 24
n. 121. The decision to incorporate the mandatory minimum penalties in the manner that it did had a
more profound effect on the federal prison population, and on the lives of many tens of thousands of
defendants, than any other decision of the original USSC. This impact was dramatically under-
estimated by the USSC at the time the Guidelines were implemented. See id. at 24.
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amendment processes envisioned in the Sentencing Reform Act, but in-
stead the will of Congress expressed through the medium of the sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Next term's case involving the Guideline for trafficking
in crack cocaine, Kimbrough v. United States,117 will give the Court an
opportunity to weigh in on this crucial question.
B. Empirical Evaluation of the Guidelines
The ultimate questions-part empirical, part policy-involve the re-
lationship between the Guidelines, the statutory purposes of sentencing,
and the goals of sentencing reform. Much of the argument in Rita con-
cerned if and how the USSC incorporated these purposes, and how well
the Guidelines are achieving them.
Sentencing reform was undertaken to a large degree to reduce un-
warranted disparity. The Rita briefs summarize research to evaluate the
Guidelines' success at achieving this goal. But again, different parties
looked at the same evidence and reached different conclusions. Peti-
tioner Rita cited the USSC's own research on the effects of pre-
sentencing stages on sentencing disparity, on regional disparity, and on
the adverse impact on black offenders of particular guideline provisions
such as that concerning crack cocaine. 1 8 He concluded that the Guide-
lines had "only partially achieved" the reduction of unwarranted dispar-
ity.1l9 The Department of Justice and the USSC, however, cited different
sections of the same report to argue that the Guidelines had reduced dis-
parity from the source at which they were primarily targeted-judicial
discretion.
120
At this point, the USSC's argument took a turn away from empiri-
cism and toward a matter of definitions. "In focusing on disparities like
the crack/powder ratio, petitioners misapprehend the intended purpose of
§ 3553(a)(6)," 12' which is the statutory provision directing judges to con-
sider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct." Disparity that is mandated by Congress, the brief argued, cannot
by definition be unwarranted. Moreover, regional or other disparities
caused by prosecutorial decisions, such as charge bargaining, "cannot be
considered unwarranted disparity within the meaning of §
117. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-
6330).
118. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *36-37 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 115, at 135, 141-43).
119. Id. at 36.
120. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING, supra note 115, at 94-99.
121. Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, supra note 7, at *27.
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3553(a)(6)"122 , even though the USSC has taken measures to reduce such
disparity (with limited success).
With these arguments, the debate has been removed from the realm
of empiricism and placed firmly on the ground of semantics. Even if the
objective facts about the Guidelines' effects on disparity are clear, no
consensus on the Guidelines' success can emerge until agreement is
reached on the meaning of "unwarranted." Nor can "disparity" be de-
fined without consensus on the purposes of punishment and the priorities
among them. 123 Judging from the briefs in Rita, this consensus is as far
away as ever.
C. Empirical Questions About Individual Guidelines
Finally, the majority opinion in Rita may contain an invitation for
judges to entertain arguments and take evidence on a type of challenge to
the Guidelines that raises empirical questions at the heart of sentencing
practice. Defendants and prosecutors have argued, with some success,
that extraordinary circumstances can make the guideline range ineffec-
tive or disproportionate in a particular case, and that an outside-the-range
sentence is needed. 24 Rita seems to invite a more general challenge-
that a particular guideline is ineffective or disproportionate in a wide
range, or even the majority, of cases to which it linguistically applies. In
short, that the Guideline itself represents unsound policy.
To date, the courts of appeals have not looked favorably on these
"categorical challenges." But Justice Breyer may be asking them to look
again. He lists the kinds of arguments a judge might hear that the guide-
line sentence should not apply to a case:
[P]erhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the case at
hand falls outside the "heartland" to which the Commission intends
individual Guidelines to apply .... perhaps because the Guidelines
sentence itselffails properly to reflect the § 3553(a) considerations,
or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence regard-
less. 125
Later, the opinion describes the kinds of reasons sentencing judges need
to articulate for the sentences they impose: If it is clear that a judge rests
her decision upon the USSC's own reasoning, she need say very little.
126
But, if "a party contests the Guidelines sentence generally under
§ 3553(a)-that is, argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judg-
122. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
123. Hofer, supra notes 12, 13, and 77.
124. See generally Regina Stone-Harris, How to Vary from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Without Being Reversed, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 183 (2007).
125. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2461, 2465 (2007) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 2468.
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ment, or, for example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant
,127 ,2characteristics in the proper way," then more explanation is needed. 8
Could it be that in Rita the Court is inviting the lower courts to hear
evidence that particular Guidelines are not working to achieve the statu-
tory purposes? Only time, and perhaps the upcoming opinion in
Kimbrough, will tell. If it turns out the Court is now open to categorical
challenges of the type many commentators have long encouraged,129 Rita
may be just the beginning of empirical evidence on sentencing questions
presented to the Court.
127. Id.
128. All this makes more intriguing the opinion's description of the effects of a presumption of
reasonableness for the guideline sentence: "Nor does the presumption reflect strong judicial defer-
ence of the kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert agency
than to a district judge." Id. The facts being referred to in this passage do not sound like facts about
the case, but facts of the type also relevant to the USSC. In other words, empirical facts about the
effects of the Guidelines and its success or failure at achieving its purposes.
129. For the earliest example of this "administrative law" approach to departures, see Ronald
F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentenc-
ing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 50-55 (1991); see also United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 365,
373 (D. Mass. 2005) (arguing for judges to compensate for the USSC's exclusion from the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act by developing a common law of sentencing that correlates particular guide-
lines with the statutory purposes); Joseph Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity Congress ": A Call
for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 1199, 1239-
40, 1255-67 (1999). For an argument that a more radical change in sentencing guidelines is needed,
with a different type of judicial review, see Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentenc-
ing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 224-
29 (2005).
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RITA, DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION, AND FAIRNESS IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
LYNN ADELMAN t & JON DEITRICH t t
INTRODUCTION
In Rita v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that a sentence
within a properly calculated advisory guideline range is, on appeal, enti-
tled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.2 While Rita spoke
primarily to appellate courts, which under United States v. Booker3 must
review sentences for "unreasonableness, '4 the decision also assured dis-
trict court judges that the Guidelines truly are advisory and that they re-
tain considerable discretion to impose non-guideline sentences. To the
extent the Rita Court emphasized that in the post-Booker era district
courts have discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines, Rita is a plus in
the ongoing effort to achieve greater fairness in federal sentencing.
The Sentencing Reform Act and the rigid guideline regime it ush-
ered in have not produced fairness, and the only way to ameliorate the
harmful effects of the present system is for district courts to exercise
greater discretion. In this article, we discuss Rita and urge district courts
to exercise the discretion it reaffirms. We also discuss the present sen-
tencing landscape and some of the obstacles that courts and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission ("Commission") will have to overcome if they are
to achieve greater fairness.
I. RITA AND DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION
In the immediate aftermath of Booker,5 two schools of thought
emerged. The first held that Booker represented an opportunity for dis-
trict judges to, after a long hiatus, again play an important role in sen-
t District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; B.A.,
Princeton University, 1961; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1965.
tt Law Clerk, Judge Lynn Adelman; Adjunct Professor of Law, Marquette University Law
School; B.A., Susquehanna University, 1992; J.D., Marquette Law School, 1995.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
2. Id. at 2462.
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. Id. at 261.
5. Although those interested enough in the topic to read this article surely need no reminder,
Booker held that the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment be-
cause they required judges to base sentences on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 236-37. As a remedy, a different majority of the Court
excised those provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that required judges to follow the Guidelines,
rendering them "effectively advisory." Id. at 245 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and
Ginsberg, J., in part).
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tencing instead of simply calculating and applying the Guidelines; 6 the
second, believing that the Commission took all relevant factors into ac-
count when it came up with the Guidelines, held that courts should con-
tinue to follow the Guidelines in all but extraordinary cases.7 The posi-
tion of the second school later morphed into the notion that appellate
courts should "presume" that sentences within the advisory guideline
range were reasonable, subject to rebuttal by the defendant.8 Most fed-
eral circuits adopted this view,9 and in Rita, the Supreme Court addressed
it.
Rita held that appellate courts could apply a presumption of reason-
ableness to within-range sentences. However, the Court based its deci-
sion on a rationale somewhat different from that articulated by lower
courts. The Court did not uphold the presumption on the ground that the
Commission had already considered all of the sentencing factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).' 0 Rather, the Court held that:
The presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is
considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sen-
tencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That
double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one.II
Thus, under Rita, the district court must first independently apply
the § 3553(a) factors and determine the appropriate sentence. The pre-
sumption of reasonableness arises only if the judge (specifically) and the
Commission (generally) separately reach the conclusion that a guideline
sentence is proper. The Rita Court also clarified that "the presumption is
not binding. It does not, like a trial-related evidentiary presumption, in-
sist that one side or the other shoulder a particular burden of persuasion
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005).
8. Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sen-
tencing After United States v. Booker, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 32-33 (discussing the genesis
of the presumption); see, e.g., United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (adopt-
ing the presumption based on the Commission's expertise and the belief that Guidelines remained
"an essential tool in creating a fair and uniform sentencing regime across the country"). Fortunately,
the appellate courts rejected the notion that district courts should presume the guideline sentence to
be the correct one. See, e.g., United States v. Demarce, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
judge is not required--or indeed permitted, United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cit.
2006)-to 'presume' that a sentence within the guidelines range is the correct sentence and if he
wants to depart give a reason why it's not correct."), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.
2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415
F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cit. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).
10. The most the Court would say is that "it is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as
practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives."
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464-65 (2007).
11. Id. at 2463 (emphasis omitted).
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or proof lest they lose their case."' 2 In this respect also, the Court dealt
with the presumption differently than some lower courts, which had re-
quired defendants to demonstrate the unreasonableness of guideline sen-
tences. 
13
Further, although Rita endorsed a presumption of reasonableness on
appeal (and praised the Commission's work), it did not suggest that dis-
trict courts must or should follow the Guidelines. First, the Court
stressed that the presumption of reasonableness applies at the appellate
level only; "the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal
presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply." 14  The Court
noted that district judges may consider non-guideline sentences when
"the case at hand falls outside the 'heartland' to which the Commission
intends individual Guidelines to apply, USSG § 5K2.0, perhaps because
the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) consid-
erations, or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence re-
gardless."' 5 Second, the Court stated that the "fact that we permit courts
of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that
courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness" for non-guideline
sentences.16 Thus, while the Court acknowledged that the presumption
may encourage judges to sentence within the range, it carefully avoided
intimating that sentences outside the range were in any way suspect.
II. POST-RITA CHALLENGES
A. Establishing Collaboration Between Courts and the Commission
Rita represents another effort by the Court to promote both the sen-
tencing Guidelines and the exercise of discretion by district courts.'
7
Although there is a surface tension between the Guidelines and judicial
discretion, the tension is more apparent than real. As Rita notes, the
Guidelines need not be static.' 8 The original idea behind the Guidelines
was that courts and the Commission would interact and improve sentenc-
ing practices through criticism and collaboration. 19  District courts
would, in sentencing, depart (pre-Booker) or impose non-guideline sen-
tences (post-Booker) and in doing so would offer critiques of particular
Guidelines. 20 The Commission would in turn collect and examine dis-
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 454 F.3d 743, 751 (7th Cit. 2006) ("A defendant chal-
lenging such a sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable.").
14. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2467.
17. The Court first attempted this in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99, 106 (1996)
(holding that appellate courts should review departures from the Guidelines for abuse of discretion
only, and that only the Commission, not the appellate courts, could decide what sorts of sentencing
considerations are always inappropriate).
18. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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trict court decisions, obtain additional input, and modify the Guidelines
appropriately.2'
Unfortunately, things did not work out as contemplated, either pre-
or post-Booker. Pre-Booker, appellate courts enforced the Guidelines
"more rigidly than anyone predicted or than the relevant statutes ap-
pear[ed] to require' 22 and made it unreasonably difficult for district
courts to depart.23 Thus, the Guidelines failed to evolve (other than as a
"one-way ratchet" as the Commission promulgated amendment after
amendment increasing sentencing ranges). 24 Even after Booker, appel-
late courts continued to police the exercise of district court discretion (at
least to impose sentences below the Guidelines) with unwarranted zeal.25
Nor did district courts distinguish themselves post-Booker. One
might have expected district courts to eagerly exercise their newfound
discretion, but generally speaking, they did not do so. A number of fac-
tors contributed to the sluggishness of district courts in acclimating to the
new regime. First, until recently, it appeared that the new regime might
not last long. Powerful Congressmen threatened to re-impose mandatory
guidelines in one form or another if district courts got out of line.26 And,
the Attorney General promoted proposals to overturn Booker.2 7 Second,
most judges on the bench have little or no sentencing experience except
under mandatory guidelines and were not used to exercising discretion in
sentencing. Finally, the fact that it is easier to sentence within the Guide-
lines may also have disinclined judges to exercise discretion.
Post-Rita, all parties to the sentencing process, the Commission, and
appellate and district courts, must redouble their efforts to make the col-
21. See id.
22. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 83 (2003).
23. The so-called Feeney Amendment, which replaced Koon's abuse of discretion standard
with de novo review of departures, made departures even more difficult. See PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 667-70 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §
3742(e) (2007)).
24. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal ofBlakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 260 (2004)
("The process of making sentencing rules by commission, which was designed, perhaps over opti-
mistically, to minimize the influence of narrowly political concerns, has become a one-way upward
ratchet. Raising Guideline sentencing levels is common and easy. Lowering them is difficult and
scarcely ever done.").
25. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentenc-
ing: Introduction, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 269, 270 (2006) (stating that "an overall assessment reveals that
the appellate courts are mostly ensuring that the Guidelines still have sufficient teeth to be treated as
nearly mandatory in practice"); see also United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 960 (8th Cir.
2006) (Bye, J., dissenting) (noting that the circuit court had reversed twenty-five below-guideline
sentences and affirmed only four, while affirming sixteen above-guideline sentences and reversing
only one).
26. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hillier, II, Letter from Federal Defenders Concerning H.R. 1528, 17
FED. SENT'G REP. 319,319-20 (2005).
27. Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich, AG's Misguided Proposals, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 2005,
at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id
=l 126861513487.
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laborative process work. If, as we believe, Booker and now Rita repre-
sent the last best chance of developing a common law of sentencing,
district courts in particular must do a better job of developing such law.
They can only do this by exercising their discretion to impose non-
guideline sentences and by explaining their reasons for doing so. And
the Commission in turn must begin to listen to the district judges when
they sentence outside the Guidelines.
B. Recognizing the Consequences of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
Guidelines
Although a detailed critique of the Guidelines is outside the scope
of this article, we make two general observations about the current fed-
eral sentencing system. It is critical that parties interested in federal sen-
tencing keep in mind how the present system came about and what its
effects have been. Only by honestly evaluating what we have now will
we be able to make improvements.
1. Racial Impact
Some of the early sentencing reformers perceived the then-existing
discretionary system as leading to arbitrariness and unfairness in sentenc-
ing and wanted to address these problems.28 But others had different
motives. As Professor Naomi Murakawa has shown, sentencing "re-
form" ran on a parallel track with post-civil rights racial politics. 29 The
Sentencing Reform Act, which created the framework for mandatory
federal sentencing, fit squarely within the anti-judge themes of the reac-
tionary post-Brown v. Board of Education30 movement-judges cannot
be trusted, judges improperly rely on squishy sociological evidence to
excuse bad behavior, and liberalized racial policies, to which judges con-
tribute, generate more crime.31 Professor Murakawa writes:
By the time Congress gave its final roll-call votes on the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, the narratives of discontent about judicial dis-
cretion had been in place for three decades, beginning sharply with
southern Democrats' criticism of Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 and gaining momentum after seemingly pro-Communist and
pro-criminal Supreme Court decisions. Criticisms of judges in the
1950s and 1960s informed the criticisms that continued through the
1970s and 1980s. Recall the three arguments launched against
judges after Brown: judges abuse their power, judges worship socio-
28. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-11 (1973).
29. Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How Con-
gress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 473, 480-81
(2006); see also Glenn C. Loury, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison? Race and the Transforma-
tion of Criminal Justice, BOSTON REVIEW, July/August 2007, at 1, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR32.4/article-loury.php (discussing a "front-lash" in which opponents of
civil rights sought to gain the upper hand by shifting to a new issue-crime).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Murakawa, supra note 29, at 483-86.
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logical evidence, and judges disregard the beneficial constraints of
Jim Crow. These arguments, issued first in debates over racial inte-
gration in the context of low crime rates, had lasting power three
decades later in debates over sentencing reform and crime control.
Some supporters of Sentencing Guidelines emphasized a fairness ra-
tionale, such as northern Democrat Senator Kennedy. But other sup-
porters of Sentencing Guidelines revealed a far more complex ration-
ale, such as southern Democrat Senator McClellan and Republican
Senator Thurmond.
32
The Guidelines responded to the first count of the reactionaries' in-
dictment-that judges were out of touch and abused their power-by
mandating strict adherence to the sentencing ranges adopted by the
Commission. Indeed, as Professor Murakawa notes: "During final de-
bates over the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supporters of Sentencing
Guidelines trumpeted judicial incompetence as a truism. ' 33  Similarly,
the Guidelines responded to the second count of the indictment of
judges-that they relied on sociological evidence-by prohibiting sen-
tencing judges from considering why an offender may have committed a
crime. The Guidelines removed from the sentencing equation any con-
sideration of motive or circumstance, as well as most aspects of the de-
fendant's character and background3 4 Sentencing courts could consider
only "objective" measures of "harm" on one axis and criminal history
scores on the other.
35
As Professor Murakawa also points out, the third count of the in-
dictment of judges-that they "generate crime by loosening the benefi-
cial constraints of Jim Crow-holds a subtle and complex connection to
sentencing and crime policy. ' 36 We accuse no one of racism, but no fair-
minded person can consider the results of the sentencing Guidelines
without noticing their racial dimension. In the post-civil rights era, when
the country has made genuine progress towards racial equality in many
areas, "the racial composition of prisons fully reversed, with prisons
turning from seventy percent white in 1950 to seventy percent black and
Latino in 2000.",3  Not only has the racial identity of most prisoners
changed, so has the length of sentences offenders of different races re-
ceive. The Commission acknowledges that racial disparity in federal
sentencing has worsened since promulgation of the Guidelines. In its
recent Fifteen Year Report, the Commission stated that the "gap between
white and minority offenders was relatively small in the preguidelines
32. Id. at 489.
33. Id. at 490.
34. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 5HI.l--5H.12 (2006).
35. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
36. Murakawa, supra note 29, at 492.
37. Id. at 492-93; see also Loury, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that the extent of racial disparity
in imprisonment rates is greater than in any other area of American life).
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era.'38 However, "[c]ontrary to what might be expected at the time of
guidelines implementation . . . the gap between African American of-
fenders and other groups began to widen." 39 Today, the average sentence
for a black defendant is about 25 percent higher than for a white defen-
dant.40
The Commission's research suggests that disparate treatment by
judges accounts for little if any of this disparity.41 Rather, it appears that
the disparity is the result of sentencing rules that have a disproportionate
impact on minorities.42 In particular, the law's treatment of one gram of
crack cocaine as equal to one hundred grams of powder cocaine43 and the
career offender guideline, which mandates much higher sentences for
defendants who have certain prior convictions, have had a racial im-
pact.44 The Fifteen Year Report concludes:
The evidence shows that if unfairness continues in the federal sen-
tencing process, it is more an "institutionalized unfairness" built into
the sentencing rules themselves rather than a product of racial stereo-
types, prejudice, or other forms of discrimination on the part of
judges .... Today's sentencing policies, crystalized into the sentenc-
ing guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes, have a greater im-
pact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account by
judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior to
guidelines implementation. Attention might fruitfully be turned to
asking whether these new policies are necessary to achieve any le-
gitimate purpose of sentencing.
45
Thus, the data suggest that judges did better in treating offenders of
different races equally without guidelines. And, racial disparity-the
most pernicious sort-has worsened under the system ostensibly de-
38. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
(AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM) 115 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_yearstudyfull.pdf. [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT].
39. Id
40. See id. at 16.
41. See id. at 127.
42. See id. at 131.
43. Id. at 131-32. The Controlled Substances Act and the Guidelines treat one gram of crack
cocaine the same as one hundred grams of powder cocaine, despite the fact that the two substances
are pharmacologically indistinguishable. See United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777-82
(E.D. Wis. 2005). To its great credit, the Commission has sought to rectify this imbalance. Id. at
781.
44. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 38, at 133-34. The Commission has suggested that
African-Americans are more likely to be subject to this guideline because easily detected drug of-
fenses taking place in open-air drug markets are more likely to occur in impoverished minority
neighborhoods. Id. The Commission has also noted that basing career offender status on prior drug
convictions actually makes the Guidelines a less accurate measure of recidivism. Id. at 134. We
suspect that in the "old days" a judge confronted with an African-American offender with two petty
drug delivery cases on his record would decline to give those priors substantial weight. Now, the
judge must sentence that defendant under the career offender guideline, which typically produces a
range of fifteen years or more, often two to three times as long as the range otherwise.
45. Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
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signed to stamp out unwarranted disparity.46 These unpleasant but un-
avoidable facts further indicate the importance of restoring judicial sen-
tencing discretion and of judges being more willing to exercise such dis-
cretion. At least in the immediate future, we see no other way of amelio-
rating the dismaying effects of our present sentencing policies.
2. Harshness
With the advent of the Guidelines, the length of the average federal
sentence rose from twenty-eight months to fifty months.47 Although the
Commission originally stated that it based the guideline ranges largely on
past sentencing practices, its methodology immediately tilted sentences
higher. The Commission decided "to calculate average pre-guideline
sentences by counting only incarcerative sentences, ''48 thus ignoring the
fact that in many cases courts imposed sentences of probation. The
Commission also constructed the sentencing grid so as to prohibit proba-
tion in all but a very small percentage of cases. 49 In so doing, the Com-
mission gave short shrift to Congress's directive that it "insure that the
guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence
other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first of-
fender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise
serious offense ... ."50 Further, in some areas, the Commission "de-
parted from past practice and for ill-defined policy reasons decided to
impose harsher sentences." 51 Based on the Commission's choices and
the concurrent abolition of parole, the average time served by federal
defendants rose from thirteen months to forty-three months.52 Professor
Marc Miller describes the result:
46. Although the Commission did not intend this result, we suspect that some of the promot-
ers of the Sentencing Reform Act would not be surprised or displeased by it.
47. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Disparity: Not a Reason to "Fix" Booker, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 160, 160 (2006) (citing KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 63 (1998)).
48. Morris E. Lasker & Katherine Oberlies, The Medium or the Message? A Review of Al-
schuler's Theory of Why the Sentencing Guidelines Have Failed, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 166, 167
(1991).
49. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1222 (2004) ("Before the guidelines, almost 50% of federal sentences were to
straight probation. Under the initial guidelines, that figure dropped to around 15%.").
50. 28 U.S.C.A. § 9940) (2007); see also Beverly G. Dyer, Revising Criminal History:
Model Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4.1-4.2, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 373 (2006) ("Congress directed the
Commission to provide alternatives to prison for first offenders in 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), but the Com-
mission has never done so, despite empirical research revealing that first offenders recidivate at
substantially lower rates than defendants with criminal histories."); Lowell Dodge, Congressional
Oversight, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. 210,210 (1990) ("Remarkably, the Commission viewed this statutory
directive as a 'problem' (U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt.A, p.
1
.8), because the Commission believes 'under pre-
sent sentencing practice, courts sentence to probation an inappropriately high percentage of offend-
ers guilty of certain economic crimes such as theft ... fraud, and embezzlement ...').
51. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker's Promise, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 521, 527 n. 16 (2006) (collecting sources).
52. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 47, at 160.
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Changes in sentencing patterns over the past twenty years include a
dramatic increase in the length of federal sentences, a monumental
shift towards incarceration and away from use of straight probation, a
dramatic increase in the size of the federal prison population, and a
significant increase in the proportion of drug offenders, especially
lower-level drug offenders, in the federal system. This system loves
punishment.
53
These harsh sentencing policies have not significantly affected the crime
rate,54 and any positive effects that they have produced have been more
than offset by the harmful consequences of mass incarceration. 55  We
hope that Booker and Rita are harbingers of a reversal of course in fed-
eral sentencing policy. By exercising the discretion conferred on them-
more secure since Rita-district courts can contribute to making this
hope become a reality.
56
C. Overcoming Institutional Resistance to Discretionary Sentencing
While we urge district courts to boldly exercise the discretion con-
ferred on them by Booker and Rita to attempt to ameliorate the harmful
effects of the Guidelines, we acknowledge that in doing so, they are
unlikely to have many partners. Congress, which obviously could reform
federal sentencing laws, is unlikely to do anything significant. As dis-
cussed, in the post-Warren Court era, the criminal justice system became
a salient political issue. Legislators are unlikely to take any action that
would make them vulnerable to a charge that they are "soft on crime."
As for the Commission, although its staff has produced some excellent
studies, it has shown little inclination to seriously rethink the original
Guidelines, to downwardly modify any Guidelines, or to seriously ad-
dress post-Booker judicial decisions critiquing the Guidelines. Instead of
embracing the exercise of judicial discretion, the Commission has con-
53. Miller, supra note 49, at 1212.
54. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 375 (D. Mass. 2005) ("Indeed, most
studies attribute falling crime rates to factors other than incarceration rates, much less to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Loury, supra note 29, at 2 ("Estimates of the share of the 1990s
reduction in violent crime that can be attributed to the prison boom range from five percent to 25
percent. Whatever the number, analysts of all political stripes now agree that we have long ago
entered the zone of diminishing returns.").
55. A number of scholars have recently written eloquently and persuasively about these
consequences. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT & INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 2-3 (2006);
JAMES G. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT & THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 (2003); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS INCARCERATION 1 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2003); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL, CRIME & SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 8-9 (2001).
56. Although discretion does not inevitably result in lower sentences, the Commission's data
show that in Fiscal Year 2006, 61.7 percent of sentences were within the guideline range, 36.6
percent below, and just 1.6 percent above. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 52 tbl.N (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/tableN.pdf. Thus, discretion is almost always exercised in
favor of leniency.
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tinued to trumpet the notion that the existing Guidelines take into consid-
eration all of the factors in § 3553(a).57
Nor can district courts seeking to remedy the deficiencies in the
Guidelines expect any help from the Department of Justice. The De-
partment has all but defied the Booker Court by asking district courts to
impose guideline sentences in virtually all cases, rather than to apply all
of the § 3553(a) factors. And, as indicated, appellate courts at least be-
fore Rita policed below-guideline sentences with inexplicable zeal, in-
sisting without justification that in an advisory guideline system judges
are not free to disagree with policies embedded in the Guidelines, such as
the misguided disparate treatment of crack and powder,5 8 or to impose
sentences based on "'factors that are not unique or personal to a particu-
lar defendant."' 59 Even after Rita, appellate courts continue to come up
with legal bases, derived from no statute or Supreme Court decision, for
reversing below-guideline sentences.60  Finally, as Professor Glenn
Loury notes, there is "no political movement for getting America out of
the mass-incarceration business. The throttle [is] stuck.,
61
Thus, district courts clearly have their work cut out for them. We
do not suggest that district judges become a political movement for sen-
tencing reform or for any other issue. What judges can do, however, is
provide a human check on the forces of harshness that have driven our
sentencing policies over the past twenty years. That is, if they have the
discretion to exercise that check. Judges must be free in individual cases
to say that the prison term recommended by the Guidelines is too long,
that some cases warrant sentences which involve no prison time at all,
that policies embedded in the Guidelines are misguided, and that human-
ity and mercy still have a role to play in sentencing. Booker represented
the first step in restoring to judges the ability to be fair in individual
cases. Rita was the second. This fall, the Court will decide Gall v.
United States62 and Kimbrough v. United States63 and hopefully complete
57. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondent at *5, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL
173622.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006).
59. United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2006)).
60. See, e.g., United States v. D'Amico, Nos. 05-1468, 05-1573, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
18695, at *28-29 (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 2007) (holding that "it is usually not appropriate to excuse a
defendant almost entirely from incarceration because he performed acts that, though in society's
interest, also were the defendant's responsibility to perform and stood to benefit the defendant per-
sonally and professionally.").
61. Loury, supra note 29, at 2.
62. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari on the issue of whether the strength of the
justification needed to sustain a non-guideline sentence varies in proportion to the degree of the
variance).
63. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari on the issue of whether district courts may
consider the 100:1 disparity in the guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine).
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the triumvirate, returning to judges the discretion essential to a fair and
just sentencing system.





Since the United States Supreme Court changed the face of federal
sentencing with Apprendi v. New Jersey,' it has engaged in substantial
mid-course corrections in Blakely v. Washington2 and United States v.
Booker,3 and, to a limited degree, in Rita v. United States.4 The pattern
of litigation is interesting in and of itself and may bear on the durability
of these changes. These were sentencing reforms-a revolution to
some-masterminded and led by the highest court in the land, dragging
the somewhat reluctant appellate courts with them.
The changes could not have come too soon. To a district court
judge who has chafed under the mandatory United States Sentencing
Guidelines regime, widely regarded as a failure in many respects,5 it has
been a welcome change. Nor am I alone. District court judges across the
country have had the same experience, especially in federal drug cases.
You apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as you have been told you must,
and you tally up the numbers and determine where the defendant is on
the grid, and ultimately come up with a result that makes no sense by any
measure. It is inconsistent with the purposes of sentencing in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act (SRA); 6 it is out of proportion to the defendant's
culpability and to sentences that have been meted out for far worse, even
violent offenses; it is not at all what the public-if they knew all the
facts-would demand.7
Whatever the ultimate result of the Booker changes, one thing is
clear: The Supreme Court has unleashed a new sentencing debate, far
beyond the tired themes of the past twenty years of guideline reform.
t District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; Visiting
Lecturer, Yale Law School; B.A., Barnard College, 1967; M.A., Yale University, 1970; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1971.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If
You Don't Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING
REFORM 199, 199-201 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 115 (2003); see also Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of
Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (2006) ("[According to the Guidelines] [s]entencing disparities
generally and racial disparities in particular worsened, and proportionality links between the serious-
ness of crimes and the severity of punishment were broken.").
6. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007).
7. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715,750-51 (2005).
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For most of the past two decades judges have asked only, "Am I doing
the same thing as the judge in the next courtroom is doing?"--even if
neither judge is ordering sentences that make any sense. Now we are
starting to look again at what works, what sentences may make a differ-
ence to the offender and to society, and what a just sentencing regime
really requires. 8 To be sure, the answers are not clear, but at the very
least the issues are being raised.
My hope in this short essay is to go beyond describing the implica-
tions of Rita, the Supreme Court's latest decision. I attempt to predict
how Rita is likely to be applied, and argue that an additional course cor-
rection by the Supreme Court is needed to make sentencing fully consis-
tent with Booker, perhaps one which is already teed up on the Court's
docket next year: United States v. Gall.9
In United States v. Booker, as I have described elsewhere,'0 the Su-
preme Court not only constitutionalized sentencing in a way it had not
done before, it altered the sentencing division of labor among the various
players in the criminal justice system. Ironically, a decision about the
jury's role restored the judge's role in sentencing. So long as the Guide-
lines required judges to find facts that had consequences pre-ordained by
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), what judges
did looked exactly like what juries were supposed to do, with few consti-
tutional protections. The result, the Court held, violated the Sixth
Amendment." As a remedy, the Court severed the provisions of the
SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory. 12 Courts were to "consider"
the Guidelines but could sentence individuals in light of all the purposes
of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation.'
3
Appellate courts were to review sentencing decisions for "reasonable-
ness" and not, as they had done before, for their strict fealty to the Guide-
8. Oregon Judge Michael Marcus calls for redesigning the criminal justice system and sen-
tencing decisionmaking around the goal of "rational crime reduction" or "reducing reoffending." See
Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation: Criminal Justice's Weakest Link, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 671, 677-81 (2004). He has created a sentencing information system which
focuses not on inputs but on information about available sanctions and recidivism. Michael Marcus:
Smart Sentencing, http://www.smartsentencing.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). To be sure, there is
a substantial debate about how much judges can affect crime rates even through "carefully crafted
sentences." Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Looking at the Model Penal Code Sentenc-
ing Provisions Through Canadian Lenses, 7 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 139, 154 n.33 (2003). Still others
have suggested that well-nm and well-targeted programs, particularly with drug offenders, can
reduce reoffending rates. Tonry, supra note 5, at 6.
9. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007).
10. Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT'G. REP. 165, 165 (2007);
Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 536 (2007); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing,
115 YALE L.J. 137 (Supp. 2006), available at http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html.
11. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (2007).
13. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
[Vol. 85:1
RITA NEEDS GALL
lines. The Guidelines, in short, were "advisory,"' 4 the Court announced.
Judicial judgment in sentencing had returned, and not a minute too soon.
Sentencing individual human beings is different from other judicial
functions. It is singularly ill-suited to mandatory rules, which are bound
to treat as similar offenders and offenses that are in fact meaningfully
different.15 While the United States suffered under the mandatory federal
regime for the past two decades, virtually every industrial country con-
tinued to give considerable sentencing discretion to trial judges. 16 No
matter how different the rest of the judicial system was from ours-
adversary versus inquisitorial or common law versus civil code-and no
matter how much legislative supremacy was touted or how complex the
criminal code, modern sentencing was not governed by strict rules or
complex grids. Significant judicial discretion remained.
17
The difficulties of promulgating mandatory sentencing rules should
have been especially clear in the United States. Regional variations in
the application of the Guidelines persisted even during the mandatory
guideline regime. 18 As federal criminal prosecutions began to overlap
more and more with state prosecutions-the federalizing of street
crime' 9 -the pattern became even clearer. A national sentencing regime
may have been possible when criminal law was in fact national and dealt
with similar significant federal offenses like bank robbery or mail fraud.
As the federal law encompassed street crime to which local and federal
prosecutors had different priorities and judicial dockets different exigen-
cies, it was no surprise that regional differences persisted.20  Finally, a
national sentencing regime was made all the more difficult because of
continuing problems with the chaotic and disorganized federal criminal
code. The code lumped together a wide range of offenders under a single
label; the Guidelines did the same, but tried to break them down into
smaller subcategories which could be "objectively" evaluated-what was
14. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
15. See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 276 (2005)
(discussing critically undue and excessive concerns about sentencing uniformity in modem sentenc-
ing reforms).
16. See Nancy Gertner, When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 570 (2005).
17. See, e.g., Cornelius Nestler, Model Penal Code: Sentencing: Sentencing in Germany, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 109-11 (2003).
18. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING (AN
ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM) 94 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/l 5_year/l 5_year studyfull.pdf
("The available evidence suggests that regional disparity remains under the guidelines, and some
evidence suggests it may have even increased among drug trafficking offenses.").
19. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, The Federalization of Crimi-
nal Law, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1, 15-16, 16 n.28, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimiaw2.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government": Federal Recourse to
State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2006) (arguing that disparities derive from
differences in state treatment of criminal convictions, on which guideline treatment is based). See
generally Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need
for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997).
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the loss or the amount of drugs, minor or major role, nature of the vic-
tim. 21 In fact, as many district courts recognized, the differences that the
Guidelines did not take into account-like drug addiction, co-defendant
disparity, or mens rea-were often more significant than those it did.22
Just how far will the Supreme Court's leadership take us in this new
world of sentencing discretion? Other major criminal justice decisions of
the Supreme Court, such as United States v. Lopez, 23 have gone nowhere
and are effectively ignored by the lower courts.24 Other bold new strokes
resulted in retreat as their implications became clear, as was the case
with the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence.25  Signifi-
cantly, other sentencing decisions in the post-guideline era that would
have introduced more judicial discretion into the process have also been
undermined by the courts charged with applying them. This is not the
first time the Supreme Court has told the district courts that there should
not be mandatory sentencing. In Koon v. United States,26 the Court un-
derscored the fact that judicial discretion remained even post-Guidelines,
and endorsed a review standard, abuse of discretion, that would be more
deferential to the trial court. Its message, however, was widely ignored27
even before legislation was passed that wholly eviscerated it.28  And
when Justice Breyer-an architect of the Guidelines as a member of the
first Sentencing Commission-emphasized that judicial discretion in
sentencing remained even under a Guideline regime in his decisions as
an appellate judge,29 the Court hardly listened. The First Circuit-the
21. See United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006); Gertner, From
Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 535.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, 493 F. Supp. 2d 255, 263-65 (D. P.R. 2007) (depart-
ing in part based on the extent to which defendant's lifestyle was inconsistent with the quantity of
drugs the government would argue should be attributed to him); Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 229-31
(departing in part based on the extent to which defendant's lifestyle was inconsistent with the quan-
tity of drugs the government would argue should be attributed to him); United States v. Jaber, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 365, 379, 382 (D. Mass. 2005) (departing downward for the franchisee of a drug trafficking
operation so that it was no longer than the sentence for the franchisor who was far more culpable);
United States v. Woodley, 344 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D. Mass. 2004) (taking drug addiction into
account in evaluating defendant's record); United States v. Costello, 16 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39-40 (D.
Mass. 1998) (departing downward for laborers who earned little for transporting valuable computer
equipment as compared to the ringleader).
23. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
24. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1253-54 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from
Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419,436 (1999).
26. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
27. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 99-103 (1998).
28. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b), (g), (i), 117 Stat. 650, 668-69, 671-73 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (2007)) (popularly known as the Feeney Amendment).
29. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 52 (1st Cir, 1989) ("[W]e read the Guide-




court on which he was about to lead as the Chief Judge-became one of
the most mandatory of the mandatory guideline circuits.
Elsewhere, I have tried to understand why federal sentencing has
proved to be so resistant to change.30  Federal judges, who opposed
guidelines twenty years ago when they were first proposed and who pro-
tested any incursion on sentencing authority, enforced the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines with a rigor not required by the text or the legisla-
tion. 3' The reasons behind this transformation are critical to evaluating
the likely impact of Booker and now Rita. In short, it takes more than an
announcement-"Now hear this! The Guidelines are advisory! "-to
make them so.
3 2
There are several reasons: First, the Sentencing Guidelines brought
with them something like the ideology that surrounds continental civil
codes: The Guidelines were comprehensive; the work of "experts"; if
there were gaps, the "experts" from the Sentencing Commission would
fill them in. The judges became clerks looking through the voluminous
Guidelines for sentencing answers. 33 Second, the pernicious anti-judge
climate of the past two decades provided every incentive for judges to
follow the Guidelines---"I had no choice but to sentence you to 150
months under the Guidelines" was a familiar refrain. Third, the judiciary
had changed in fundamental ways over the past twenty years, leaving
many judges without any criminal justice experience apart from guide-
line sentencing. 34 Fourth, the psychological phenomenon of "anchoring"
when standards are linked to numerical ranges had a substantial impact.35
Fifth, there was no competing philosophy of sentencing among trial
judges; the sentencing Guidelines effectively preempted the field.36 And
this was particularly so in the appellate courts, which had never ad-
dressed sentencing at all before the Guidelines.
Given this history, how the Supreme Court defines "reasonable-
ness" review and the weight it gives to the Guidelines is critical. The
question is not, as some have suggested, "How can judicial authority be
reined in again so that there will not be a return to the days of indetermi-
nate sentencing? ' 37 Rather, the question is, "What does it take to restore
judicial sentencing authority after nearly twenty years of passivity, after
30. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 524 (arguing that sen-
tencing, which had been an area of an American judge's "unique competence," became its "polar
opposite in twenty short years").
31. Id.
32. See Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, supra note 10, at
137.
33. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 10, at 534.
34. Id at 533 n.40.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 533.
37. See Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, supra note 10, at
137-38.
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the judicial culture has fundamentally changed, not to mention the politi-
cal atmosphere, and after judicial sentencing expertise, to the extent it
existed at all, has become vestigial?
' 38
Rita involved a within-guideline sentence that the Fourth Circuit, in
a per curiam decision, had affirmed as presumptively reasonable. 39 The
decision was problematic for two reasons: First, as I have described,
given the past two decades of slavish guideline compliance, the "pre-
sumptively reasonable" label will only hasten the slide to "mandatori-
ness" and hence, constitutional error. Second, the Sentencing Guidelines
do not deserve the label. This agency has hardly functioned like the ex-
pert agency envisioned by the SRA, much less like the kind of adminis-
trative agency to which deference is due. It has been, as Justice Scalia
described it, a "junior-varsity Congress.
'40
In addition, for the Guidelines to be truly advisory requires that
there be an alternative to guideline-speak. That means that courts neces-
sarily have to be willing and encouraged to engage in two kinds of think-
ing: First, courts have to be willing to critically examine the Guidelines.
Many Guidelines were not keyed to the statute's purposes; various num-
bers on which sentences were "anchored" were not empirically tested,
but often just picked out the air, the product of political compromise.41
Second, courts have to be willing to develop other approaches, including
those rejected by the Guidelines' drafters. Why not consider drug addic-
tion when there is a body of literature about which treatments are effica-
cious? Why not look afresh at the imprisonment of first offenders given
the literature on their recidivism?
How then does Rita measure up? It was a mixed decision. It said, in
effect, that if appellate courts wish to label the Guidelines "presump-
tively reasonable" they may (within certain limits), but they are not re-
quired to do so.42 The Court did not cast its lot with the "Guidelines are
presumptively reasonable" group, as the government urged and many
appellate courts found. Nor did it conclude that the Guidelines were
38. Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, supra note 10, at 165 (suggesting that the Court
look to areas that involve similar institutional questions about the allocation of decisional authority,
such as appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as well as federal habeas review
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and further suggesting that the
question for courts of appeals under the APA and federal habeas is not whether the initial decision
maker was wrong in its interpretation or application of law, that is, whether the reviewing court
would have made a different decision. Rather, the question is whether the initial decision maker was
"unreasonably wrong.").
39. United States v. Rita, 177 F. App'x 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
40. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371-77; see also STIT14 & CABRANES,
supra note 27, at 95 (describing Guidelines as a set of "administrative diktats" that the Commission
"promulgated and enforced ipse dixit"). "Even for those categories of cases in which the Commis-
sion did indeed seek to replicate past sentencing averages, the Commission's data was limited, and
possibly compromised, in several fundamental respects." Id. at 61.
42. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-63 (2007).
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merely one factor among many, as the federal defenders and Justice
Souter, in dissent, had suggested.43 There is, in short, something for eve-
ryone here. On the one hand, Rita (with Justice Breyer writing for the
majority) dilutes the impact of the "presumption of reasonableness" even
as it affirms its use. This presumption is not a binding presumption like
trial-related evidentiary presumptions which oblige one side or the other
to shoulder a particular burden of proof."a Nor does it reflect the kind of
deference that a court is obliged to give to an expert agency rather than a
district judge. And it is an appellate presumption, not a district court
standard.45
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer's reasoning surely gives the Guidelines
46the kind of "gravitational pull" of which Justice Souter warns. As the
Court notes, the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals
court is considering a within-guideline sentence on review, "both the
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case., 47 That
"double determination," the Court held, "significantly increases the like-
lihood that the sentence is a reasonable one. 48 In other words, "sentenc-
ing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as
carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the
other at wholesale. 4 9 The problem is that Justice Breyer's comments
overstate both the reasonableness of the Guidelines and the nature of the
trial sentencing process that has been so completely skewed by them. It
envisions two fully developed processes that happily coincide on the
reasonable sentence. The reality is quite different.
With respect to the Guidelines: Justice Breyer's analysis of the
Guidelines' rationale reiterates the ideology of the Guideline formation-
not their actual genesis or operation. In fact, it mirrors the very ideologi-
cal framework, which I have described, that Justice Breyer played a sub-
stantial role in creating and has for years attempted to implement. 50 In
43.
[1]f sentencing judges attributed substantial gravitational pull to the now-discretionary
Guidelines, if they treated the Guidelines result as persuasive or presumptively appropri-
ate, the Booker remedy would in practical terms preserve the very feature of the Guide-
lines that threatened to trivialize the jury right. For a presumption of Guidelines reason-
ableness would tend to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly as mandatory
Guidelines had done, with judges finding the facts needed for a sentence in an upper
subrange. This would open the door to undermining Apprendi itself, and this is what has
happened today.
Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 2463 (majority opinion).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2463 (majority opinion).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The Guidelines introduction, quoted liberally in Rita, mirrors Justice Breyer's comments
in Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).
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fact, this account of the bona fides of the Sentencing Commission and its
product gave rise to the presumption of reasonableness in the post-
Booker era in the first place.51 And once again, in Rita, Justice Breyer
described his hopes that Guidelines post-Booker can coexist alongside a
more robust judicial discretion, notwithstanding the unsuccessful at-
tempts to do just that in Koon (when Justice Breyer was on the Supreme
Court) and Diaz- Villafane (when Justice Breyer was on the First Circuit).
While his language is tempered-he acknowledges that the guideline
drafters eschewed identifying which of the sentencing purposes they
were enacting, 52 and he concedes that the Guidelines are "a rough ap-
proximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives ' -53 -
the effect may well be the same. The Court in effect says that where the
sentence is within the Guidelines, the trial court does not have to say
much to justify it. To busy courts, that alone has a gravitational pull.
As far as the trial judges' sentencing processes are concerned, the
Court ignores the extent to which the Guidelines have profoundly altered
sentencing advocacy. Parties-even post-Booker--continue to argue in
terms of guideline facts, 54 rarely even developing a guideline critique
much less an alternative rationale for sentencing. Discovery regarding
sentencing factors is not covered by the federal rules. 55 Defendants con-
tinue to fear that if they press for additional discovery, or indeed litigate
51. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912-21 (D. Utah 2005). Wilson was
issued within days after United States v. Booker, it announces in language very similar to Justice
Breyer's in Rita that a guideline sentence must be given "considerable weight." Id. at 912. The
"presumptively reasonable" courts base their analysis on very similar logic. See, e.g., United States
v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006); United States
v. Newsom, 428 F.3d 685, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2005).
52. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAL.L. n.3
(2006) (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission could not "reconcile the differing perceptions
of the purposes of criminal punishment"); Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on
the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed.
Reg. 18046, 18121 (May 13, 1987) ("Of all of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, it is most
unfortunate that the goal of rationality has been abandoned and even frustrated by these guide-
lines."); Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More Discre-
tion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 465 (2006) (noting the
"Commission's failure to articulate a philosophy for federal sentencing").
53. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Maisonet, No. 06-150(JAG), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46768, at
*6-7 (D. P.R. June 26, 2007) (noting that Counsel only developed a record of guideline-specific
facts).
55. Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statement § 6A1.2 opines that "[clourts should adopt pro-
cedures to provide for the timely disclosure of the presentence report." Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 53 Fed. Reg. 15530, 15535 (June 15, 1988). And § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines
Manual goes on to declare that "parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present informa-
tion to the court." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 6A1.3(a). But the
Guidelines nowhere require disclosure of the evidence on which the probation officer relies in pre-
paring the presentence report, or advance disclosure to the defense of the "information" the govern-
ment intends to "present ... to the court." Id. While FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 requires the disclosure of
facts necessary to proof of guilt, that may not be the same as facts at issue in sentencing. In any
case, Rule 16 obligations arguably end at the plea. The obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
continues past the plea and covers issues which would diminish a defendant's punishment, but what
that consists of is frequently a matter of dispute.
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56anything, they will risk a higher guideline sentence. Some prosecutors
have added discovery waivers to plea agreements. 7 Probation officers
are not trained or encouraged to engage in anything other than "guide-
line-speak." Without information or advocacy with respect to alterna-
tives outside of the Guidelines, "presumptive" will, once again, slide to
"mandatory," or something short of that: namely, "Guidelines-Lite."
Take the case of Victor Rita:58 Mr. Rita was charged with making
two false statements to a federal grand jury.59 The grand jury was inves-
tigating InterOrdnance, a company prosecutors believed distributed a kit
capable of assembling a machine gun without proper registration.60 After
Rita had bought one of the kits, he was contacted by the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives (ATF).6' Before meeting
with the agent, however, Rita returned the kit and turned over to the ATF
another which did not amount to a machine gun.62 He then denied before
the grand jury that the government had asked him for the machine gun
kit, and denied that he contacted someone at the company after he was
contacted by the ATF.63 The government charged Rita with perjury,
making false statements, and obstructing justice. He was convicted on
all counts before a jury.64
The guideline offense level was driven by the offense level of the
underlying crime with respect to which the perjury was committed, here
InterOrdnance's possible violation of the machine gun registration law.65
The level for perjury in connection with that offense required taking as
the offense level "6 levels lower than the offense level for the underlying
offense." 66 The underlying offense level was 26;67 thus the base offense
56. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 443-64 (2004) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines
system deters effective advocacy and penalizes zealous representation by equating it with the defen-
dant's obstruction ofjustice or failure to accept responsibility).
57. Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A De-
bate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1999).
58. It should be noted that the Defendant moved for a rehearing after the President commuted
the sentence of Lewis Libby, arguing that the government was taking inconsistent positions. Petition
for Rehearing, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 2155533.
59. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).
60. Id.




65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 2M5.2 (sentencing for violation
of 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(2) (2007) (importing defense articles without authorization)).
66. Id. § 2X3.1.
67. Id. § 2M5.2.
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level was 20.68 Rita had a criminal history of I, leading to a guideline
range of 33 to 41 months.69
The defense presented evidence that Rita had an extensive record of
government service, was a dedicated family man, and had a number of
physical ailments attributable to his military service.70 For 24 years, Rita
had served in the United States Marine Corps, the United States Army,
and the United States Army Reserve.71 His service included tours of
duty in Vietnam and the Gulf Wars, and he had received more than 35
awards and medals for distinguished conduct.72 As a result of his service
he had several ailments, including skin rashes following exposure to
Agent Orange during the Vietnam War as well as post traumatic stress
disorder.73 He also had diabetes, which caused him periodic numbness in
the feet as well as memory and eyesight loss. 74 He suffered from arthri-
tis, an enlarged prostate, acid reflux, a herniated disk, and sleep apnea.75
To treat these conditions, Mr. Rita-who was 59 years old-required a
long list of prescription medications. 76 His service had left him so dis-
abled that he was totally and permanently unemployable.77
At sentencing, the district court heard Rita's presentation but con-
cluded that it was "unable to find that the [presentence] [report's recom-
mended] sentencing guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline
range for that, and under 3553 ... the public needs to be protected if it is
true, and I must accept as true the jury verdict., 78 In light of Rita's per-
sonal history and physical condition, what would it have taken to con-
vince the judge otherwise? Clearly, the court's remarks suggest that Rita
had to show that he was somehow extraordinary, not the usual person in
this guideline range. That harks back to the pre-Rita days and a "heart-
land" analysis that rarely succeeded.79 Indeed, the Solicitor General said
as much during the argument. 80 To credit a non-guideline approach here,
he argued, would be subjective, and would risk the return of sentencing
disparities: "[W]e are in a Federal system with 674 Federal district
judges, and we cannot have all our own personal guidelines systems. 81
68. Of course, nothing in the Guidelines indicates why the Commission chose six levels,
rather than four or three.
69. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2461.
70. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 58, at *4, *5.






77. Id. at *6.
78. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
79. Id. at 2461; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 5K2.0.
80. Transcript of Oral Argument at *37, Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL




He used as an example of an unreasonable sentence one in which the
judge "takes a guidelines range like this one, of 33 months to 41 months,
and the judge says in my view military service means that this defendant
gets probation. ' 2
Of course, no judge should say, "Military service in my personal
guideline system means this defendant should get probation" (although,
to be sure, that comment may be no more rational than the Commission,
which held without explanation that such service should never be in-
cluded). A judge might say, instead, that the Guideline that excludes
military service from consideration may be appropriate in general,83 but
that in this case-in light of Rita's minimal criminal history, age and
illness-it is not. A judge might say that the guideline result in this case
is inconsistent with statutory edict. Section 9940) of the SRA ordered
the Commission to "insure that the guidelines reflect the general appro-
priateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in
which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a
crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense ... The Commis-
sion, however, implemented that directive by redefining "serious of-
fense" in a way that was entirely at odds with prior practice, without em-
pirical support, and, in fact, inconsistent with its own deterrence stud-
ies.85 A reasoned critique of the Guidelines is hardly the "personal
guidelines system" the Solicitor General mocked.86 Indeed, it might well
become a new national standard in like cases.
In short, the fact that a district court's sentence is aligned with that
of the Commission does not necessarily indicate that there was careful
reflection about what the appropriate sentence should have been, but may
simply reflect a judge's good faith effort to comply with the Guidelines
(knowing their traction even post-Booker), or the failure of effective ad-
vocacy at sentencing. In Rita, the district court did not have to say very
much to justify the Guideline sentence-no opinion, no detailed findings.
And for the Fourth Circuit, all it took to affirm it was a per curiam opin-
ion. The "gravitational pull" of the Guidelines, particularly in a circuit
that is amenable to the "guidelines as presumptive" approach, limits sen-
tencing arguments, stops meaningful critique of the Guidelines, and en-
courages cursory treatment of the sentence on all levels, at trial and on
appeal.
82. Id. at *38.
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 5H 1. 11 (prohibiting considera-
tion of military service without explanation or legislative history). Section 5H1.11 was enacted-
without explanation-to overrule United States v. Pipich, 688 F. Supp. 191 (D. Md. 1988). See
Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Bedfel-
lows, 104 YALE L.J. 933,955-56, 956 n.134 (1994).
84. 28 U.S.C.A. § 9940) (2007).
85. United States v. Germosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228 (D. Mass. 2007).
86. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80, at *37.
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Where will the Supreme Court go from here? Gall v. United
States8 7 will give the Court an opportunity to stop the gravitational pull
of the Guidelines, or, at the very least, create an equal and opposite force,
a paradigm of what a non-guideline approach might look like. In Gall,
the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
MDMA, commonly known as "ecstasy." 88 He had participated in a con-
spiracy that involved ecstasy distribution from February 2000 until Sep-
tember 2000. The conspiracy predated his entrance, beginning May
1996, and continued long after he left, until October 2002. Although he
was making a considerable amount of money, which, as a working class
young man he sorely needed, in September 2000 he informed his co-
conspirators that he was "getting out of the drug business and wanted
nothing more to do with [it]." His withdrawal was voluntary, as there
was no hint of a government investigation at the time. 89 And he stayed
out of the drug business, fully believing his criminal days were behind
him, until an indictment was filed in April 2004. By that time the defen-
dant had started a business; earned a Bachelor of Science degree in com-
puter science; was supported by coworkers and family; and had begun to
come to grips with his alcohol and drug addiction. Numerous witnesses
testified on his behalf about the changes that he had effected between
2000 and 2002. The record disclosed his company was on the verge of
beginning a major construction project when he was indicted. He had
the lowest criminal history score, Criminal History I, with a few minor
offenses. He offered to cooperate with the government, but since his
information was stale-he had left the conspiracy long before-he had
nothing to offer prosecutors.
The Guidelines calculation was classic. It was driven by the quan-
tity of MDMA tablets involved during the conspiracy, resulting in an
offense level of 24.90 The defendant received some reductions for his
acceptance of responsibility, and willingness to give an accurate proffer,
but they paled in comparison to the offense level. He received a two
point reduction under § 5C 1.2 of the Guidelines for being "'safety valve'
eligible," and a three point reduction for "acceptance of responsibility." 91
The adjusted offense level was 19, yielding a guideline range of 30 to 37
months.
92
The defendant made several departure motions based on his age,
cooperation with the government, remorse, aberrant conduct, and post-
87. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari).
88. Unless otherwise noted, the following factual background is from United States v. Gall,
446 F.3d 884, 885-88 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) [hereinafter United
States v. Gall].
89. Unless otherwise noted, the following information pertaining to Gall's personal history is
taken from United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761 (S.D. Iowa 2005) [hereinafter Gall].





offense rehabilitation.9 3 However, given the Eighth Circuit's departure
law, all pre-Booker, the Court felt there was no basis for a departure.94
The trial court, taking into account the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), decided, in effect, that any term of imprisonment was counter-
productive and wholly unjustified.95 In effect, as described above, the
judge "added up the column of figures" 96 and concluded that the total
made no sense by any measure. The offense level, based solely on drug
quantity, substantially overstated Gall's actual culpability. Indeed, many
of the salient factors here-both as to recidivism and culpability-were
simply not counted: his age, his withdrawal from the conspiracy, the life
he had built. There was, in short, a significant difference between Gall
and most offenders in this category, a difference which was understand-
able and reasoned. The trial court sentenced Gall to probation for three
years.97
The Eighth Circuit, a "presumptively reasonable" circuit, reversed.98
First, the court's approach made outside-the-Guidelines sentences ex-
tremely unlikely, every bit as unlikely as in the pre-Booker days. The
court noted that how compelling the justification for the variance had to
be depended upon the extent of the difference between the guideline
range and the sentence imposed. 99 Since the guideline range was 30
months, a probation sentence amounted to a 100 percent variance-an
extraordinary one that had to be supported by extraordinary reasons.
The district court's reasons-articulated both on the record and in a
lengthy decision, and far, far more elaborate than the district court's rea-
sons in Rita-did not suffice. First, according to the Eighth Circuit, the
district court placed too much emphasis on Gall's withdrawal from the
conspiracy when the Guidelines had already accounted for that by apply-
ing the Guidelines from an earlier, and more lenient book, and by the fact
that Gall was not being held accountable for the drugs of other co-
conspirators.100 Second, the district court gave inappropriate considera-
tion to Gall's age, which the Guidelines do not permit.' 0 ' Third, the
93. Id. at 760-61.
94. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d at 889. There is at least an argument that one way to
address potential disparity post-Booker is to reevaluate this departure law, now in the light of 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2007). Departure law evolved when the Guidelines were mechanically applied;
few appellate court decisions keyed their holdings to anything other than the specific language of the
Guidelines-under which family circumstances were evaluated for "extraordinariness" rather than in
light of their effects on recidivism or deterrence. See United States v. Germosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d
221, 222-23 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 229 (D. Mass. 2006).
95. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
96. Id. at 760.
97. Id. at 763.
98. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d at 889 (quoting United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415,417
(8th Cir. 2006)).
99. Id,
100. Id. at 889-90.
101. id. at 890.
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court did not properly weigh the seriousness of ecstasy distribution, as
the Guidelines provide. 0 2 Fourth, the court did not consider whether his
sentence would create "unwarranted sentencing disparities,"10 3 which the
Guidelines were intended to eliminate. And fifth, the court placed too
much emphasis on post-offense rehabilitation, another ground demeaned
by the Guidelines. 0 4 In effect, the court was saying, as courts have done
for two decades, that the Guidelines cover pretty much everything and
everyone.
This was not a review as under the AEDPA or the APA. There was
no consideration of a range of reasonable sentences, including the sen-
tence imposed by the thoughtful trial court judge who had heard wit-
nesses, lived with the case, sentenced the codefendants and had written
an opinion. This was a decision that said: "The Guidelines are the gold
standard; deviate from them at your peril."
To be sure, the government might say here, as it did in Rita, that the
trial court's decision was nothing more than the "personal" weighing of
one judge-like the judge who would have "personally" valued military
service in his guideline universe. And it will say yet again: If judges are
permitted to do this, disparity would reign again as it had pre-Guidelines.
That position wholly ignores the impact of two decades of guideline
analysis on judges and advocates, and of the continued traction of the
Guidelines, whether or not they are labeled as mandatory. And it ignores
the way the common law evolves, the way judges persuade other judges,
the way judicial precedents are created. If the trial court's reasoning is
applied by other judges in like cases, it will not be because they wish to
implement their own normative imperatives, but because they have been
persuaded by the court's reasoning. New standards will evolve along-
side the guideline standards. Surely, judges can be trusted to make
meaningful distinctions-which the Guidelines as a national system
could not make-between co-conspirators who find religion with the
constable at the door, and those who do not; between individuals who do
everything that prison is supposed to get them to do-put their lives in
order, secure a job, an education, address their addictions. Surely, the
public would understand the difference between Gall and his co-
defendants. And surely judges can be trusted-indeed, encouraged-to
think critically, like lawyers are supposed to do, about these Guidelines
and the rules they have created, about when they should apply and when
they should not.'05
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006)).
104. Id.
105. In United States v. Germnosen, 473 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D. Mass. 2007), I applied the aberrant
conduct guideline to a defendant, a drug "mule," recognizing that the language did not strictly apply,
but noting the deficiencies of the guideline analysis in cases like the one before me. I mentioned the
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Gall offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to say what it did not
say in Rita. Sentencing is an imperfect exercise. The Guidelines were
flawed; as the Guidelines' Introduction conceded, 10 6 they could not pos-
sibly account for the full range of sentencing situations. If the reasons
offered in Gall do not pass muster while those in Rita do, Booker will
have gone the way of Koon and the sentencing reforms it triggered will
be at an end.
government's concerns whenever factors like employment or family are added to the equation, and
the risk that in considering those factors, white collar offenders will be treated too leniently. I held:
True, some of the letters to the Commission by groups interested in the [aberrant conduct
Guideline] were concerned about the abuse of aberrant behavior departures in the case of
white-collar offenders. But those concerns do not apply here. This case is not about the
well-heeled banker who commits a substantial fraud, all the while supporting the local
symphony and countless community groups. It is not about white-collar offenders who
try to buy their way out of trouble by pointing to their charitable contributions. This case
involves a man who struggled all his life, supported his community at great personal risk,
and then made a mistake. It is not about Enron. It is about a drug mule.
Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
106. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 52, § 1Al.l (Historical Note 4(b))
(explaining its policy, the Commission noted that "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines
that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.").
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AN APPELLATE PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERAL SENTENCING
AFTER BOOKER AND RITA
JEFFREY S. SUTTONt
Federal sentencing is haunted by two sets of truths that, if not mutu-
ally exclusive, are at least difficult to reconcile.
I. INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
One set of truths goes something like this: Individuals who commit
crimes, like individuals who do not, are unique. They commit crimes for
different reasons; they have different prospects for redeeming themselves
or for doing it again; and prison time will affect people differently at
different stages in their lives. Some crimes deserve more punishment
than other crimes. And the effects of crime, whether on individual vic-
tims, communities or institutions, differ from crime to crime.
First the President, then the Senate, devotes considerable time to en-
suring that the federal judges empowered to sentence these individuals
have the experience, intelligence and judgment to sentence them fairly.
And each judge takes an oath to do just that.' Over time, trial judges
charged with sentencing criminals day in and day out develop not just
experience but expertise in their sentencing practices and in sentencing
individuals within typically wide ranges set by Congress. Before impos-
ing each sentence, trial judges also do something that no legislature,
commission or appellate court can do: They hear from the defendants,
and they sometimes hear from their families and from the victims of the
crime as well, after which the judges must explain on the record why
they sentenced the defendant the way they did. In the face of these reali-
ties, Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission and above all
appellate judges ought to respect these individualized sentencing judg-
ments and be exceedingly reluctant to second-guess them-no matter
how varied the resulting sentences may be. Let the trial judges be
judges, in short, and let them exercise the judgment entrusted to them.
II. CONSISTENCY
The other set of truths goes something like this: When it comes to
federal criminal laws, the National Government is one sovereign and
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; B.A., Williams Col-
lege, 1983; LL.B., The Ohio State University College of Law, 1990. 1 would like to thank several of
my law clerks-Nicholas Degani, Jameson Jones, Jamie McDonald, John Scudder and Tara
Stuckey-for reviewing drafts of the article, for helping me to think through these issues and for
supplying several citations for the article.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 453 (2007).
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there thus ought to be some parity, from one federal courthouse to the
next, in sentencing practices for violations of the same criminal laws by
individuals with similar criminal records. "Equal Justice Under Law"
are the first words that visitors see as they approach the entrance to the
Supreme Court, yet there is nothing equal or just about permitting one
judge to send an individual to prison for ten years while permitting an-
other judge to give probation to a second individual who committed the
same crime and who comes before the court with the same criminal re-
cord. Bitterness, not self-reflection, is bound to be the first, and may
well be the lasting, sentiment of the hapless criminal sent to languish in
jail with the unparolable ten-year sentence.
The risk of federal sentencing disparities, history shows, is not a
phantom threat.2 It takes more than one judge to sentence some 72,500
federal criminal defendants a year.3 And just as the circumstances of
each criminal defendant differ, so do the backgrounds of the 1,000 or so
active and senior judges who fill the federal trial bench. The experiences
and sentencing philosophies of some judges are bound to lead them to err
on the side of shorter sentences and the hope for rehabilitation, and the
experiences of others are bound to lead them to be more wary of the risk
of recidivism and the price (another victim) of being wrong. The see-
sawing goals of sentencing only feed these disparities. Rehabilitation,
deterrence, retribution, protecting the public--each of them offers a dif-
ferent insight, frequently a rival insight, about an appropriate sentence.
While sentencing disparity may happen for legitimate reasons and
may well reflect the hopelessly disparate goals of sentencing, the impera-
tives of predictability, consistency, equal justice and respect for the law
require someone, somewhere, to level out these sentences. Unguided
and unreviewable sentencing discretion cannot co-exist with sentencing
parity-and that is where Congress, the Sentencing Commission and
appellate courts enter the picture. In establishing statutory sentencing
ranges, in recommending guidelines ranges and in reviewing trial court
sentences, these national institutions play an essential role in eliminating,
or at least ameliorating, sentencing disparities.
At the extremes, these two sets of truths represent rival visions of
national sentencing policy. One cannot exalt the virtues of individual-
ized sentencing without diminishing the virtue of consistency. Sentenc-
ing practices in the pre-guidelines era tilted in favor of individualized
sentencing that was indeterminate in nature and was subject to virtually
2. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-6 (1973); Michael
M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. 0IN. L. REV. 749, 762-90
(2006); Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 33-36 (2000).
3. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, STATISTICAL INFORMATION
PACKET 4, available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2006/lc06.pdf (providing statistics for
Fiscal Year 2006).
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no appellate review. And sentencing practices during the mandatory-
guidelines era tilted in favor of consistency because departures were few
and far between and because guidelines-centric appellate review was
rigorous-save for the interval when Koon v. United States4 set the stan-
dard of review.5
III. INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING AND CONSISTENCY AFTER BOOKER
AND RITA
The question after United States v. Booker6 and Rita v. United
States7 is where the next Hegelian turn will take us-back to an indi-
vidualized sentencing regime, back to a consistency regime governed by
guidelines that are advisory in name but not in practice, or forward to a
system that attempts to accommodate, however imperfectly, these com-
peting goals. Only a fool would presume to know how this will play
out-because knowing requires not just a prediction of how the courts
will respond to the decisions but also knowing how (and whether) Con-
gress will respond to the courts. And perhaps only a fool should hope.
But if an utterly indeterminate sentencing regime slights consistency and
if an overly determinate sentencing regime slights individualized sen-
tencing, it may be that Booker and Rita present an opportunity to thread
the sentencing needle.
At the same time that the Booker constitutional opinion elevated the
role of the jury,8 the Booker remedial opinion elevated the role of district
courts by giving them discretion to impose sentences based on all of the
§ 3553(a) factors rather than effectively just one of them-the guide-
lines.9 The § 3553(a) factors in some ways promote consistency by di-
recting courts to consider a national guidelines range,'0 to take into ac-
count policy statements of the Sentencing Commission" and to "avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities."' 2  The § 3553(a) factors in other
ways promote individualized sentencing by telling courts to consider
"the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant,"'' 3 "the need for the sentence imposed" based
4. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
5. Compare id. at 98 ("A district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines ... will in
most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a
sentencing court."), with Feeney Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d), 117 Stat. 650, 670
(2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (2007)) ("With respect to [departure] determinations...
the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts.").
6. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
7. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
8. Booker, 543 U.S. at 224.
9. See id. at 249, 259-60.
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on the various goals of sentencing, 14 "the kinds of sentences available"' 5
and the need to provide restitution to crime victims. 16
Complicating matters, the Sentencing Commission, at Congress's
direction, has attempted to account for these same factors, suggesting
that the recommended guidelines ranges represent an initial cut at recon-
ciling these disparate objectives. 7 And of course one of the effects of
establishing nationwide recommended guidelines ranges based in part on
"empirical" data of actual sentences' 8 is to further consistency and indi-
vidualized sentencing-an objective reinforced by the Commission's
creation of recommended sentencing bands, not recommended sentences.
Even though the Sentencing Commission's recommendations have
taken the § 3553(a) factors into account and even though the Commis-
sion's mission serves at some level to synthesize the disparate goals of
consistency and individualized sentencing, the fact remains that the key
players in this new world, at least initially, are the district court judges.
It is they, not the appellate courts and not the Sentencing Commission,
whom Congress (and the Supreme Court) has empowered to balance
these considerations in each individual case. It is they alone who have an
opportunity to hear from the individuals involved in, and affected by, the
crime. 19 "While trial judges sentence individuals face to face for a liv-
ing, [appellate judges] review transcripts for a living. No one sentences
transcripts. 2 ° Once a sentencing court offers a reasoned explanation for
its application of the § 3553(a) factors to an individual, it therefore
makes considerable sense for appellate courts to "give the benefit of the
doubt to the district court's judgment-conducting reasonableness re-
view that comes to nothing more than abuse-of-discretion review.''
That deference, however, may mean different things in different
cases-and one of the questions raised by this article is whether it
should. Three categories of district-court sentences have emerged since
Booker: within-guidelines sentences, modest variances from the guide-
lines and extreme variances from the guidelines. Each group raises a
different set of concerns regarding the tension between individualized





17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(i)(A) (2007); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463
(2007) ("Congressional statutes ... tell the Commission to write Guidelines that will carry out these
same § 3553(a) objectives."); id. at 2464-65 ("[l~t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as
practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s
objectives.").
18. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
19. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2007).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 358 (citing Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465).
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A. Appellate Review of Within-Guidelines Sentences
Any tension between the objectives of individualized sentencing
and consistency essentially disappears when the independent views of
the sentencing court and the Sentencing Commission "align[]. ' 22 As Rita
explained in permitting appellate courts to apply a presumption of rea-
sonableness to within-guidelines sentences, there is no presumption of
unreasonableness for outside-guidelines sentences.23  What makes the
appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences
consistent with Booker and consistent with the Sixth Amendment is that
it turns in part on the "double determination" that "both the sentencing
judge and the Sentencing Commission... reached the same conclusion
as to the proper sentence in the particular case.",
24
If the Sentencing Commission and the sentencing judge come to the
same conclusion about an appropriate sentencing range, and if the sen-
tencing judge exercises independent judgment in reaching that conclu-
sion and satisfies the procedural requirements of post-Booker sentencing
(appreciating the advisory nature of the Guidelines, properly calculating
the guideline range and offering a reasoned explanation for the sentence),
it is difficult to see how either individualized sentencing or consistency
has been compromised. That is not to say there is no role for appellate
review in this setting; the presumption of reasonableness, we know, re-
mains a rebuttable one.2 5 It is to say, however, that a central concern of
post-Booker review-respecting individualized sentencing judgments
while preserving consistency--does not support reversal when the discre-
tionary views of one judge and the national recommendations of the
Commission are on the same page.
B. Appellate Review of Modest Variances from the Guidelines
When by contrast the Commission and the sentencing judge dis-
agree, even insubstantially, that means an appellate judge concerned
about furthering individualized sentencing and consistency has some-
thing to think about. The key role of the appellate court when the dis-
agreement is relatively modest, as I see it, is a procedural one, and the
most essential procedural protection is an insistence on a coherent expla-
nation for the sentence.
If one takes seriously the Sentencing Commission's role in develop-
ing appropriate sentencing ranges, courts of appeals should insist that
district courts offer a reasoned explanation for any guidelines variances,
not because outside-guidelines sentences are presumptively wrong, not
22. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).
23. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467.
24. Id. at 2463; see Buchanan, 449 F.3d at 736-37 (Sutton, J., concurring).
25. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463 ("For one thing, the presumption is not binding."); id. at 2474
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he rebuttability of the presumption is real.").
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because the district court lacks authority to reinstate the same sentence
on remand after giving a more thorough explanation, but because any
hope that the Sentencing Commission's recommendations will evolve to
account for the views of 1,000 or so district court judges demands dia-
logue. Congress has recognized as much. Although it requires courts to
give a statement of reasons for each and every sentence, it requires courts
to give "'the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different
from"' the sentence recommended by the Sentencing Commission. 6
The Supreme Court seems to have come to the same conclusion, suggest-
ing that within-guidelines sentences demand a less thorough explanation
than outside-guidelines sentences.27
After insisting on this explanation (and after insisting on trial-court
compliance with the other procedural rules of post-Booker sentencing), I
see little room for appellate review-little room for a substantive re-
assessment of the length of the sentence in light of the district court's
application of the § 3553(a) factors. Why? It is notoriously difficult to
conduct this kind of review in a principled way; appellate courts are
poorly positioned to reassess the application of these factors from a dis-
tance-think of the challenges of reassessing an individual's prospects
for rehabilitation or recidivism; the cost of not conducting substantive
review (modest inconsistencies) is low; and the value of not doing it
(promoting individualized sentencing) is high.
The difficulty of policing modest variances has at least two sources.
If 1,000 district court judges have different views about how to imple-
ment the disparate purposes of sentences, you can bet that 270 or so ap-
pellate judges do as well. Even if you break the numbers down to the
active and senior judges serving on one appellate court (the Sixth Circuit
has 22), there is no reason to think that geographical affinity will some-
how eliminate these differences-to say nothing of creating a consensus
on what substantive reasonableness or abuse-of-discretion review means
in the setting of modest variances.
How, moreover, does a court of appeals explain the decision to af-
firm some of these modest variances but not others on substantive rea-
sonableness grounds? In reversing some extreme upward and downward
variances on substantive grounds, our court has explained that the district
court's explanations left "no room to make reasoned distinctions between
[the defendant's downward] variance and the variances that other, more
worthy defendants may deserve. 28 An insistence that trial courts make
"reasoned distinctions" among types of defendants may be appropriate
26. Poynter, 495 F.3d at 356 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (2007)).
27. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468 ("[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.").
28. United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 2006) (vacating a 99.89% downward
variance); see Poynter, 495 F.3d at 354-55 (vacating a 206% upward variance).
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when it comes to extreme variances. But is it doable with respect to
modest variances? And even if it is, courts of appeals that insist on "rea-
soned distinctions" between defendants ought to ensure that they provide
"reasoned distinctions" between the modest variances they uphold and
the ones they reverse, and that their efforts in the end promote the best
reason for conducting such review in the first instance-consistency-
rather than undermining it. That is a difficult mission, perhaps an impos-
sible mission. For my part, so long as appellate courts ensure that the
trial courts meaningfully communicate why a guidelines sentence does
not make sense in a given case and so long as they ensure that trial courts
comply with the procedural requirements of post-Booker sentencing, I
see little room for substantive-reasonableness review of such sentences.
The value of individualized sentencing trumps the minor consistency
gains that substantive review might give us.
All of which prompts the question of what kinds of variances am I
talking about-what kinds of sentences should receive little substantive
review? The answer is not a numerical one-with downward variances
of, say, 20% receiving little substantive review and downward variances
of, say, 80% receiving more rigorous review. The answer is a functional
one. If a court of appeals can draw "reasoned distinctions" among de-
fendants, then it should not hesitate to engage in substantive review,
which will further consistency while curbing the risks of unchecked indi-
vidualized sentencing. If it cannot, then the game is not worth the can-
dle.
C. Appellate Review of Extreme Variances from the Guidelines
The individualized-sentencing/consistency tension arises most
acutely in the setting of extreme variances from the guidelines. Here we
have the issue in full bloom-broad statutory sentencing ranges, indi-
vidualized sentences from one end of each range to the other and the risk
that with time sentences all over the map for the same crime will become
the rule rather than the exception.
Any effort to avoid the return of sentencing disparities while pre-
serving individualized sentencing must account for the role of the appel-
late courts. Leave it to an appellate judge, I realize, to identify a prob-
lem, then insist that only appellate judges can solve it, but bear with me.
Trial courts, for starters, cannot manage consistency-unless they reflex-
ively follow the guidelines and forsake the independent judgment that
Booker and Rita expect of them. Once they exercise that judgment, "dis-
trict court judges cannot correct" unwarranted sentencing disparities
"within their circuit or even their own court (so long as two or more
judges sit there), much less nationwide, because 'different judges (and
others) can differ as to how best to reconcile the disparate ends of pun-
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ishment. ' ''29 Reasonableness review allows "appellate courts to mini-
mize sentencing disparities between and among district courts (and be-
tween and among courts of appeals), 30 and thus to "iron out" these sen-
tencing differences.
31
No doubt, Congress and the Sentencing Commission can manage
consistency, but the question is whether they can do so while preserving
the virtues of individualized sentencing. Perhaps more importantly, nei-
ther body has responded to Booker-either by correcting the Sixth
Amendment defect in the original guidelines or by correcting the rem-
edy. Until then, the appellate courts are the only body available to man-
age the individualized-sentencing/consistency dilemma.
In "iron[ing] out" serious sentencing differences through reason-
ableness review, appellate courts must determine the role that the guide-
lines will play and must determine what other tools they may use to pre-
serve consistency without squelching individualized sentencing.32 A few
tools seem straightforward and relatively non-controversial.
First, in conducting reasonableness review, appellate courts ought
to be able to treat the guidelines as an organizing principle-in view of
the Sentencing Commission's expertise, its efforts to account for the
§ 3553(a) factors and the absence of any other tenable threshold for be-
ginning the discussion.
Starting with the statutory minimum (if any) for the offense, then ad-
justing the sentence upward (if appropriate) based on the appellate
court's own assessment of the § 3553(a) factors, and then (and only
then) considering the guidelines range might work in theory but
would seem doomed to founder on the "rough equality" requirement,
if not the impracticability of such an approach.33
Booker and Rita seem to resolve this issue, both clearly noting that rea-
sonableness review must account for the guidelines recommendation and
both seeming to permit that review to start with a consideration of the
guidelines-recommended sentencing range.34  Consistent with this ap-
proach, Rita suggests that the trial court should consider whether to grant
a departure before considering whether to grant a variance.35
29. Poynter, 495 F.3d at 352 (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464).
30. Davis, 458 F.3d at 495.
31. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263 (2005).
32. Id.
33. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).
34. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 ("The sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally
begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines."); Booker, 543
U.S. at 264 ("The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guide-
lines and take them into account when sentencing.").
35. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
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Second, appellate courts should be able to insist that trial courts of-
fer more detailed explanations for outside-guidelines sentences than for
within-guidelines sentences. Although Congress expects sentencing
courts to give a rationale for all sentences, it requires them to give "the
specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from" the
guidelines-recommended sentence.36 Given this congressional directive,
appellate courts have ample grounds for conducting a searching inquiry
of the "specific reason" or reasons given when a district court chooses to
impose a sentence near or at the outer edge of the statutory range--or
what often comes to the same thing, a sentence that varies substantially
from the guidelines range.37
Third, I likewise see no reason why courts of appeals cannot give
careful scrutiny to the other procedural requirements of post-Booker rea-
sonableness review in the context of extreme variances. When a sentenc-
ing judge exercises his discretion to vary from the recommendations of
the Sentencing Commission in a substantial way, he should not be sur-
prised when appellate courts scrutinize his compliance with the proce-
dural requirements of post-Booker review-not because outside-
guidelines sentences are presumptively wrong or even discouraged but
because an appellate court's concerns about uniformity ought to ensure
that such variances adhere to these rules and ensure for the benefit of the
Sentencing Commission that the explanations for these sentences are
meaningful ones.
Fourth, whatever rules appellate courts adopt for reviewing post-
Booker sentences, they ought to apply them with equal vigor or laxity to
upward and downward variances. Nothing in the guidelines suggests
that variances in one direction over another deserve special attention.
Nothing in Booker and Rita suggests different standards of review should
apply to the two types of variances; indeed, the opposite is true.38 Noth-
ing Congress has said indicates that different standards of review should
apply. The directive that trial courts should "impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the provisions set
forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection" does not favor one type of sen-
tence over another. 39 It is as concerned with ensuring that sentences are
"sufficient" as it is with ensuring that they are "no greater than neces-
sary." 40  And nothing about the individualized-sentencing/consistency
dilemma suggests that different standards of review ought to apply de-
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (2007).
37. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 356 (6th Cir. 2007).
38. Cf Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Thus, if the contours
of reasonableness review must be narrowed in some cases because of constitutional concerns, then
they must be narrowed in all cases in light of Congress's desire for a uniform standard of review.");
Booker,,543 U.S. at 257 ("Congress would not have enacted sentencing statutes that make it more
difficult to adjust sentences upward than to adjust them downward.").
39. § 3553(a).
40. Id.
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pending on whether the variance runs toward the statutory minimum or
toward the statutory maximum.
Fifth, once the appellate judge moves beyond these tools for review-
ing extreme variances, the matter gets more complicated. How does an
appellate court conduct substantive reasonableness review? How does it
work toward consistency while preserving individualized sentencing?
May it apply a sliding-scale form of review to extreme variances, insist-
ing that the greater the variance, the greater the explanation needed to
justify it? May it permit trial judges to sentence individuals based on
policy disagreements with the guidelines? What of discouraged factors
under the guidelines-such as family circumstances, employment history
or a disadvantaged youth?4' The Court has some of these questions be-
fore it in Gall v. United States42 and Kimbrough v. United States.43 In
view of that fact, let me highlight the unusual nature of this litigation and
briefly consider these debates in the context of the individualized-
sentencing/consistency dilemma.
Both cases, like Rita, arise in an atypical setting. It is not every day
that the Court, after deciding that a statute violates the Constitution, ad-
dresses whether the implementation of the remedy for that constitutional
violation itself violates the Constitution or whether the remedy remains
consistent with congressional intent as revealed by the remnants of a
partially invalidated statute. Booker of course was not an everyday case,
so implementation questions should surprise no one.
This unusual backdrop also helps to explain why Rita would permit
appellate courts to adopt a presumption of reasonableness while not re-
quiring them to do so.44 If an appellate presumption of reasonableness
does not violate the Sixth Amendment and if it is not otherwise inconsis-
tent with what Congress would have wished once the mandatory provi-
sions of the guidelines were invalidated, on what basis could the Court
strike it? And if the absence of the presumption does not raise any of
these problems, on what basis could the Court invalidate this contrary
approach to appellate review? The Court might have said that the ab-
sence of an appellate presumption fosters inconsistency-a driving con-
cem behind the creation of the guidelines. 45 But there has been no sus-
41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.5, 5H1.6, 5H1.l2 (2006).
42. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-
7949).
43. 174 F. App'x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007)
(No. 06-6330).
44. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) ("The first question is whether a court
of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a
proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We conclude that it can.").
45. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2007) (stating that one purpose of the Sentencing Com-
mission is to devise guidelines that "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sen-
tencing, [while] avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct .... "); see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467
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tained indication that the presumption has produced meaningfully differ-
ent outcomes in the circuits.4 6 If neither side of a circuit split violates the
Booker constitutional or remedial opinions, and if the disagreement be-
tween the circuits has not generated materially different results, one can
readily sympathize with the Court's inclination to let the circuits con-
tinue to implement these approaches as they will.
Rita, as I have indicated, does not undermine consistency or indi-
vidualized sentencing. Because the presumption of reasonableness ap-
plies only when the sentencing judge independently agrees with the Sen-
tencing Commission's national recommendations, the Court's approval
of the presumption does not compromise either objective.
Gall and Kimbrough, by contrast, squarely present the individual-
ized-sentencing/consistency dilemma. Sliding-scale review, at issue in
Gall, raises the specter of advancing consistency at the expense of indi-
vidualized sentencing and of potentially using this form of review to
reinstate mandatory guidelines. But the absence of some form of sliding-
scale review, particularly in the context of extreme variances, is equally
problematic. How does an appellate court manage consistency concerns
or, in the words of the statute, "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing dispari-
ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar criminal conduct 'A7 without insisting on an explanation com-
mensurate with the length of an extreme variance? "What would an
'unwarranted' sentencing disparity be if not a sentence lacking sufficient
justification for its disparity from the sentences of other similarly situated
defendants? ' '48 And how else can a court of appeals judge "tell when
such disparities are occurring without consulting the guidelines range? 'A9
The Kimbrough case raises similar problems. Prohibiting district
court judges from disagreeing with the application of certain guidelines
in individual cases risks favoring consistency over individualized sen-
tencing. What are advisory guidelines, moreover, if they are not guide-
lines with which district court judges can disagree-or at least disagree
with their application in a given case? But if a district court judge may
disagree with the policy judgment behind a guideline, what does a court
of appeals do when another district court judge takes a different view?
Are both views permissible? Or only one? One view destroys consis-
tency while the other promotes it. Or do trial and appellate judges have
authority only to offer reasoned explanations for choosing not to apply a
guideline in a given case?
("Congress sought to diminish unwarranted sentencing disparity. It sought a Guidelines system that
would bring about greater fairness in sentencing through increased uniformity.").
46. United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).
47. § 991(b)(1)(B).
48. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 2007).
49. Id.
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The critical question is whether the cases are amenable to resolution
without compromising one objective or the other. Time will tell. If there
is a path to common ground, it is likely one that narrows what is meant
by sliding-scale review and what is meant by policy disagreements with
the guidelines. Sliding-scale review need not foreshadow a return to
mandatory guidelines if all that the appellate court seeks is an explana-
tion commensurate with the variance, a requirement that advances the
Sentencing Commission's information-gathering function, that is essen-
tial to preserving consistency in the context of extreme variances and that
at any rate does not prohibit the sentencing judge from re-imposing the
same variance on remand after supplying additional reasoning. With
respect to policy disagreements with the guidelines, it is one thing to
permit trial courts (or courts of appeals) to register wholesale objections
to a guideline and effectively take on the task of writing a new one; it is
another thing to permit a district court to explain not why a guideline has
no conceivably legitimate application, but why its application makes
little sense in that case. The latter approach raises the possibility of pre-
serving consistency and individualized sentencing.
The broader question-maybe the most important question-
lurking in both cases is the respect the Sentencing Commission deserves
in attempting to reconcile consistency goals with individualized-
sentencing goals through its recommended guidelines ranges. Few peo-
ple, I suspect, would object to a world in which rough sliding-scale re-
view applied and judges could not register across-the-board objections to
specific guidelines if all participants in the criminal justice system had
the same level of confidence in the work of the Commission. Whether
there is a need for a better understanding of how the Commission ac-
counts for what district court judges are in fact doing and what diverse
experts in the field are in fact recommending, or whether there is a de-
mand for the Commission to have success in altering guidelines that have
lost the confidence of the public (take the 100:1 crack-powder cocaine
ratio), one cannot help but think that concerns about consistency and
individualized sentencing will be easier to manage in the future as the
Commission continues to make headway in convincing stakeholders that
what Congress asked the Commission to do-account for all of the
§ 3553(a) factors-it in fact did do.
In that sense, Gall and Kimbrough may be beside the broader point.
The goal after Booker ought to be to ensure that district courts exercise
the independent judgment the Court gave them; the courts of appeals
ought to ensure that trial judges exercise this discretion while preserving
rough ranges of consistency; and the Commission ought to listen to both
of them and continue working to convince all participants in the criminal
justice system that its recommendations deserve respect.
Congress of course has a role to play as well-first in letting the
Commission do the task it was assigned and second in its regulation of
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crime. Any long-term effort to respect the virtues of individualized sen-
tencing and consistency should account for the role that the federaliza-
tion of crime has played in creating the problem. It is one thing for a
state such as Ohio to develop criminal laws and ranges of criminal pun-
ishments for 11.4 million people who live within 41 thousand square
miles;50 it is quite another for Congress to undertake the same task for
299 million people who live within 3.5 million square miles.5 While
Ohio has no obligation to sentence those who commit drug offenses
within its borders consistently with those who do the same in North Da-
kota, Congress does have such an obligation. Anyone interested in bal-
ancing consistency with individualized sentencing ought to acknowledge
that the task is harder for the Federal Government than for a State, and
ought to keep that in mind each time someone proposes federalizing a
new area of crime. Criminal law experiments unleashed on 300 million
people are as difficult to implement and monitor as they are to change.
50. OHIO QUICKFACTS FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/39000.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
51. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/nations/United-
States (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).

DAYS WITHOUT IMMIGRANTS: ANALYSIS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION
RALLIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
MICHAEL C. DUFFt
INTRODUCTION
In the late winter and spring of 2006, a series of massive "pro-
immigration" rallies occurred in a number of cities throughout the United
States. One of the unusual aspects of the rallies was that many of them
took place during the week on traditional work days.' As one commenta-
tor has noted, large-scale political demonstrations historically have been
held on the weekend, presumably so that potential participants would not
have to miss work to attend and would not face the possibility of being
disciplined by their employers.2 A number of employees attending the
immigration rallies on a work day were fired by their employers. 3 Ac-
cording to newspaper accounts, at least some of these fired employees
filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 4 alleging
that their discharges violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West
Chester University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. The author is grateful to
Matthew Bodie, Jacqueline Bridgeman, Debra Donahue, Betty Duff, Harvey Gelb and Victoria
Klein for their frank criticisms and helpful suggestions.
1. A review of approximately seventy-five news stories (list on file with author) reveals the
following general timeline: Major rallies were held in various locations throughout the nation on
Tuesday, February 14; Friday, March 10; Thursday through Monday, March 23 through March 27;
Wednesday, March 29; Saturday, April 1; Saturday, April 8; Sunday, April 9; Monday, April 10
(102 cities simultaneously); Tuesday, April 11; and Monday, May 1 (El Gran Paro Americano - the
Great American strike). Thus, two of the most significant of these rallies, in which hundreds of
thousands of individuals participated, were held on Mondays-April 10 and May 1.
2. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Roots of May Day: Today's Marchers are Liberals' Best Hope,
SLATE MAGAZINE, May 1, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140846/. Of course, there is a tacit
assumption by the author that the term "work day" continues to make sense in the American econ-
omy. As of 2004, one-third of employed Americans worked Saturdays, Sundays or both weekend
days. Harriet B. Presser, Extended Abstracts from Conference, Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety
and Health, Working in a 24/7 Economy: Challenges for American Families, April 29-30, 2004,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/workschedules/abstracts/presser.html#prev.
3. The thrust of these accounts is that the employees were fired for absenteeism. It is also
conceivable that employees may have been discharged for mere attendance at an immigration rally.
While this article will not discuss the second theory, if immigration rallies are protected activity
under the NLRA, it could be argued forcefully that a discharge for engaging in the activity during
nonworking time presumptively violates the NLRA because it would not invade a management
interest. See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 572 (1978) (employer retaliation for employee
distribution of union newsletter-a protected NLRA activity--off the employer's property "clearly
would be protected by [section 7 of the NLRA] against employer discipline").
4. Georgia B. Pabst, Restaurant Workers File Labor Charge, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2006, available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=416449.
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tions Act (NLRA).5 This article explores legal issues arising from these
discharges through the prism of the NLRA.6 The relationship between
federal labor law and immigration rallies may not be immediately appar-
ent. However, as will be developed through this article, immigration
rallies protesting congressional legislation likely to lead to the loss of
immigrant workers' jobs-through increasingly aggressive enforcement
of immigration laws-can be readily conceived as both "work" disputes
and mass political protests over immigration policy. Indeed, this article
argues that for reasons of policy and efficacy the rallies are best viewed
as labor disputes.
The immigration issue intensified in the early months of 2006 in re-
action to legislation proposed in the House of Representatives that would
have essentially classified employees working without required immigra-
tion documentation as felons.7 The proposal sparked the rallies under
discussion. Following these "days without immigrants," 8 many politi-
5. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (2007). Unless otherwise indicated, "NLRA" is used throughout
this article to refer to the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 and its major amendments,
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, and the Labor-Management Reporting
& Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959. "Internal" statutory citations will also be utilized, for
example, Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that "[i]t shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7." 29 U.S.C.A. § 158. Section 7 states in turn that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities." 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.
6. At the conclusion of 2006, the NLRB's chief prosecutor, the General Counsel, had pub-
licly issued a handful of "Advice" memoranda addressing the subject of whether employee participa-
tion in the immigration rallies is protected concerted activity under the NLRA. Advice memoranda
are documents that announce the willingness of the NLRB to pursue legal issues, particularly issues
that are novel or controversial. If the General Counsel will not pursue a legal theory, it cannot be
presented to the adjudicatory arm of the NLRB or to the courts for consideration. Some of the
immigration rally memoranda will be discussed in this article. There is no easy way for observers
outside the NLRB to divine from the issued memoranda the total number of charges filed in the
regional offices raising the same or similar issues. Presumably, the issued documents effectively
dispose of other similar pending cases. Although those memoranda, and this inquiry, were prompted
by the 2006 rallies, the issues arising from those rallies would probably arise in most immigration
protest scenarios. In light of present immigration trends, the emergence of immigration protest
issues will likely continue, notwithstanding the poor turnout at subsequent immigration rallies staged
in the Fall of 2006. See Daryl Fears & N.C. Aizenman, Immigration Rally's Low Turnout Disap-
points Advocates, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A6, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/07/AR2006090701247.html.
7. The newspaper reports are legion. A few examples include: Monica Davey, Protest
Rallies End in Job Loss for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/59/19116 [hereinafter Davey, Protest];
Monica Davey, Employers Gird for Immigrant Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A12 [hereinaf-
ter Davey, Employers]. Rallies occurred nationwide throughout this period. Attendance at a rally
held on Mar. 25, 2006 in Los Angeles was estimated at between 500,000 and 750,000 protesters.
See Jim Newton, Villaraigosa Tells Where He Stands, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at AI, available
at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/59/19116#1; see also Thousands March for
Immigrant Rights: Schools, Businesses Feel Impact as Students, Workers Walk Out, CNN.Com,
May 1, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html.
8. The colorful term used to advertise many of these rallies was "A Day Without Immi-
grants." See, e.g.,, Jon Sarche, US Prepares for'Day Without Immigrants,' ABC NEWS.COM, May 1,
2006, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/05/0 /nationa/aO4560ID96.DTL.
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cians and legislators have called for immediate reform, and the subject of
illegal immigration 9 has frequented the headlines of the popular press.
The policy questions surrounding the immigration debate over roughly
the last decade are profound and sweeping. But economic evidence as to
whether immigration represents a net gain or loss to the American econ-
omy remains complex, often in conflict and, by any estimation, still
evolving.' 0 Nevertheless, a significant portion of the American "general
public" appears to view present immigration trends as a de facto "inva-
sion,"" and demands that the government immediately close the borders
and classify undocumented immigrants already present in the country as
felons. 12 Much of the anti-immigration frenzy seems driven substantially
by the largely erroneous notion that undocumented immigrants draw
more in public benefits than they contribute to the treasury.1 3  Regard-
9. Any discussion of immigration immediately presents a terminological mine field. See
Beth Lyon, When More Security Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering US. Laws that
Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 573-82 (2004). Following
Lyon, throughout this article the term "unauthorized worker" is utilized to refer to anyone whom
immigration laws forbid to work, and "undocumented immigrant" to refer to any individual whose
presence in the United States is unauthorized. Not all undocumented immigrants work or seek to do
SO.
10. For example, compare Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Gains
From Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the U.S., (Fondozione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working
Paper No. 52.06, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=896667 (net gain to economy) with
GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1999) (net
loss to economy). For a general survey of economic assessments of immigration, see Francine J.
Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representa-
tion, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (2006).
11. Lipman, supra note 10, at 2 n. 1. A flurry of legislative activity at the close of the 109th
Congress reflected this mood. During the 2nd Session, the House of Representatives passed (but the
Senate did not approve) the following measures: Secure Fence Act of 2006, H.R. 6061, 109th Cong.
(2006) (a bill authorizing building 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border); Federal
Election Integrity Act of 2006, H.R. 4844, 109th Cong. (2006) (a bill requiring people registering to
vote to provide proof of U.S. citizenship); Border Tunnel Prevention Act of 2006, H.R. 4830, 109th
Cong. (2006) (a bill making it a crime to build or finance a tunnel between the U.S. and Mexico or
Canada); Community Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 6094, 109th Cong. (2006) (a bill purporting to
combat "alien gang crime" that would give the Department of Homeland Security the authority to
detain illegal aliens); Immigration Law Enforcement Act, H.R. 6095, 109th Cong. (2006) (a bill
affirming the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration laws).
Taken together the legislation seemed to reflect the sense of the Congress that constituents in certain
quarters felt besieged. Whether that sense will be perceived and pursued with equal energy by future
Congresses remains to be seen. An articulate exposition of the invasion theme is set forth in
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD INVASION AND CONQUEST OF
AMERICA (2006).
12. Border closure as a remedy to alleged immigration onslaught is not a new phenomenon in
American history. Michelle Wucker states that "[iun the early 1920s, the American nativist move-
ment that had been growing over a half century finally succeeded in dramatically cutting back immi-
gration and intimidating immigrants into trying to obscure their foreign origins." MICHELE
WUCKER, LOCKOUT: WHY AMERICA KEEPS GETTING IMMIGRATION WRONG WHEN OUR
PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON GETTING IT RIGHT xiii (2006). However, as Professor Reich has noted,
"Nativists assume that unlawful immigration can be easily controlled, ignoring the ineffectiveness of
INS enforcement and denying the reality of a continued undocumented presence." Peter L. Reich,
Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV.
219, 243 (1991).
13. Seventy-five percent of illegal immigrants have their income taxes withheld, and less than
a third of these taxpayers file for a refund. Larry J. Obhof, The Irrationality of Enforcement? An
Economic Analysis of U.S. Immigration Law, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 175 (2002). Though
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less, with an estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in
the United States, roughly 7 million of whom are unauthorized workers
(about 4.9 percent of the overall work force), 14 mass immigrant "round-
ups" and deportations would be extremely contentious and destabilizing.
Leaving aside the multitude of ethical objections to such a policy, mass
deportation would also be extremely expensive.15
Although such dramatic events involving the forcible suppression of
millions of people could however unadvisedly transpire, it is difficult to
imagine how that could happen soon.16  Accordingly, because undocu-
mented immigrants will keep working in the United States for the fore-
seeable future, their status under American labor and employment laws,
and the implications of that status, will remain significant.'7 Further-
more, the policies underlying the dizzying array of federal and state
workplace regulation will accordingly continue to collide with immigra-
tion policy in complex and unexpected ways.'
8
surprising to many observers, a variety of tax devices allow unauthorized workers to report income
and pay taxes and allow employers to withhold payroll taxes. Many of these devices appear to
center on the use by unauthorized workers of fraudulently obtained social security numbers. Lip-
man, supra note 10, at 20-26.
14. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY,
PEW HISPANIC CENTER (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6l .pdf.
15. A report by the Center for American Progress estimated the cost of deportation as of 2005
at between $206 and $230 billion dollars over five years. RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT,
(2005), http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting the undocumented.pdf. This represents a
minimum annual expenditure during that period of about $41 billion dollars, a figure exceeding the
entire 2006 budget of the Department of Homeland Security, and representing half of the 2006
spending on the Iraq War and double the amount spent on the Afghanistan campaign the same year.
16. Recognition of this fact appears to be the rationale behind passage of H.R. 6095, see Fears
& Aizenman, supra note 6, which seeks reaffirmation for the authority originally granted in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), the initial effort by Congress to
"deputize" State and Local officials to perform aspects of immigration enforcement, an inherently
Federal function. As a general proposition, the delegation is permissible. See De Canas v. Bica, 424
U.S. 351, 356-58 (1976) (while immigration is an inherently Federal function, state regulation only
speculatively touching on immigration is not proscribed because there is insufficient evidence that
Congress intended to preempt the entire field of immigration). Thus, while state involvement in
immigration enforcement is hardly novel, see, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468,473-75
(9th Cir. 1983), the idea has reached new levels of urgency because the forcible "removal" of 12
million immigrants from the United States without heavy resort to State and Local law enforcement
is virtually unimaginable. The uneasiness reflected by the duplication of efforts inherent in H.R.
6095 appears well-founded. An undertaking of such magnitude and complexity cries out for the
clearest authorization.
17. The impact of foreign-born workers on policy issues involving organized labor seems to
be increasing. Statistics compiled by the Migration Policy Institute reveal that while the percentage
of both native born and foreign born workers represented by a union declined between 1996 and
2003, from 17% to 15% in the case of native born workers and from 14% to 11% in the case of
immigrant workers, the absolute number of foreign-born workers represented by a union rose by
23% during the same time period while the number of native-born workers represented by a union
declined by 7% during that period. ELIZABETH GRIECO, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, FACT
SHEET No. 7, IMMIGRANT UNION MEMBERS: NUMBERS AND TRENDS (May 2004),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/7_ImmigrantUnionMembership.pdf.
18. One of the more recent and powerful examples of this collision was the Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148-50 (2002). In Hoffmnan,
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Part I of this article addresses whether immigration rallies are pro-
tected activity under the NLRA and, if so, the best way to characterize
the protected activity. Part II discusses the employee status of unauthor-
ized workers under the NLRA. Part III considers whether NLRA protec-
tion of employees engaging repeatedly in immigration rallies could be
lost if the rallies are unprotected intermittent work stoppages. Part IV
addresses whether the immigration rallies constitute unlawful "secondary
activity" because they enmesh unoffending employers in a labor contro-
versy "not of the employers' making." Assessing the above strands of
inquiry, Part V considers the significance of the rallies being classified as
NLRA-cognizable conduct. The assessment takes due account of recent
Supreme Court authority holding that unauthorized workers are not enti-
tled to important NLRA remedies, but expands the inquiry to systemic
considerations deriving from federal labor law preemption principles and
to conflicts between federal labor law and national immigration policy.
The article concludes that federal labor law could in some instances pro-
tect participation in the rallies and in other instances render the rallies
unlawful. Without explicit congressional authorization, legal actors
should not in either case abandon the labor law model for a risky and
untested amalgam of federal and state enforcement of immigration law
when addressing legal issues arising from the rallies. Such a course
would unnecessarily generate conflicts with federal labor law, which in
any event possesses a superior model for dealing with concerted work-
related protests.
I. RALLY PARTICIPATION AS PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NLRA
The discussion of whether employee participation in immigration
rallies is protected by Section 7 of the NLRA 19 will operate under the
general assumption that activities surrounding immigration rallies have
nothing to do with formal "self-organization" of employees. The discus-
sion will also assume that activities surrounding immigration rallies gen-
erally do not represent an attempt by employees to "form, join, or assist
labor organizations," "bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing," or "engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining" as each of these phrases is defined in Sec-
tion 7.20 Accordingly, whether the NLRA could in general be applied to
the Court held that an unauthorized worker found by the NLRB to have been unlawfully laid off was
not entitled to back pay, the only significant remedy available in the circumstances. The literature
discussing the Hoffman case is already substantial. For a very readable discussion, see Catherine L.
Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights
Without Remedies, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399-438 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005). The discussion chronicles the mainly unsuccessful attempts by employers to extend the
Hoffman holding beyond the confines of the NLRA to an array of State and Federal labor and em-
ployment law regimes. Id. at 432-36.
19. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (2007) (relevant statutory language).
20. By all accounts, the 2006 protest rallies were solely an appeal to the Government. See,
e.g., Greg Miller, Immigration Activists March Again, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at 11, available at
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immigration rallies depends on the characterization of rally participants'
conduct as engaging "in other concerted activities for the purpose of...
other mutual aid or protection.",
21
The Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 7's "mutual aid
or protection" language in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.22 The seemingly narrow
issue in Eastex was whether an employer that prevented its union-
represented employees from distributing a union newsletter in non-
working areas of the employer's property during non-working time had
violated the NLRA by interfering with statutory employees engaged in
"other concerted activities" for the purpose of "mutual aid or protec-
tion., 23 The newsletter in question urged employees to support the union
and discussed a proposal to incorporate the state "right-to-work" statute
into the state constitution as well as a presidential veto of an increase in
the federal minimum wage.24 In defense of its action of forbidding dis-
tribution of the newsletter, the employer argued that the sections of the
newsletter treating the right-to-work and presidential veto issues did not
fall within the purview of Section 7's coverage of concerted activity for
the mutual aid or protection of employees.25 The NLRB administratively
rejected the employer's argument, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit also
rejected the employer's additional argument that the "mutual aid or pro-
tection" clause of Section 7 protected only concerted employee activity
directed at conditions that the employer had the authority or power to
change or control.2 6 The Fifth Circuit found that all of the material in the
newsletter was reasonably related to the employees' jobs or to their
status or condition as employees in the involved plant.27
The Supreme Court characterized the issues in Eastex as whether
the distribution of the newsletter was protected activity and, if it was,
2006 WLNR 6968120. It does not appear that there were attempts by employees or organizations
involved in the rallies to approach employers during these events to directly advocate changes in
immigration policy. As discussed later in the article, some organizations involved in organizing the
rallies are labor unions and some involved organizations that are not labor unions in the traditional
sense may have nonetheless been statutory labor organizations. See infra Part V.
21. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151.
22. 437 U.S. 556, 563-70 (1978).
23. Id. at 558.
24. Id. at 559-60. The union argued that the elevation of the state right to work law to state
constitutional status was objectionable and urged its members to write to their legislators to oppose
it. The union also criticized the President's veto of the minimum wage increase while the profits of
the oil industry were increasing and argued that "as working men and women we must defeat our
enemies and elect our friends." Id. The newsletter concluded by urging its recipients to vote.
25. See id. at 561.
26. Id. at 561-62 (citations omitted). The analysis of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in this section
is based on the Supreme Court's discussion of it.
27. Id. at 562. As Professor Hyde notes, it is far from clear whether the Court approved, sub
silentio, the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the NLRB's further administrative determination that, if the
newsletter contained any statements protected by Section 7, it would be protected in its entirety. See
Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Legal Liberalism, 60
TEx. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981). For purposes of this discussion the distinction is not critical because the
Court agreed that the contested statements contained in the newsletter were protected by Section 7.
[Vol. 85:1
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whether the employer had a countervailing interest justifying interference
with the activity. 28 With respect to the first question, the Court con-
cluded that the mutual aid or protection clause of Section 7 was, among
other things, intended to protect employees "when they engage in other-
wise proper concerted activities in support of employees of employers
other than their own., 29 The Court rejected the employer's argument that
employees lost their protection under the clause when they sought to
improve their terms and conditions of employment or "lot as employees"
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relation-
ship.30
In advancing its argument regarding the breadth of the "mutual aid
or protection" clause, the Eastex Court took pains to note that Congress
had deliberately included the clause's ostentatiously expansive language
delimiting "concerted activity" with the narrower modifying purposes of
"self-organization" and "collective bargaining" precisely because it real-
ized "that labor's cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective
bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment
context.' The Court also noted that the "mutual aid or protection"
clause had already been interpreted by courts as protecting employees
from retaliation by their employers when seeking to improve working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums, or when
employees appealed to legislatures to protect their interests as employ-
ees.32 In short, the Court had no difficulty in broadly extending (or rati-
fying the extension of) the "mutual aid or protection" clause beyond col-
lective bargaining negotiations between employees and employers in a
discrete place of employment.
As a practical matter, the Court's opinion in Eastex might have set-
tled most questions regarding the scope of Section 7's mutual aid or pro-
tection clause had it not "pulled back" on the holding by also announcing
a powerful caveat to its otherwise broad formulation. The Court stated:
It is true, of course, that some concerted activity bears a less immedi-
ate relationship to employees' interests as employees than other such
activity. We may assume that at some point the relationship becomes
so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within
the "mutual aid or protection" clause. It is neither necessary nor ap-
propriate, however, for us to attempt to delineate precisely the
boundaries of the "mutual aid or protection" clause. The task is for
28. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 563. Discussion of the non-germane second question has been omit-
ted.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id. at 565.
31. id.
32. Id. at 565-66.
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the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide va-
riety of cases that come before it.
33
Thus, the NLRB was to do the line-drawing as to the appropriate ambit
of Section 7 and, as it happened, had done so already in a recent case
highlighting early conceptual problems at the intersection of labor law
and immigration policy.
Four years before the Court decided Eastex, the NLRB had consid-
ered whether Section 7 protected employee communications to Congress
that protested proposed changes in immigration rules. In Kaiser Engi-
neers, 34 four employees of Kaiser35 signed a letter authored by employee
Allen, which the employees then sent to three United States Senators and
two United States Representatives. 36 The employees had become con-
cerned that Bechtel Corporation, a company with which Kaiser had a
cooperative arrangement for hiring engineers, was reportedly applying to
the Department of Labor "to ease restrictions on the importation of for-
eign engineers. 37 The Kaiser employees were of the opinion that "such
action was contrary to the engineering profession. ' 3 8 Upon learning of
the letter, Kaiser "offered" Allen the "opportunity to resign or be fired,"
and Allen chose to resign.
39
The NLRB characterized the issue in Kaiser as "whether or not the
sending of the letter to the legislators constituted protected activity
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act."40 In answer to that question
it concluded:
33. Id. at 567-68.
34. 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974).
35. Id. at 754-55. The four employees were members of an in-house "society" of approxi-
mately seventy engineering employees which the NLRB found to be a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the NLRA.
36. Id. at 754.
37. Id. The text of the letter in its entirety read:
Dear Sir,
We write on behalf of a group of about 70 civil engineers at Kaiser Engineers.
It has come to our attention that Bechtel Corp. is seeking authorization [sic]
from the Dept. of Labor to obtain resident visas for any engineers they may
recruit outside the country. We realise [sic] that at the minute engineers are in
demand. However, to import engineers at this time of boom will be extremely
shortsighted for as the market is bound to ease, engineers will be made redun-
dant, and we could have conditions that existed immediately after the big cut-
back in the aerospace industry recently.
Engineers as a profession are not well organised [sic] at present and so cannot
influence such matters as, say, the unions of the AMA can. So it is to our leg-
islators that we must look for some protection from the indiscriminate impor-
tation of engineers by large companies.




40. Id. at 755.
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It appears that the reason for the letter was a fear on the part of the
Society [of Engineers] and its members that relaxing immigration
laws to permit increased importation of alien engineers might affect
the job security of the members of the Society and their fellow engi-
neers. It is concluded that the action to persuade legislators to pre-
vent the influx of alien engineers was for the mutual aid or protection
of the Society as well as their fellow engineers in the profession.4
In support of the proposition that the "mutual aid or protection" clause
extended broadly to include activities beyond those immediately involv-
ing a particular employment relationship, the NLRB cited one of its ear-
lier cases, G & W Electric Specialty Company,42 and a 1940 First Circuit
case, Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation v. NLRB.43
In the course of affirming the NLRB, the Ninth Circuit noted that
cases addressing the extension of Section 7 beyond the strict confines of
the employment relationship were conflicting, 44 and agreed with Kaiser
that employees sending a letter to their legislators "involved no request
for action on the part of the company, did not concern a matter over
which the company had direct control, and was outside the strict confines
of the employment relationship. ' '45  The court nevertheless concluded
that the NLRB's decision was supported by substantial evidence and had
a reasonable basis in the law because the NLRB could properly have
found that "the members of the [Society of Engineers] had a legitimate
41. Id. Ultimately, the NLRB found that Kaiser violated both Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA. Id. at 756. Section 8(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" by means of
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment .. " 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (2007). A labor
organization is defined in Section 2(5) of the NLRA as any "employee representation committee or
plan .. .which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." See
also Kaiser Eng'rs, 213 N.L.R.B. at 755. Thus, the Board found that the Society was a labor organi-
zation and that Allen had been discriminated against by being forced to resign his employment in
part for the purpose of discouraging his membership, and the membership of other Kaiser employ-
ees, in the Society. Id. The decision lacked the detailed allocation of burdens utilized under present
law to analyze whether the Government has established a violation of Section 8(a)(3). That refined
analysis was adopted by the NLRB and approved by the courts about four years later. See NLRB v.
Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-403 (1983); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980),
enforced, 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). That analysis would have
required the General Counsel to explicitly find the existence of protected activity as part of a prima
facie case in considering whether Allen was forced to resign. The implied establishment of the
Section 8(a)(3) prima facie case was in any event bolstered by the additional finding that the forced
resignation independently violated Section 8(a)(1). Kaiser Eng'rs, 213 N.L.R.B. at 756 n.7.
42. 154 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1137 (1965). In G & W, the NLRB opined that construing Section 7
as protecting only activities "directly and immediately" involving a particular employment relation-
ship had the effect of reading the mutual aid or protection clause out of the NLRA. Id. at 1137-38.
43. 114 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1940). In Bethlehem Shipbuilding, the First Circuit held that
.. the right of employees to self-organization, and to engage in concerted activities,... is not
limited to direct collective bargaining with the employer, but extends to other activities for 'mutual
aid or protection' including appearance of employee representatives before legislative committees."
Id. In Kaiser, the NLRB had no difficulty extending this principle to written communications from
employees to legislators.
44. Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 1385.
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concern in national immigration policy insofar as it might affect their job
security," and that lobbying legislators regarding changes in such policy
could be "action taken for 'mutual aid or protection' within the meaning
of section 7 .... , 46
Then-Circuit Court Judge Anthony Kennedy dissented from the
opinion. Kennedy flatly disagreed that the Society's lobbying with re-
gard to national immigration policy was protected activity under the
NLRA.47 Kennedy adhered to the "general rule," previously articulated
by the Seventh Circuit, that Section 7 activity necessarily concerns "a
matter with respect to which the employer had the power and right to do
something about.' '48 The Ninth Circuit had been following the same rule,
in slightly altered language, that "a protected activity must seek a spe-
cific remedy for a work related complaint or grievance." 49 The Supreme
Court later noted in Eastex, however, that the Seventh Circuit rule es-
poused by Judge Kennedy in Kaiser "ignore[d] [the] substantial weight
of authority to the contrary, including the Seventh Circuit's own prior
holding.,
50
The Eastex majority cited the NLRB's decision in Kaiser twice with
apparent approval. 51 There was no suggestion by the Court that any fed-
eral court had at that juncture questioned Kaiser's rule that employee
entreaties to legislators concerning immigration policy impacting em-
ployment fell within the ambit of Section 7. There continues to be no
adverse authority on this point, and federal courts have had no subse-
quent occasion to disturb Kaiser.
5 2
A recent memorandum issued by the General Counsel of the NLRB
in Reliable Maintenance states that "employee concerted activity en-
gaged in to support a protected subject matter may not itself be protected
if it exerts economic pressure on an employer with no control over the
subject matter., 53  Curiously, the memorandum cites to Eastex, which
had in turn favorably cited Kaiser, a case that had also involved em-
ployee protest over immigration policy over which the employer had "no
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1387 (quoting G & W Elec. Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir.
1966)).
49. Id. (quoting Shelley & Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200, 1202-03
(9th Cir. 1974)).
50. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978).
51. Id. at 566-67 nn.16-17.
52. See, e.g., Tradesmen Int'l v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1143-45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding
the principle that employees may direct concerted activities toward entities other than their own
employers, or even entities other than other employees' employers, in order to protect job security,
but, distinguishing Kaiser, denying the union's activities in Tradesmen had either that effect or that
objective).
53. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Robert W. Chester,
Reg'I Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Reliable Maint., Case 18-CA-18119 (October 31, 2006),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Advice%20Memos/2006/18-CA-18119.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Kearney, Reliable Maint.].
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control." The factual distinction between Kaiser, to which the General
Counsel did not cite, and Reliable Maintenance, is presumably 4 that the
latter case involved a cessation of work while the former did not. Al-
though the General Counsel purported not to be deciding whether "the
employee's participation in, or support for, such demonstrations would
have been conduct protected by the 'mutual aid or protection' clause of
Section 7, ''55 in the next sentence he nevertheless concluded that "eco-
nomic pressure directed at an employer that has no control over the dem-
onstration's subject matter is also not protected. 56 This statement as-
serts, albeit stealthily, that immigration protests involving work stop-
pages are not protected as a matter of law. But many forms of protected
activity, particularly those involving "work stoppage," apply "economic
pressure" to an employer.57 If a concerted employee protest concerning
immigration taking the form of a letter written to Congress is subject to
protection, as Kaiser held, why should the protection evaporate simply
because the concerted approach to Congress takes the form of a work
stoppage?
58
The General Counsel argued in the Reliable Maintenance memo-
randum that a footnote in Eastex compelled the conclusion that concerted
work stoppages in opposition to changes in national immigration policy
are not protected by the NLRA.5 9 In the footnote cited by the General
Counsel, the Supreme Court opined that the forms concerted activity can
54. Id. The General Counsel's memorandum reveals the underlying facts of the case spar-
ingly. Apparently, a single employee missed work to attend an immigration rally; the employer
terminated her for violation of its attendance policy. Id. at 1-2. While there is some indication that
the employee "no-call, no-showed" for "several days thereafter," there is no information provided as
to how precisely the employee's record compared to other employees purportedly discharged for
"similar infractions." Id. at 2-3. The employer apparently provided evidence to the NLRB that it
had discharged 140 other employees for such "similar infractions." Id. at 4. This suggests high
employee turnover. One logical inference is that minor attendance infractions would more likely be
ignored than acted upon and inquiry would be warranted to distinguish major from minor infrac-
tions.
55. Id. at 1.
56. Id.
57. The General Counsel additionally suggests in Reliable Maintenance that the denial of
protection to otherwise protected conduct because the employer lacks control over the subject matter
is consistent with the secondary boycott provisions of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. See infra note
194 and accompanying statutory text. But this argument is silent with respect to Section 8(b)(4)'s
threshold requirement that a labor organization be involved in such a secondary boycott, a fact not
found in Reliable Maintenance. Secondary boycott, or "unoffending employer," considerations will
be further discussed later in this article. See infra Part IV.
58. It will be recalled that in Kaiser the involved employee was discharged because the em-
ployer "considered the letter [to legislators protesting immigration policy] embarrassing and a very
serious matter because it might be construed as indicating that [the employer] advocated discrimina-
tion against foreign engineers." Kaiser Eng'rs, 538 F.2d at 1382. Whether the employer's concern
was that it might in the future have difficulty recruiting foreign engineers, be subject to a lawsuit, or
might in some other manner suffer reputational injury, it is difficult not to view the letter as a form
of "economic" pressure. The employer feared adverse economic consequences resulting from the
letter; employees intended to exert pressure to change certain of the employer's policies. This pres-
sure was not deemed sufficient to remove the activity from the protection of Section 7.
59. Keamey, Reliable Maint., supra note 53, at 2-3.
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permissibly take "may well" depend on their object;60 the Court quoted
the following passage from a 1967 law review article by Professor Julius
Getman: "The argument that the employer's lack of interest or control
affords a legitimate basis for holding that a subject does not come within
mutual aid or protection is unconvincing. The argument that economic
pressure should be unprotected in such cases is more convincing."
6 1
It cannot be contended seriously that in citing this scholarly foot-
note the Supreme Court was making a significant positive pronounce-
ment. It is far more likely that the Court's mere gloss on unprotected
concerted activity was a passing reference to the conduct already pro-
scribed, when coupled with certain forbidden "objects," by Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA. 62 That conduct enjoined by a statute may not si-
multaneously be protected by it seems clear. And a nuanced reading of
the balance of Professor Getman's article supports the view that the Gen-
eral Counsel was overreaching in his interpretation of the footnote. As
the Court was surely aware, Getman explained later in the same passage
that "walkouts" causing economic damage to an employer who is not a
party to a controversy should be unprotected "unless it is determined that
the activity was in substantial part a protest against existing conditions
by unorganized workers and, thus, the first step towards self organiza-
tion., 63 Indeed, a careful reading reveals that Getman tacitly assumed,
for purposes of his discussion, the existence of a unionized workplace
with a well-developed tradition of grievance arbitration as the type of
workplace in which "[i]n most cases employees can achieve the same
results without resorting to such tactics .... [W]alkouts of this type are
less likely to be the result of general dissatisfaction." 64 This was the ac-
tual context supporting the conclusion that some concerted walkout ac-
tivity inflicting "economic pressure" should be unprotected. The organ-
ized workplace, presumably possessing less general dissatisfaction, was
deemed a workplace in which it was easier "to distinguish cases involv-
ing economic pressure from those involving an expression of opinion.,
65
Thus, Getman's views on this issue were in reality much more com-
plex than the General Counsel's interpretation of them suggests, as the
Supreme Court surely realized. First, Getman was not convinced that an
employer's mere inability to control a subject removed the subject from
60. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978).
61. Id. (quoting Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1221 (1967) [hereinafter Getman, Economic
Pressure] (emphasis added).
62. Under Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, a union may not engage in activity directed against a
"neutral" employer with whom it does not have a primary dispute where the object of that activity is
proscribed. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4) (2007). See infra Part IV.
63. Getman, Economic Pressure, supra note 61, at 1222 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1221-22. Alternatives for employees include filing grievances and obtaining arbitra-
tion awards.
65. Id. at 1222.
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the scope of Section 7; indeed this was the Court's central conclusion in
Eastex. Second, Getman argued that protection of concerted work stop-
pages may be warranted even in the case of an "unoffending" employer
when the involved employee group is not organized into a union. Fi-
nally, Getman asserted that there may be an additional basis for the pro-
tection of concerted work stoppages when it is possible to clearly discern
that the "walkout" involved an "expression of opinion."66 In short, an
immigrant protest rally is worlds apart from the type of conduct that
Getman's article suggested was unprotected. The work stoppage accom-
panying such a rally would usually result from the general dissatisfaction
of unorganized employees over terms and conditions of employment
rather than from an attempt by an organized group to gain tactical advan-
tages in formal bargaining negotiations or for political objectives not
implicating an employment subject. Moreover, rallies of this type would
be much more likely at their core to present "an expression of opinion."
Ultimately, Eastex is harmonious with the central lesson of Kaiser
that concerted overtures to legislators concerning the impact of immigra-
tion policy on "job security" are not so attenuated from the employment
relationship to fall outside the protection of the NLRA. But the logical
ensuing question is whether the job security holding in Kaiser is suffi-
ciently analogous to the issue presented in employee protests over immi-
gration status to be properly deemed relevant. Kaiser is factually distin-
guishable from the immigration context at issue. In Kaiser the engineers
feared being supplanted by immigrants. The complaint of the rally par-
ticipants is that they do not want to lose their jobs through automatic
arrest and deportation. But both groups were seeking to maintain job
security or tenure. And if immigrants engaging in such protests are em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA,67 there does not seem to be a
principled distinction under Kaiser between the rally protesters and the
citizen-engineers.
A "work dispute" must have a connection with work to be cogniza-
ble under labor law. At the most basic level, unauthorized workers come
to the United States to engage in employment,68 though they may also
enjoy the many other benefits of living in the United States.69 Increas-
ingly restrictive immigration laws impact unauthorized workers' ability
66. Id
67. See discussion infra Part II.
68. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11 th Cir. 1988); see Obhof, supra note 13, at
175 (citing RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 363 (5th ed. 1994).
69. Marc L. Berk et al., Health Care Use Among Undocumented Latino Immigrants: Is Free
Health Care the Main Reason Why Latinos Come to the United States? A Unique Look at the Facts,
19 HEALTH AFFAIRS No. 4, 55 (2000); MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, NAT'L
IMMIGRATION FORUM, REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM OCTOBER 2005 POLL OF UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS 2 (Mar. 30, 2006) (showing that the main reason immigrants come to the United States
is to work).
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to engage in employment. It does not seem possible to separate "immi-
gration" issues from "employment" issues fully or in any meaningful
way. This is undoubtedly why the NLRB has consistently held that an
employer's threat to contact immigration authorities in retaliation for
protected concerted activity by employees violates Section 7: Though a
report by an employer to immigration officials that one of its employees
is an unauthorized worker would seem to implicate only the immigration
laws, it may also chill employee activity protected by the NLRA. 7° Em-
ployee protest over proposed increased penalties and restrictions in im-
migration law similarly goes to the heart of an unauthorized worker's
employment relationship, particularly when those changes would operate
to suspend the employment relationship altogether.7' Such protest seems
to be "lobbying [of] legislators regarding changes in national immigra-
tion policy which affect [employees'] job security." These are activities
that the Ninth Circuit, and earlier the NLRB, held to be "mutual aid or
protection" within the meaning of Section 7.72 Thus, the weight of au-
thority appears to establish that employee participation in "immigration
protest" is protected activity.
Kaiser admittedly did not specifically address whether a work stop-
page as a form of protected concerted activity was permissible as a pro-
test against immigration policy impacting work. There is no reason ap-
parent in the decision for differentiating between forms of protected ac-
tivity. This is significant because a work stoppage is one paradigm for
viewing immigration rallies attended by employees temporarily abandon-
ing work to participate in them. And it appears to be the clearest. The
text of the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in work
stoppages and strikes.73 The right applies to all employees engaging in
concerted work stoppages, not only to those represented by labor organi-
70. QSI., Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 16 (2006) ("Threats of resort to contacting Federal
immigration authorities are inherently coercive as 'they place in jeopardy not only the employees'
job[s] and working conditions, but also their ability to remain in their homes in the United States")
(citing Viracon, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 245, 247 (1981)).
71. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(9) (2007) (defining a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." Protests over the prospect of immediate deportation appear to implicate employ-
ment "tenure" because the action would sever the employment relationship).
72. Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1976).
73. 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (2007). The right is clearly the default position of Federal labor policy
and any reasonable gloss on the statutory language would suggest that restrictions of the right would
be exceptional. However, as every student of labor law soon discovers, the Supreme Court has
managed to severely constrain or even eviscerate the right, primarily by inventing (or upholding the
invention o0 the right of employers to permanently replace employees engaging in an economic
strike. See James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103
MICH. L. REV. 518, 528-31 (2004-2005) [hereinafter Pope, American Workers]. This employer right
is not to be found in the statutory language. Id. The term strike "includes a strike or other concerted
stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-
bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by
employees." 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(2) (2007).
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zations.74 Moreover, employees do not "lose their right to engage in
concerted activities under [Section 7] merely because they do not present
a specific demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find
objectionable." Given the statutory definition of a "strike" and the gen-
eral protection afforded to employees to engage in concerted strikes or
work stoppages, a defensible presumption is that attendance by employ-
ees at rallies protesting anticipated adverse immigration legislation is
protected concerted activity under Kaiser. This conclusion seems war-
ranted because the contemplated legislation would threaten to sever the
protesting employees' employment relationship through deportation and
by rendering the employment a felony. The ability of the protesting em-
ployees' employers to control or direct federal immigration policy does
not appear to alter the protected nature of the employee conduct.
It might be argued that employers discharging employees for absen-
teeism in connection with attendance at the April and May 2006 rallies
were unaware that employee absences resulted from a concerted work
stoppage.75 In all cases involving presumptive protected concerted em-
ployee activity, with or without a union, it is necessary that an employer
be aware that a protected work stoppage is concerted before employees
engaging in the work stoppage receive the protection of the Act.76
Knowledge of the purpose of the activities may be inferred from sur-
rounding circumstances. 7  There is little doubt that employers knew
generally, and would also know on similar future occasions, about well-
publicized immigration protest rallies on a massive scale. On such occa-
sions, the inference that employers would at least suspect that immigrant
employee absences contemporaneous with the rallies resulted from at-
tendance at those rallies should be maintainable.
In the course of the 2006 rallies, for example, news accounts
broadly reported that many employers closed their businesses because
they expected widespread employee absences.78 The New York Times,
among others, noted further that rally organizers in several cities claimed
that a number of employers who had been advocating for the government
to give legal status to unauthorized workers "cooperated with the demon-
74. 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(2); NLRB v. Wash. Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10-17 (1962); Iowa Pack-
ing Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 1140, 1144 (2003).
75. To be persuasive this argument would of course require the absence of obvious concert in
an individual workplace. The argument would, for example, have been difficult to advance in the
case of the 200 discharges from Wisconsin employers in connection with an April 2006 rally.
Davey, Protest, supra note 7.
76. See generally Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986) (illustrating cases in which em-
ployers became aware of the concerted stoppage prior to its protection under the NLRA).
77. Wash. Alum., 370 U.S. at 14.
78. If it could be proved in an NLRB fact finding proceeding that an employer having such
advance warning of imminent absenteeism failed to warn employees of adverse consequences in
connection with the absenteeism, a persuasive argument could be made that any resulting discipline
was in retaliation for attending the rallies, not for absenteeism. See infra note 82 and accompanying
text.
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strations and allowed workers time off."' 79 This "pre-authorization" sug-
gests widespread employer knowledge of these well-coordinated and
publicized events. In advance of one rally on May 1, 2006, the Los An-
geles police "prepared for hundreds of thousands of people to attend
demonstrations, while smaller rallies were expected in other West Coast
cities., 80  In these circumstances, NLRB case authority would permit
inferences that an employer discharging an employee who had partici-
pated in one of the massively publicized rallies, where the discharge oc-
curred in close temporal proximity81 to the employee absence, knew or
suspected that the employee had engaged in a concerted work stoppage.82
79. Davey, Protest, supra note 7.
80. Davey, Employers, supra note 7.
81. World Fashion, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 922, 926 (1996) ("Motivation can be demonstrated by
the timing of discharges soon after a work stoppage") (citing City Dodge Ctr., 289 N.L.R.B. 194,
195 (1988)).
82. The NLRB routinely infers the existence of employer knowledge of protected activity
where other surrounding factors support the inference. Shattuck Denn Mining Co., 362 F.2d 466,
470 (9th Cir. 1966). Assuming an employer asserted that the basis of the discharge was that the
employee engaged in absenteeism, it would be a relatively simple investigative matter for the NLRB
to evaluate the employer's claim by comparing the discharged employee's attendance record to the
attendance records of employees who were not discharged. If the employer's defense is demonstra-
bly false, a sustainable inference can be made that the employer's true motive in discharging the
employee was to retaliate against protected activity. Id. Questions have occasionally arisen as to
whether employer knowledge is a necessary threshold element for the NLRB to find that a discharge
violated Section 8(a)(1). Violations of Section 8(a)(1) tend to hinge on the objective impact of an
action on a group of employees rather than with discrimination against an employee for supporting a
union. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (2007); compare In re Alliance Products, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 495,
501 n.4 (2003), and Waste Stream Management, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1099, 1100 (1994) (denying
knowledge as an element of prima facie case where employer fails to establish legitimate and sub-
stantial business justification for its conduct), with Meijer, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 463 F.3d 534, 542 (6th
Cir. 2006) (requiring knowledge at all times as an element of a prima facie case). Despite this estab-
lished body of law, there is no guarantee that the General Counsel, the NLRB's chief prosecutor,
will pursue "inference" cases under even the most compelling facts. Consider, for example, the facts
of El Cerrito Elec. Co. The issue in that case was whether an employer discharged an employee
because it suspected he attended an immigration rally. Memorandum from Barry J. Keamey, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Alan Reichard, Reg'l Dir., Region 32, NLRB., regarding El Cerrito Elec.
Co., Case 32-CA-22661 (August 16, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/
Advice%20Memo/2006/32-CA-22661(08-16-06).pdf [hereinafter Keamey, El Cerrito]. There was
no dispute that he did not in fact attend, but an employer who discharges an employee because of
mere suspicion that the employee engaged in protected activity violates the NLRA irrespective of
whether the employee actually did so. Id. Thus, in El Cerrito, the employer, on May 1, 2006, a date
on which a massive immigration protest was occurring, telephoned an employee, who was prone to
habitual absenteeism, to inquire "what happened." Id. The employee, no doubt surprised to be
receiving the call in light of his routine absenteeism and the employer's apparent disregard of it, said
that he "was sick." Id. The employer immediately asked him "if he went to the march," an arguable
instance of unlawful interrogation under the NLRA in itself. Id. Not surprisingly, the employee
stated that he did not attend. Id. The employee at one juncture stated that the march was neverthe-
less "for the people." Id. The employer responded that "he did not give a f about those f
Mexicans and that he was pissed." Id. It is a true instance of the peculiar administrative imagination
to conclude that the source of the employer's anger was not its belief that the employee had partici-
pated in "the march." Id. In fact, the employer did not indicate that the employee was not to return
to work until after the comments about the march and the "f Mexicans" had been uttered. Id.
The General Counsel refused to issue a complaint. Id.
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Early indications, however, are that the present composition of the
NLRB 83 may not easily concede that employee participation in immigra-
tion rallies is protected activity, let alone a species of work stoppage.
For example, in a recent General Counsel memorandum in La Veranda,
the General Counsel appeared to ignore the "work stoppage" model for
immigration rally attendance and to equate such attendance to participa-
tion in a union meeting.84 Although the General Counsel purported to
assume without deciding that participating in the involved rally was pro-
tected by Section 7, parsing the language of the memorandum reveals
that the possibility the rally was a protected work stoppage was not con-
sidered. The General Counsel uncritically presumed that employees par-
ticipating in the rallies during working time were not entitled to NLRA
protection because "[e]mployees have no Section 7 right to time off,
even when the reason for missing work is to engage in protected activity
elsewhere., 85 The cases cited by the General Counsel in support of this
proposition are readily distinguishable from the circumstance under dis-
cussion. The principal authority relied on by the General Counsel was
Quantum Electric,86 and presumably the cases cited therein.87 Quantum,
83. The NLRB consists of a five-member board appointed by the President, subject to Senate
confirmation. STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 66 (2d ed. 2005).
84. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Dorothy L.
Moore-Duncan, Reg'I Dir., Region 4, NLRB, regarding La Veranda, Case 4-CA-34718 (November
15, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Advice%20Memos/2006/4-CA-34718.pdf
[hereinafter Kearney, La Veranda]. The facts are straightforward. In early February 2006 employ-
ees decided to take part in a "Day Without Immigrants" rally being held in Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania on February 14, 2006. Id. at 1. The employer not surprisingly learned of the plan and one of
its co-owners questioned an employee about the intention. Id. When the interrogated employee
essentially informed the employer that employees planned to attend the Valentine's Day rally
whether or not "permission" was granted, the employer proceeded to poll employees regarding their
intention to miss work. Id. at 2. When the polled employees indicated their "unequivocal" intention
to attend the rally, the employer summarily terminated them. Id. Not considered by the memoran-
dum is the well established law holding that discussion of "a work stoppage constitutes protected
activity, even if the work stoppage itself arguably would be unprotected." ATC of Nev., 348
N.L.R.B. No. 43, slip op. at 3 n.3 (2006) (citing Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 151,
slip op. at 11 (2005), enforced, 179 L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 2920 (4th Ci. 2006)). Thus, the discharges,
effectuated not because of actual participation in a rally, but because of an expressed intention to do
so some two weeks hence probably violated Section 8(a)(1) irrespective of the rally's categorization
as protected activity. "[A]llowing employers to discipline employees for discussing concerted
protests that might fall outside the protection of the Act would undoubtedly chill employees from
discussing other forms of concerted activity, including many forms that are protected by Section 7."
Sunrise Senior Living, 344 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 18.
85. Keamey, La Veranda, supra note 84, at 2. The reference to the locus of the protected
activity is puzzling. Assuming the activity involves an employment dispute, the locus of the activity
should not be relevant except in a very narrow range of circumstances not present in the case.
86. 341 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1279 (2004) (NLRB upholds AU's finding that unrepresented em-
ployees not participating in a work stoppage were lawfully discharged for leaving work early on a
scheduled work day after a request for the early departure had been denied earlier the same day).
The absence of a concerted work stoppage in Quantum Electric renders the case inapposite to La
Veranda if participation in the immigration rally was a protected concerted work stoppage. In any
event, the ALJ clearly overstated the basis for her decision in concluding that "[leaving work early
is not protected activity even when the object of leaving is to engage in protected activity." Id. That
proposition would plainly depend on surrounding factual circumstances and certainly cannot be
applied formulaically, particularly in the context of work stoppages. Indeed, taken at face value, the
statement cannot be squared with many cases, including Wash. Alum., Co.
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however, merely followed "partial strike" theory8 by reaffirming that
employees do not have the right to set their own terms of employment.
8 9
But the employees in the cited cases, unlike the employees in La Ve-
randa, "walked out" of their workplaces during the course of a work day
and were therefore at least arguably attempting to "set the terms of their
employment" in a manner that is theoretically similar to an unlawful "sit-
down strike." 90 In a prototypical immigration rally case, the issue is the
complete absence from work, not the attempt to alter the nature of the
job by leaving the workplace once an employee has arrived. Stated
somewhat differently, many, perhaps all, strikes violate an employer's
absentee policy, but that does not operate to defeat the right to strike. 9'
The general proposition that "working time is for work" is well-
established in the decisional law of the NLRB, but in dissimilar contexts.
87. House of Raeford Farms, 325 N.L.R.B. 463, 463 n.2 (1998) (employees leaving work
before the end of their shifts to get an early start to the Thanksgiving holiday were not engaging in
protected concerted activity); Specialized Distribution Mgmt., 318 N.L.R.B. 158, 159 (1995) (NLRB
upheld an AL's deferral to an arbitrator's decision that an employer's discipline of employees for
attending, without authorization, "some sort of union meeting" after their work shift had commenced
was not repugnant to the NLRA; the ALJ specifically noted that employees had not been engaging in
a work stoppage); Bird Eng'r, 270 N.L.R.B. 1415, 1415-16, n.3 (1984) (employees disregarded an
employer's newly-implemented rule forbidding employees from leaving the workplace during their
lunch breaks, in overt defiance of both the rule and of immediate managerial directives not to leave;
the NLRB specifically found that employees had not engaged in a protected work stoppage); Scioto
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 766, 766-67 (1980) (employer lawfully terminated nine
drivers for absenteeism where there was no evidence the employer knew the drivers had engaged in
a "strike" or protected work stoppage when they were absent from work during the period Septem-
ber 1 to September 5, 1978; there was no evidence from which knowledge of protected concerted
activity could be inferred); see cases cited supra note 82; Crown Coach Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 625,
634-35 (1965) (eleven of fourteen employees engaging in a strike were "replaced" or "discharged,"
but in any event were reinstated; there was no evidence that the remaining three strikers applied for
reinstatement; the NLRB held that the employer had a right to operate his business, but in context
this amounted to no more than a right to hire striker replacements).
88. See infra note 119.
89. See Kearney, La Veranda, supra note 84, at 3. The General Counsel buttresses his con-
clusion with a "business necessity" argument. Id. That rationale is incoherent if employees in fact
engaged in a protected concerted work stoppage because employees have the right to strike even if it
interferes with an employer's business; that is the point of a strike. The General Counsel character-
ized the employer's assertions that Valentine's Day was "unusually busy" as a "claim" that had not
been contradicted by evidence. Id. This wan characterization invites scrutiny. Did comparative
documentary evidence support the claim? Were the discharged employees confronted with the
claim? If they were, did they agree or disagree with it? Why would the factual underpinnings of this
central issuc in the case-the "rule"-be omitted from the memorandum?
90. See generally NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939). The
exceptions are the Scioto Coca Cola Bottling Co. and Crown Coach Corp. cases. See supra note 87.
But in Scioto Coca Cola, the employer had no knowledge that employees were engaging in protected
activity and in Crown Coach striking employees were in reality immediately reinstated in accor-
dance with law following the cessation of a brief strike, situations that were not arguably present in
La Veranda.
91. See Kearney, La Veranda, supra note 84, at 3 (discussing the employer's defense that he
needed all of his employees on Valentine's Day due to an increase in business). At a practical level,
the employer's defense in La Veranda makes little sense; if it would suffer significant disruption by
not having employees available on an allegedly busy day, how was the potential for disruption
ameliorated by discharging those same employees shortly before the same day?
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For example in the 1943 case Peyton Packing Co.,92 the NLRB stated the
following maxim in connection with the discharge of nine employees for
violating a "no solicitation" rule:
The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and
enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on
company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the
province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be pre-
sumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a
discriminatory purpose.93
The NLRB never reached the question of whether the discharged em-
ployees in Peyton had in fact violated the rule because it found that "the
respondent promulgated and enforced the rule for the purpose of prevent-
ing self-organization."
94
Considering attendance at immigration rallies as work stoppages
casts cases like La Veranda in a different light. First, because the em-
ployer knew in advance that certain employees intended not to appear at
work on Valentine's Day, it had the obvious lawful option of perma-
nently replacing them if they effectuated the intention.95 Second, while it
is axiomatic that even non-union employees engaging in a concerted
walkout are protected against retaliatory discharge,96 it is also true that an
employer deciding to discharge employees in such circumstances may
attempt to show that it would have carried out the discharges for reasons
not involving the protected work stoppage. This could be accomplished
by, for example, showing that other employees had previously been dis-
charged for violating a uniformly enforced attendance rule.97
In La Veranda, however, the General Counsel made the decision
not to remedy the discharges "because... there is no evidence to suggest
that the Employer's response to the employees' request in this case dif-
fers from its response to similar requests." 98 The memorandum fails to
92. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943); see also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805
(1945) (Supreme Court ratified the principle that a rule limiting union solicitation to non-working
time was presumptively valid, but that limitations on solicitation during non-working time were
invalid unless an employer could show they were necessary to maintain production or discipline).
93. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. at 843.
94. Id. at 847.
95. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1983) ("If an employer can
protect the reasonable needs of his business by permanently replacing a worker he has no right to go
further and discharge him.").
96. NLRB v. Wash. Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10-17 (1962); Arrow Electric Co. v. NLRB, 155
F.3d 762, 766 (6th Cir. 1998).
97. Arrow Electric Co., 155 F.3d at 766 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980),
enforced, 662 F.2d 889 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)); see also Assoc'd. Milk
Producers, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 1033, 1035-36 (1982). This presumes both that the rule is lawful on
its face and that the real reason for the discharges was not the protected activity-in other words that
the application of the rule was not in itself pretextual.
98. Kearney, La Veranda, supra note 84, at 3.
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reveal whether the employer demonstrated that any employees had in
fact previously made similar requests to be absent or, more importantly,
whether any employee had ever been discharged for not complying with
this "rule." Also, if the "no taking off on Valentine's Day" rule was dis-
criminatorily promulgated to interfere with the February 14 rally, it was
unlawful in application, even if it arguably would have been necessary to
maintain production.99
In the end, the "union meeting" rationale is not compelling because
immigration rallies, unlike union meetings in organized workplaces, are
not routine (and therefore subject to immediate rescheduling). The tim-
ing of the regionally and nationally planned rallies was obviously beyond
the control of employees in any particular workplace. The scope and
uniqueness of the rallies were obvious. To command "rescheduling" was
to command employee nonparticipation in a vast concerted work-related
protest.
The "work time is for work" proposition, in the context of solicita-
tion rules, is a regulation of what happens once an employee arrives at
work. If an employee does not arrive at work, or expresses an intention
not to arrive at work, the situation is radically different. The employer's
option in that situation is employee replacement, not employee dis-
charge. 00 Ultimately, the General Counsel has succeeded in affording
employees the Hobson's choice of making a request for time off, which
will be denied by many employers. The denial of the request will invite
disciplinary action for insubordination if the time off is nevertheless
taken. Alternatively, employees may simply attend the rally without
providing advance warning, which will also make them vulnerable to
discipline for absenteeism. Many rational employees caught in this di-
lemma may simply opt not to participate in the rallies. Thus, the practi-
cal outcome is to render employee exercise of Section 7 activity subject
to employer discretion.'
0'
While the distinction between replacement and discharge of an em-
ployee may appear unimportant on the surface, there are some important
differences between the two statuses. 10 2 A replaced striking employee
will often be entitled to immediate reinstatement following the strike
replacement's separation from employment with the "struck" em-
99. See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. at 847.
100. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d at 389.
101. Discharge for cause pursuant to an employer rule "cannot mean that an employer is at
liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities which Section 7 of
the Act protects ... for it would prohibit even the most plainly protected kinds of concerted work
stoppages until and unless the permission of the company's foreman was obtained." Wash. Alum.
Co., 370 U.S. at 17.
102. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d at 389 ("Discharge severs the employment relationship
entirely; should the discharged worker apply for reemployment he would have to take his turn in the
queue with any other applicants. In contrast, a worker who has been permanently replaced jumps to
the head of the queue; in addition he is entitled to notice of job openings ... ").
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ployer. 10 3 In a high-turnover industry, the departure of a strike replace-
ment might not take long to transpire, so reinstatement of a striker could
occur quickly. It is also highly unlikely that, in the extremely low paid
industries in which unauthorized workers-the likely actors in these dis-
putes-tend to be employed, a strike replacement could even be located
on short notice. 1°4 If no strike replacement is hired, an employer is re-
quired to reinstate a striking employee immediately upon the employee's
unconditional offer to return to work.10 5 An employer aware of technical
reinstatement obligations may opt not to go through the trouble of re-
placement, particularly if it is aware that the striking employee intends to
immediately return to work. On the other hand, a discharged employee
has little hope of reinstatement with the same employer. Even if the em-
ployee might have left that employer in any event-on his or her own
accord-there is a significant difference between leaving employment
when one is prepared to do so and leaving when one is unprepared.
II. THE EMPLOYEE STATUS OF UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS
While the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in pro-
tected concerted work stoppages and strikes, at least some of the partici-
pants in "Days Without Immigrants" were-and may continue to be in
future rallies-unauthorized workers. 0 6  One question in assessing
whether individuals participating in these rallies are protected, therefore,
is whether unauthorized workers are employees within the meaning of
the statute, for it is clear that the NLRA would not otherwise protect rally
participation by unauthorized workers. 1
07
103. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1967). The striking employee
must make an unconditional offer to return to work to become eligible for reinstatement. Browning-
Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d at 389.
104. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the
Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO STATE L. J. 961, 973-76 (2006) (discussing, among
other things, the low wage nature of the immigrant workplace and employers' structuring of jobs to
ensure that mainstream workers will be much less likely to accept them).
105. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d at 389.
106. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Peter B.
Hoffman, Reg'l Dir., Region 34, NLRB, regarding Gargiulo Constr. Co., cases 34-CA-1 1473 and
34-CA-11499 (July 12, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/Advice%20Memos/
2006/34-CA-1 1473.pdf [hereinafter Kearney, Gargiulo Constr. Co.]. Although the cases were
dismissed by the NLRB without deciding the ultimate question of whether participation in the rallies
was protected activity, which has become the NLRB's pro forma approach to the issue, the charges
filed in connection with the cases explicitly acknowledged that some of the discharged employees at
issue were unauthorized workers who had been interviewed on CBS Television and admitted their
unauthorized status to a nationwide audience. Id. at 1. The charges alleged that retaliatory disci-
pline and discharges resulted from the interviews. Id. at 2.
107. Before Taft-Hartley, the definition of employee under the NLRA was extremely broad.
See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 120-32 (1944). Currently, Section 2(3) of the NLRA
continues to define "employees" broadly as:
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
2007]
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The Supreme Court's 2002 opinion in Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB 0 8 undoubtedly limited the remedies available to unauthor-
ized workers, 0 9 but it did not alter the NLRA employee status of those
workers. The Court implicitly reaffirmed the conclusion it had reached
in Sure-Tan v. NLRB 110 that unauthorized workers are employees under
the NLRA. Therefore, the NLRA should apply or not apply to unau-
thorized workers participating in the rallies in the same manner as other
statutory employees.
The analysis of whether "documented"' 2 statutory employees par-
ticipating in immigration rallies are protected by the NLRA is different
from the analysis pertaining to unauthorized workers. Assuming that the
immigration rallies sufficiently concern the terms and conditions of un-
authorized workers,13 "documented" employees participating in the ral-
lies in sympathy with unauthorized workers are engaging in protected
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual em-
ployed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an inde-
pendent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any indi-
vidual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45
U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person
who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (2007). The NLRB has historically been entrusted with making factual deter-
minations of employee status. See Hearst Publ 'ns, 322 U.S. at 130-31.
108. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 137 (2002); see supra note 18.
109. See supra note 18.
110. 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) ("Since undocumented aliens are not among the few groups of
workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of
'employee."'); see the statutory definition for "employee" supra note 107.
111. The Court initially suggested that the Sure-Tan holding was contingent on the substantive
immigration statute in effect in 1984 when that case was decided. Id. Thereafter, the Court quoted
language from Sure-Tan stating that, because the immigration statute had not made it a separate
criminal offense for employers to hire unauthorized workers, or for unauthorized workers to accept
employment after entering the country illegally, there was "no reason to conclude that application of
the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms
of the [immigration statute]." Id. at 892-93. Because the new immigration statute under considera-
tion had made the employment of unauthorized workers unlawful, the Hoffman Court seemed to be
signaling that the employee status of unauthorized workers was at issue. Later in the opinion, how-
ever, the Court clearly upheld the availability of other NLRA remedies, not including back pay or
reinstatement, which could only be relevant in the case of violations of the rights of employees. Id.
at 906. Further, the Court did not expressly dispute Sure-Tan's conclusion that unauthorized work-
ers are NLRA employees. Thus, the Court implicitly conceded that unauthorized workers are em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA. Lower Federal courts appear to have read Sure-Tan as
unambiguously concluding that unauthorized workers enjoy employee status under the NLRA. See,
e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that unauthorized workers
are employees under the FLSA). In Patel, the court noted that "courts frequently look to decisions
under the NLRA when defining the FLSA's coverage," and read Sure-Tan as clearly establishing
that Congress did not intend to exclude unauthorized workers from the NLRA's ambit. Id. The
court also noted that undocumented "aliens"-alien prisoners of war-were deemed by the Depart-
ment of Labor to be covered by the FLSA as early as 1942. Id. This raises the interesting question
of whether Congress may have been sufficiently aware of the prospect of extension of "the social
legislation of the 1930's," to have implicitly included unauthorized workers in the employee classifi-
cation by not specifically exempting them in the labor law amendments of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).
112. The term "documented employees" is meant simply to distinguish these employees from
unauthorized workers.
113. See supra Part I.
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activity. In the event that the unauthorized workers and "documented"
employees are employed by different employers, "[i]t is well settled that
employees' conduct on behalf of the employees of another employer who
are engaged in protected concerted activity is itself protected concerted
activity."" 4 The principle is even more settled when the employees in
question are employed by the same employer. As the Supreme Court
restated in Houston Insulation Contractors Ass 'n v. NLRB:
1 5
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a
fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in
his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or
protection," although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them
who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by
their action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever
comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then helping, and
the solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in the most literal sense,
as nobody doubts. 1
6
Thus, an employer discharging documented employees for partici-
pation in lawful immigration rallies in sympathy with unauthorized
workers will prima facie violate the NLRA once a nexus between the
rallies and the terms and conditions of unauthorized workers' employ-
ment is established.
III. COULD STRIKE INTERMITTENCY DEPRIVE EMPLOYEES
PARTICIPATING IN IMMIGRATION RALLIES OF THE PROTECTION OF THE
NLRA?
Assuming arguendo that a "day" without immigrants is protected
concerted activity because it is a concerted work stoppage in furtherance
of a legitimate protected employment aim, an additional complication is
whether "days" without immigrants-employees concertedly engaging in
multiple such stoppages-at some point lose the protection of the NLRA
because the repetition renders the strikes "intermittent." A number of the
2006 rallies occurred in different cities on different dates."' But an
intermittency issue could be presented if the same employer was "struck"
multiple times by the same employees.
114. Office Depot, 330 N.L.R.B. 640, 642 (2000) (citing Boise Cascade Corp., 300 N.L.R.B.
80, 82 (1991)).
115. 386 U.S. 664 (1967).
116. Id. at 668-69 (1967) (quoting Labor Bd. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,
130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942)).
117. See supra note 1.
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Traditionally, the NLRB has considered "partial" strikes," i8 includ-
ing intermittent strikes, unprotected under the NLRA."19 As scholars
have noted, the rationale for denying protection to employees engaged in
these work stoppages has been "muddled" and at times has taken on a
"moral" tone. 120  Nevertheless, the NLRB has generally held that inter-
mittent work stoppages become unprotected when "the stoppage is part
of a plan or pattern of intermittent action which is inconsistent with a
genuine strike or genuine performance by employees of the work nor-
mally expected of them by the employer."' 121 The general objection to
employees or their representatives being able to engage in this conduct is
that they would thereby be able to unilaterally "dictate the terms and
conditions of employment.' 22  Historically, the NLRB and the courts
118. A partial strike is one in which employees refuse to work on certain assigned tasks while
accepting pay or while remaining on the employer's premises. Audubon Health Care Ctr., 268
N.L.R.B. 135, 136 (1983). The Board and courts have historically distinguished partial strikes from
"intermittent" strikes. See, e.g., Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806, 1810-11 (1954) (in
which the NLRB appears to classify a repetitive weekend strike as "intermittent" by comparing it to
the "intermittent" work stoppages considered by the Supreme Court in its opinion in Briggs-Stratton,
336 U.S. 245, 264 (1949)); see infra note 127 and accompanying text. The reference fails to result
in terminological clarity, however, since the employee action in Briggs-Stratton, a cessation of work
on the employer's premises during working hours, seems barely distinguishable from the circum-
stances in Audubon Health Care, which involved a refusal by on-duty nurse aides to cover for absent
employees by working outside the aides' assigned areas. The NLRB's General Counsel has em-
ployed the additional term "recurrent strike activity" in an apparent attempt to mask the doctrinal
incoherency in this area. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to
James J. McDermott, Reg'l Dir., Region 31, NLRB, regarding Univ. of S. Cal., Case 31-CA-23538
(Apr. 27, 1999), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/Research/Memos/AdviceMemos/tem-
platehtml.aspxfile=http://www.nlrb.gov/shared files/Advice%20Memo\l 999\aa042799_universit
yofsocalif.html&size=13 [hereinafter Kearney, Univ. ofS. Cal.].
119. "Traditionally" is not tantamount to "originally," for in its early days the NLRB appeared
to apply the opposite presumption, viewing intermittent strikes through the same lens as any other
strike, presumably because the statute fails to distinguish strikes in this fashion. See Michael H.
LeRoy, Creating Order Out of Chaos and Other Partial and Intermittent Strikes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
221, 239 (Fall 2000).
120. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1547-48 (1954) ("[the union] chose ... to resort to a
form of economic warfare entirely beyond the pale of proper strike activities.") (emphases added);
see also LeRoy, supra note 119 at 239-40; Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New
Forms of Collective Work Stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
351, 380 (1994) [hereinafter Becker, Better Than a Strike].
121. Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972).
122. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1595 (1954), enforced, 230 F. 2d 947 (6th
Cir. 1956). This is a paradoxical formulation. The objective of every strike is the "unilateral dicta-
tion" to an employer of some term and condition of employment. The striking party (usually a
union) wants something. The struck employer refuses to voluntarily provide it. Negotiations break
down. The striking party attempts to unilaterally compel provision of the disputed item through
resort to economic weaponry, which is by definition outside of a "bargaining" model. Subtly em-
bedded in this language of "fairness" is the notion that the strike action may succeed because the
employer is unable to utilize its standard weapon against a strike action: the permanent replacement
of striking employees. Employers may have difficulty replacing employees in unpredictable work
stoppages of short duration for two very practical reasons: 1) There is not enough time to find
replacements; and 2) Even when replacements can be found the unpredictable status of their subse-
quent employment makes recruitment of desirable candidates problematic. The characterization of
this species of employee tactics as unfair is extremely ironic. Permanent replacement of strikers is
itself a legal fiction of the courts that has operated to the extreme detriment of union rights in appar-
ent disregard of the policies of Section 1 of the NLRA. See generally Pope, American Workers,
supra note 73, at 528-34.
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have treated intermittent work stoppages by employees not represented
by a union differently than those by employees with union representa-
tion. 23 There is little if any NLRB authority finding intermittent work
stoppages unprotected without union involvement. The probable expla-
nation for this is that the NLRB has been much more likely to construct a
theory of unlawfulness when employees' actions evince a plan or pattern
of intermittency, 124 a difficult construction in the absence of a "planner,"
like a union, or of a broad "tactical" objective like achievement of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.
Against this patchwork of administrative cases turning rather trans-
parently on elusive notions of motive and "morals" stands the Supreme
Court's 1960 opinion in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union
(Insurance Agents).125  In this opinion, the Court attempted to clarify
doctrinal confusion arising from a 1949 opinion dealing with the legiti-
mate use of economic weapons in labor relations.126 In that earlier opin-
ion, UA W Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs-
Stratton),127 a Wisconsin state labor relations board ordered a union to
cease and desist from calling repeated "membership meetings" during
working hours.128 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the order in
limited form. 129  The union advanced a series of arguments clustered
around the proposition that the order violated the Constitution, but the
Court concluded that "[t]he substantial issue is whether Congress has
protected union conduct which the state has forbidden, and hence the
state legislation must yield."'130 Answering the question in the negative,
the Court found that the meetings were unprotected, stating in relevant
part: "We think that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage
of work to win unstated ends was neither forbidden by federal statute nor
was it legalized and approved thereby."' 31 In the wake of this congres-
123. See, e.g., Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 882 F.2d 1355, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1989) (unrep-
resented employees who engaged in two work stoppages in a one-week period protected by the
NLRA).
124. See Pac. Tel., 107 N.L.R.B. at 1547-50. But see Robertson Indus., 216 N.L.R.B. 361,
361-62 (1975), enforced, 560 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976) (no unlawful plan of intermittent work stop-
page where in roughly a two month span employees ceased working twice, first when they were not
represented by a union and then after they had obtained representation).
125. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
126. Insurance Agents was the second in a triumvirate of Supreme Court cases, starting with
Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), and culminating in Lodge 76, 1AM v. Wis. Employment
Relations Bd. [hereinafter Lodge 76, Machinists], 427 U.S. 132 (1976). See extended discussion
infra notes 141-52, possessing underlying factual scenarios involving union utilization of partial or
intermittent strike tactics. All three cases arose in unionized settings.
127. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
128. There was no contention that the meetings did not constitute work stoppages. Indeed, the
union admitted that it thought the meetings to be "better than a strike." Id. at 264 n. 17. (Hence the
title of Professor Becker's article cited supra note 120.)
129. Id. at 250-51.
130. Id. at 252.
131. Id. at 264-65.
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sional silence, the Court further concluded that state intervention at-
tempting to regulate the work stoppages was not preempted.
132
In Insurance Agents, the Court did not purposefully disturb'33 the
conclusion of Briggs-Stratton that "employee conduct quite similar to the
conduct at bar was neither protected by [Section] 7 of the Act nor prohib-
ited (made an unfair labor practice) by [Section] 8,'' 3 but it took issue
with the NLRB's arguments that "nontraditional" tactics by a union in-
dependently violated the NLRA and that these tactics were worthy of
legal sanction because of the "public's moral condemnation" of them.
135
Before discussing the Court's responses to the NLRB's arguments
that the tactics employed by the union in Insurance Agents were unlaw-
ful because they were "nontraditional" and "immoral," it would be useful
to catalogue the tactics. Following the expiration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement between Prudential Insurance Company and the Insurance
Agents International Union, the union initiated a "Work Without a Con-
tract" program, which utilized a number of devices designed to exert
economic pressure on the employer while the parties continued to engage
in collective bargaining for a successor collective bargaining agree-
ment.136 The stratagems included outright refusals to perform various
duties, reporting to work late, engaging in "sit-in mornings" where em-
ployees did "what comes naturally" and then left at noon on the same
days, skipping business conferences, picketing and leafleting in front of
company offices, distributing leaflets to and soliciting signatures from
customers, and presenting policyholder petitions at corporate headquar-
ters while simultaneously conducting mass demonstrations there.137 In
sum, the union very effectively combined elements of a partial strike (it
does not appear that employees absented themselves from the workplace
for entire work days) with what would now be termed a corporate cam-
paign.
138
In discussing these nontraditional immoral tactics, the Court stated:
The Board contends that because an orthodox "total" strike is "tradi-
tional" its use must be taken as being consistent with [Section]
8(b)(3); but since the tactics here are not "traditional" or "normal,"
they need not be so viewed. Further, the Board cites what it con-
ceives to be the public's moral condemnation of the sort of employee
tactics involved here. But again we cannot see how these distinctions
132. Id. at 265.
133. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union (Insurance Agents), 361 U.S. 477, 483 n.6 (1960).
134. Id. at 495 n.23.
135. Id. at 495.
136. Id. at 480-81.
137. Id.
138. "The corporate campaign has been accurately described as a 'cafeteria plan of confronta-
tional tactics' conducted outside the workplace." James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions
and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV.
889, 904 n.77 (1991) (citing CHARLES R. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 4 (1987)).
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can be made under a statute which simply enjoins a duty to bargain in
good faith .... [T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a la-
bor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of completely
academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the
process of collective bargaining.139
Thus, though the Court was willing to assume for the sake of argu-
ment that the union's actions were both "unusual" and "bad," it was un-
willing to conclude that they were sufficiently unusual or bad to establish
that the union's resorting to them violated its statutory duty to engage in
good faith bargaining, which was the only theory of unlawfulness ad-
vanced by the NLRB.140 The language of the Court's opinion also called
into question NLRB decisions like Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,14' which had refused employees the protection of the NLRA because
their union had utilized economic weapons that were "beyond the pale"
of "proper" strike activities;1 42 tactics which were, in other words, im-
moral or nontraditional.
Subsequent to Insurance Agents, the Court had occasion to revisit
the issue of "nontraditional" strike tactics in a second preemption case
presenting facts similar to those considered in Briggs-Stratton twenty-
seven years earlier. In Lodge 76, 1AM v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board (Lodge 76, Machinists),143 a union engaged in a series of
concerted refusals to work overtime after negotiations for a successor
collective bargaining agreement to the employer-terminated predecessor
agreement had dragged on for over a year. 144 Shortly after the expiration
of the predecessor agreement, the employer announced its intention to
unilaterally implement an increase in the standard work week from 37'/2
to 40 hours, and an increase in the standard work day from 7V2 to 8
hours. 45  In response, members of the union decided that they would
refuse to work any of the extra hours the employer might implement.
46
139. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 495 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 496. Pursuant to Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, a union has a duty to bargain in good
faith with an employer over terms and conditions of employment that is the correlative of an em-
ployer's duty to bargain with a union pursuant to Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.A. §
158(b)(3) (2007).
141. 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954); see also supra notes 121, 125.
142. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1548 (1954).
143. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
144. Id. at 133-34.
145. Id. at 134.
146. Id There is no analysis in the Court's opinion, or in the underlying proceedings before
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as to whether the union had in fact refused to work "overtime" since
it had merely insisted that it would continue to adhere to the status quo-which did not include the
overtime-following the contract's expiration. Because the overtime had been unilaterally defined
and implemented by the employer following the expiration of the effective collective bargaining
agreement, the union was arguably privileged not to work it. Fourteen years prior to Lodge 76,
Machinists, the Court had issued its opinion in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), a case standing
for the proposition that an employer is precluded from making unilateral changes to terms and condi-
tions of employment during the course of negotiations. It is now settled under Katz that unilateral
changes implemented following the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement are as unlawful
2007)
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The employer decided in these circumstances not to implement the an-
nounced changes and decided instead to file a charge with the NLRB
alleging that the union's threatened refusal to work the overtime hours
violated Section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA. 147 The NLRB dismissed the
charge at the local administrative level pursuant to Insurance Agents.
148
The employer then decided to file a complaint with the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission, alleging that the union's threatened
action would violate state law. 149 As in Briggs-Stratton, the state com-
mission ordered the union to "cease and desist" from engaging in partial
strike tactics and the Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the
order. ' 50
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that:
[while] a State still may exercise "its historic powers over such tradi-
tionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets
and highways,".... the Union's refusal to work overtime is peaceful
conduct constituting activity which must be free of regulation by the
States if the congressional intent in enacting the comprehensive fed-
eral law of labor relations is not to be frustrated.1
51
In reaching this decision, the Court specifically overruled Briggs-
Stratton.152 But in addition to articulating its central holding, the Court
also made two interesting observations by way of dicta. First, it made
plain that even if states were not permitted to regulate labor relations
having only vague connections with their traditional police powers, em-
ployers were not precluded from taking action against unions utilizing
weapons that were not protected by the NLRA. In other words, tactics
such as intermittent strikes may be permitted by federal law because they
are not specifically precluded by Congress, but not protected against
employers' exercise of their economic weapons. 53  Second, the Court
asserted:
as those made during the course of negotiations. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advan.
Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 545 n.6 (1988). A finding that the employer had unlaw-
fully implemented the overtime provisions at issue in Lodge 76, Machinists would likely have com-
promised its position. Under present law, an arguably unlawful implementation of the overtime
policy would have mandated preemption of state regulation of the controversy. See San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). Katz is notable in the context of this intermit-
tency discussion because the Court was unimpressed that the relevant unilateral changes had alleg-
edly been implemented in response to the union's partial strike tactics. Katz, 369 U.S. at 742 n.7.
147. Lodge 76, Machinists, 427 U.S. at 134-35.
148. Id. at 135.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 136.
151. Id. at 137 n.2, 155 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 155.
153. As scholars have noted, this has left intermittent strikes, and perhaps other non-traditional
job tactics, in a "no man's land" between prohibition and protection. See Becker, Better Than a
Strike, supra note 120, at 381.
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It may be that case-by-case adjudication by the federal Board will ul-
timately result in the conclusion that some partial strike activities
such as the concerted ban on overtime in the instant case, when unac-
companied by other aspects of conduct such as those present in In-
surance Agents or those in Briggs-Stratton (overtones of threats and
violence and a refusal to specify bargaining demands), are "pro-
tected" activities within the meaning of [Section] 7, although not so
protected as to preclude the use of available countervailing economic
weapons by the employer.1
54
The passage suggests that, in the event a union was engaged in concerted
job actions utilizing weapons short of a full scale strike-not involving
"threats and violence" and unaccompanied by a refusal to specify bar-
gaining demands-the NLRB would have a good deal of discretion to
nevertheless hold the activity "protected.' 55  The degree of protection
would be limited by the employer's right to use "available countervailing
economic weapons," presumably the right to lock out employees engag-
ing in the "protected" activity. 56 The mystery, however, is at what type
of "partial strike" activity the Court might have been hinting.
A number of subsequent cases suggest what the NLRB may have
come to think the Supreme Court had in mind. In City Dodge Center,
Inc., 57 for example, the NLRB found that two work stoppages by six
unrepresented mechanics carried out between August 29 to September 3,
1986, in response to the alleged refusal of the employer to discuss vari-
ous work-related grievances did not constitute an intermittent strike be-
cause the stoppages "appear[ed] to be a series of reactions to steps taken
by [the employer]," and thus could not "reasonably be construed as a
plan to strike, return to work, and strike again., 158  In upholding the
NLRB's decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that the employees "did not
have a preconceived plan to engage in a series of strikes to harass [the
employer].' 59
154. Lodge 76, Machinists, 427 U.S. at 153 n. 14 (citations omitted).
155. Julius G. Getman, The Protected Status of Partial Strikes After Lodge 76: A Comment, 29
STAN. L. REv. 205, 209 (1977).
156. The limitation may swallow the rule because distinctions between discharges and lockouts
of limitless duration seem practically negligible to an out-of-work employee. However, the distinc-
tion could be substantial where employees are represented by a union sufficiently strong to eventu-
ally achieve a collective bargaining agreement. Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 928, 928
(1998) (employer lawfully locked out two unions representing its employees following commence-
ment of non-traditional "inside game" tactics but ultimately ended lockout following successful
negotiations for collective bargaining agreements).
157. 289 N.L.R.B. 194 (1988) enforced sub. nom., Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 882 F.2d
1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989); see supra note 124.
158. City Dodge Center, 289 N.L.R.B. at 194.
159. Roseville Dodge, 882 F.2d at 1359. In making this observation the court distinguished
one of its earlier decisions, NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 998, 1005 (8th Cir. 1965), a case in
which the court had found unprotected as intermittent "three one-day work stoppages in less than
two weeks, undertaken pursuant to a preconceived and continuing plan to stop work each time the
company refused to adjust grievances." Roseville Dodge, 882 F.2d. at 1359. The Eighth Circuit
decided Blades eleven years prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Lodge 76, Machinists and the
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The NLRB decided another post-Lodge 76, Machinists case in
United States Service Industries, Inc.160 In that case, the NLRB refused
to find that an unspecified number of striking janitors, who had engaged
in work stoppages on May 30 and July 26, 1990, lost their entitlement to
reinstatement because the work stoppages were unlawful intermittent
strikes. The NLRB concluded:
"[H]it and run" strikes engaged in as part of a planned strategy in-
tended to "harass the company into a state of confusion" are not pro-
tected activity. However ... in the instant case there is no evidence
that any such strategy was in place,... and the mere fact that some
employees may have struck more than once does not render their
conduct intermittent striking. 
161
The remarkable aspect of United States Service Industries is that the
NLRB on its own initiative raised the possibility (under the guise of at-
tempting to "understand" one of the employer's arguments) that the in-
volved job actions were part of a planned strategy because they arose out
of the national "Justice for Janitors" campaign. 162 With almost no dis-
cussion the argument was rejected because "the mere fact that employees
struck more than one time is not sufficient evidence on which to base a
finding of unprotected intermittent striking .... [W]e cannot make a
finding that the striking employees ... were engaged in a campaign to
harass the [c]ompany into a state of confusion., 163 Surely, a fundamental
if sometimes unstated purpose of any strike is to harass an employer into
a state of confusion. Unpacking what is really going on in this case re-
quires the additional observation that the employer offered no evidence
that it had made any attempt to replace the striking employees. 164 Thus,
the work stoppages did not "preclude the use of available countervailing
economic weapons by the employer., 165 As a result of this omission by
the employer, the NLRB was not faced with the problem of grappling
with the "harassment" it logically must have been discussing in United
States Services Industries-namely, conducting a work stoppage in such
a way that the employer was precluded from hiring replacements.
Continuation of this post-Lodge 76, Machinists development is fur-
ther reflected in a 1999 memorandum by the NLRB's Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel in a case entitled University of Southern California.166 In
Roseville Dodge court did not speculate in the course of efficiently distinguishing Blades how, if at
all, its thinking on intermittency had evolved.
160. 315 N.L.R.B. 285 (1994), enforcedper curiam, 72 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id. at 285,290.
163. Id. at 285-86.
164. Id. at 293. No doubt this was because of the short duration of the work stoppages, the
May 30 strike lasted a single day and the July 26 strike concluded on August 3, when the union
made an unconditional offer to return to work. Id.
165. Lodge 76, Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 153 n.14 (1976).
166. Kearney, Univ. of S. Cal., supra note 118.
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this case, the NLRB's General Counsel authorized issuance of a com-
plaint in the face of an employer's suspension of striking, union-
represented, food service and custodial employees at the conclusion of
five strikes conducted on March 20, 1996 (sixty-minute strike), April 26,
1996 (less than one day strike), April 10, 1997 (one day strike), October
8, 1997 (two day strike), and April 29, 1998 (twelve day strike).
Throughout the roughly two years of work stoppages, the parties were at
an impasse over a collective bargaining agreement and, in particular,
over an agreement concerning limits on the employer's ability to subcon-
tract work of the type performed by the union-represented employees. 1
67
Notwithstanding the "intermittent" striking, the General Counsel
concluded that "all five work stoppages here were protected activity.' 68
In coming to this conclusion, the General Counsel devised an analytical
framework cobbled together from a number of prior cases. According to
the General Counsel, "recurrent" strike activity is rendered unprotected
when there is "[a]n occurrence of more than two strikes" and:
[T]he strikes are not responses to distinct employer actions or prob-
lems with working conditions, but rather part of a strategy to use a
series of strikes in support of a single goal because this would be
more crippling to the employer or would require less sacrifice by
employees than a single prolonged work stoppage during which
strikers could be replaced; ...the union announces or otherwise
states its intent to pursue a plan or strategy of intermittent strikes, or
there is clear factual evidence of an orchestrated strategy to engage in
intermittent strike activity, and ... the strikes are of short duration
and proximate in time. 
169
On the other hand, "repeated" work stoppages are protected when
they are "spontaneous attempts to pursue work-related complaints or
grievances and/or [sic] ...which are precipitated by, and in protest
against, separate acts of the employer."'' 70 The General Counsel cited the
NLRB's decision in Westpac Electric17 1 for the proposition that the key
factor in determining whether a series of short strikes is protected or un-
protected is whether the strikes were "intentionally planned and coordi-
nated so as to effectively reap the benefit of a continuous strike action
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id (citing Chelsea Homes, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 813, 831 (1990); Robertson Indus., 216
N.L.R.B. 361, 362 (1975); Crenlo, Div. of GF Bus. Equip., Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 872, 878-79 (1974),
enforced, 529 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1975); Pac. Tel. & Tel., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1547 (1954); see Nat'l
Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499, 510 (1997); Embossing Printers, 268 N.L.R.B. 710
(1984); Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (1972); John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394, 396
(1959).
170. Kearney, Univ. ofS. CaL, supra note 118 (citing Meilman Food Indus., 234 N.L.R.B. 698,
712 (1978); Overboard Door Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 431 (1975) enforcement denied, 540 F.2d 878 (7th
Cir. 1978); Westpac Elec., 321 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1360 (1996); Blades Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 561,
566 (1963), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1965)).
171. 321 N.L.R.B. 1322.
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without assuming the economic risks associated with a continuous forth-
right strike." '172 The citation to Westpac is significant because the strikes
in that case transpired in the context of a salting campaign. 173 Whatever
else salting may be, it is certainly part of a coordinated plan, and work
stoppages in the context of such a campaign are not infrequently a part of
that plan.' 74  The General Counsel's reference to such a controversial
"strike case,"' 175 which clearly raises in the minds of many observers a
question as to the "forthrightness" of a strike, in an intermittent strike
scenario involving five strikes over a two-year period, speaks volumes to
the doctrinal distance on intermittency that the NLRB has traveled since
Lodge 76, Machinists. The NLRB now seems much more willing to
offer statutory protection to repeated work stoppages if there is any ar-
gument that they were "spontaneous."
To date, it does not appear that the NLRB has squarely addressed
the legal status of intermittent work stoppages in a non-union workplace
directed against specific workplace grievances. Protests by employees
against congressionally initiated proposals for changes in immigration
policy that would adversely impact unauthorized employees' terms and
conditions of employment would appear to fall into this category. There
is no apparent "plan" on the part of employees protesting such changes
beyond an attempt to remain employed and free from incarceration. The
agenda is set by Congress, and the protests seem merely reactive and
more akin to the spontaneous decision by employees to exit their unac-
ceptably cold building in the Washington Aluminum work stoppage.1
76
However, even if under some theory "a plan" of "harassment" could be
conceived, 177 cases like United States Service Industries and Westpac
172. Kearney, Univ. ofS. Cal., supra note 118 (quoting Westpac Elec., 321 N.L.R.B. at 1360).
Neither the ALJ nor the full NLRB characterized the cited passage as a key factor, and the ALJ
appeared to simply be responding to an argument proffered by the employer.
173. "'Salting a job' is the act of a trade union in sending a union member or members to an
unorganized job site to obtain employment and then organize the employees." Aztech Elec. Co., 335
N.L.R.B. 260, 260 n.4 (2001); see also Pamela A. Howlett, Salt in the Wound? Making a Case and
Formulating a Remedy when an Employer Refuses to Hire Union Organizers, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
201, 201 (2003).
174. See, e.g., Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1234 (1992).
175. There has been a decade-long, contentious legal debate regarding the bona fides of salting
campaigns. See Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Organizers,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1341, 1345-47 (1994-1995).
176. NLRB v. Wash. Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1962) (employees spontaneously left plant
alleging it was too cold to work).
177. Professor Hyde has noted that "[s]ome organizations providing services and advocacy for
immigrant workers also speak for them on issues at work," and some of these organizations, termed
immigrant work centers, "deserve[ ] separate treatment because of the more intense level of partici-
pation [they] generate[ ]." Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United
States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 385, 396-97 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Hyde, New
Institutions]. According to Professor Hyde, there are "[a]t least 133 immigrant work centers," and
"[a]ll occasionally advocate with employers on behalf of individual workers." Id. at 397 (citing
Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of a Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 417 (2005-2006)). Accordingly, Professor Hyde concludes that certain worker centers "are
quite likely to be statutory labor organizations." Id. at 408. While this point will be taken up later in
a different context, see infra notes 226-27, it may be noted here that it is conceivable the NLRB
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Electric, arising in the context of obvious union orchestration and in
which the NLRB nevertheless afforded employees the protection of the
NLRA, make denial of protection to non-union, immigration-context
"strikers" problematic, especially if statutory protection is initially af-
forded. Although the Supreme Court's opinions in Lodge 76, Machinists
and Insurance Agents seem to afford the NLRB discretion to classify
intermittent work stoppages as neither protected nor prohibited, the
NLRB would probably be hard-pressed to explain its denial of protection
in the immigration protest context in light of its recent intermittency de-
cisions.
178
In immigration protest contexts, applying the law of intermittency
to repeated work stoppages leads to the general conclusion that in the
circumstances in which these rallies have arisen (and are likely to arise in
the future), employees should not be denied the protection of the
NLRA. 179  The greater the frequency of rallies resulting in work stop-
pages, particularly in shorter intervals of time, the more likely it will be
for the NLRB and courts to deny participating employees NLRA protec-
tion. There does not appear to be any adequate justification for denying
NLRA protection to employees participating in the immigration rallies
during non-working time. Nevertheless, the development of the statute is
controlled by the prosecutor in the NLRA scheme. A refusal by the
could view immigrant rallies as planned work stoppages if the rallies were coordinated and imple-
mented by a sufficiently broad network of these immigrant work centers.
178. This likely explains the recent "no go" memoranda issued from the NLRB's Office of the
General Counsel which rather transparently dodge the central issue of NLRA protection. Memoran-
dum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Irving E. Gottschalk, Reg'l Dir., Re-
gion 30, NLRB, regarding Marshall & lsley Corp., Case 30-CA-17442 (July 12, 2006), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared files/Advice%2OMemo/2006/30-CA-17442(07-12-06).pdf (need not
reach question of protection because employer established violation of attendance policy and em-
ployee "dishonesty"); Kearney, Gargiulo Constr. Co., supra note 106 (need not reach issue of pro-
tection because employees not disciplined or discharged, as alleged, but rather "temporarily laid
off'); Kearney, El Cerrito Elec. Co., supra note 82 (need not reach issue of protection because there
is insufficient evidence to establish that the termination was motivated by any suspicion that the
employee attended the rally); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to
Martha Kinard, Reg'l Dir., Region 16, NLRB, regarding Joe's Coffee Shop, Case 16-CA-25014
(October 30, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/Advice%20Memos/2006/16-CA-
25014.pdf (need not reach issue of protection, assuming wearing of ribbon in support of immigrant
rallies was protected activity, "other employees" were not involved in the ribbon wearing or aware
of the discipline; insufficient evidence one month later related to "arguably protected conduct");
Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Stephen M. Glasser, Reg'l
Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Discount Paper, Case 7-CA-49543 (October 31, 2006), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Advice%20Memos/2006/7-CA-49543.pdf ("assuming without
deciding" that participation in rallies was protected concerted activity, employer established it would
have discharged employee for excessive absenteeism that was "extraordinarily disruptive"); Kear-
ney, Reliable Maint., supra note 53 ("assuming without deciding" that participation in immigration
rallies is protected concerted activity, the discharge of an employee was warranted because the right
to participate does not supersede the requirement to be present at work and is in any event eviscer-
ated when the subject of the protest is not within the employer's control).
179. This conclusion is fortified if rallies continue to be held on different dates in different
cities. In such circumstances the likelihood of an individual employer being "struck" intermittently
is reduced. On the other hand, rallies held simultaneously on multiple occasions in the same cities
would increase the likelihood of an individual employer sustaining multiple work stoppages with a
subsequent finding of unlawful intermittency depriving employees of the protection of the NLRA.
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General Counsel of the NLRB to find participation in the rallies to be
protected concerted activity, thereby foreclosing the possibility of con-
sideration of the issue by the NLRB or the courts, renders the problem a
political one that complainants would have to refer to Congress.
180
IV. ARE IMMIGRATION RALLIES DIRECTED AGAINST "UNOFFENDING"
EMPLOYERS UNLAWFUL?
Judge Kennedy's dissent in the Kaiser case' 8 1 turned on the argu-
ment that employer conduct subject to Section 7 of the NLRA must in-
volve "a matter with respect to which the employer had the power and
right to do something about."'182 This thought serves as an efficient in-
troduction to the problem of NLRA "neutrality," which is implicit in an
immigration protest context. The issue is whether immigration rallies
resulting in work stoppages are unlawful because they are directed
against employers who are neutral with respect to the dispute between
unauthorized workers and the Government.
As a general proposition, the NLRA forbids a labor organization
from pressuring an employer with whom it has a dispute, known as a
primary employer, by engaging in certain statutorily proscribed conduct
directed at "neutral" employers with whom it has no dispute.183  There
are various policy reasons for this limitation, but one of the central justi-
fications centers on the notion of fairness: a neutral employer does not
have "the power [or] right to do something about" a dispute between a
union and a primary employer.'
84
Because many of the organizations directing the immigration rallies
during the winter and spring of 2006 either were or resembled statutory
labor organizations as defined by the NLRA, employers could have ar-
gued that the 2006 rallies (and may argue that similar future rallies) were
unlawful "secondary" activity directed against "neutral" employers. The
consequence of the NLRB making such a finding is that temporary in-
junctions-which are authorized under the NLRA and routinely granted
by federal courts to enjoin unlawful "secondary" conduct-could be
180. The dismissal of a charge alleging that an adverse employment action resulting from
participation in an immigration rally violated Section 7 of the NLRA could only be appealed to the
Office of the General Counsel, the entity that implicitly or explicitly made the decision not to pursue
the charge in the first place. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(d) (2007). The General Counsel's decision not to
pursue a charge is not reviewable by the courts. See Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v.
Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1996). However, the General Counsel is a political
appointee of the President who must be approved by the Senate. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(d). In theory,
this may exercise a degree of influence over prosecutorial decision making. A clear and consistent
disregard of statutory mandate is probably only practically remediable through governmental budg-
etary processes. Given the super-heated immigration political environment, Congress may be will-
ing to assess the issue in a timely fashion.
181. See supra Part 1.
182. Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting G & W
Elec. Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1966)).
183. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 691-92 (14th ed. 2006).
184. Kaiser Eng'rs, 538 F.2d at 1387.
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sought.185 Further, in many instances, depending on the precise nature of
the conduct at issue, the NLRA provides employers a civil court action to
recover monetary damages arising from unlawful secondary activity.8 6
Therefore, assuming that an employer is in no position to control
immigration policy, 87 the question presented is whether concerted work
stoppages directed against "unoffending employers" violate the NLRA's
prohibition of "secondary" activity.188  It seems problematic on First
Amendment grounds to think of constitutionally protected "political"
speech, as the immigration rallies on the surface would appear to be, as
being a violation of the NLRA. 189  But the question is not so simply
framed. The issue is not merely whether employees-leaving the ques-
tion of citizenship to one side-are privileged to petition the government
concerning political grievances. Rather, the issue is whether employees
organized as statutorily cognizable labor organizations may lawfully
pressure facially innocent employers by engaging either in work stop-
pages or in other forms of concerted activity with the object of effectuat-
ing changes in federal immigration policy.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of pressure brought to bear
by a labor organization on employers for political reasons beyond the
employers' control (and having seemingly little to do with "traditional"
labor relations) in International Longshoremen's Ass 'n, AFL-CIO v. Al-
lied International, Inc. (Allied).190 In that case, the Longshoremen's As-
sociation (the union) ordered its members to stop handling cargoes arriv-
ing from or destined for the Soviet Union "to protest the Russian inva-
sion of Afghanistan."'' 91 The membership complied, and "longshoremen
up and down the east and gulf coasts refused to service ships carrying
Russian cargoes."'192 In response, Allied International, Inc. (Allied), an
American importing business, 93 filed an unfair labor practice charge
185. Pursuant to Sections 10(j) and 10(l) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1600), (1) (2007).
186. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 303 (Taft-Hartley) [hereinafter LMRA], 29
U.S.C.A. § 187 (2007).
187. This article does not address the interesting question of how the ensuing analysis might be
altered if employees brought pressure to bear on employers demonstrably implicated in the develop-
ment of immigration policy through lobbying or similar measures. That is to say, it might be argued
that employers involved in such sponsorship activity are not neutral entities.
188. The term "unoffending employers" has been frequently employed by the courts to de-
scribe neutral employers caught up in "controversies not their own." See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
189. The subject of the constitutional status of labor activity containing an arguable speech
component is complex. For purposes of this article, it will merely be noted that the labor activity in
question did not take place on the premises of neutral employers and for that reason "looked" more
like speech than coercive conduct directed at neutral employers. The issue addressed here is the
work stoppages accompanying the rallies rather than the outright suppression of the rallies.
190. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
191. Id. at 214.
192. Id. at 214-15.
193. Allied arranged for the import of the Russian goods by an American shipping company
called Waterman Steamship Lines (Waterman), which operated ships of American registry. Id. at
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alleging that the union had violated the NLRA's secondary boycott pro-
visions.1 94 Allied also filed a companion action for damages under Sec-
tion 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).195 In assess-
ing the Section 303 action, the Federal District Court of Massachusetts,
contrary to the eventual administrative determination of the NLRB, con-
cluded that the union's actions did not violate Section 8(b)(4) because
the boycott was "a purely political, primary boycott of Russian goods"
and therefore "not within the scope of [Section] 8(b)(4).' 96  The First
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that "the...
boycott... was within [Section] 8(b)(4)'s prohibition of secondary boy-
cotts, despite its political purpose, and that resort to such behavior was
not protected activity under the First Amendment."'
' 97
In affirming the First Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that the rele-
vant provisions of the statute "appear to be aimed precisely at the sort of
activity alleged in this case."' 198 Those provisions appear to govern "ac-
tivities designed to influence individuals employed by 'any person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce. "1 99 The Court
noted that the union had "no dispute with Allied, Waterman or Clark,"
215. Allied had a contract with Clark & Son (Clark) to unload the cargo in the United States. Id
Clark was signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with an ILA local union in Boston. Id.
194. Id. at 216. Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA provides in relevant part that it is an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization:
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any per-
son engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in,
a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materi-
als, or commodities or to perform any services ... where.., an object thereof
is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proc-
essor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person...
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft or class rather
than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of
the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees perform-
ing such work.
29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b)(4) (2007).
195. Section 303 of the LMRA provides monetary damages when a labor organization is dem-
onstrated to have violated Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA and where that violation is shown to have
resulted in monetary damages to any injured party. 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (2007).
196. Allied, 456 U.S. at 217 (citing language from the District Court's denial of the NLRA's
request for a preliminary injunction in Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 530-
31 (Mass. 1980), and its subsequent substantive dismissal of the Section 303 action involving the
same parties at 492 F. Supp. 334, 336 (Mass. 1980)). Allied's complaint had been consolidated with
Walsh's. Id. at 217 n.8.
197. Alliedat 456 U.S. at 218 (citing Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1981)).
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis added). The Court purported to be quoting Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.
However, that provision nowhere mentions mere attempts to "influence" as unlawful conduct or as
an unlawful object of conduct. See also supra note 194.
DAYS WITHOUT IMMIGRANTS
and did "not seek any labor objective from these employers., 200  The
Court quoted the underlying circuit court opinion:
We think it plain that the ILA was not engaged in primary activity
and that the boycott against Allied's goods was "calculated to satisfy
union objectives elsewhere." The ILA concedes it has no dispute
with Clark, Waterman, or Allied, and there is no suggestion that it
seeks to affect the labor relations of any of these employers. It is also
plain that these "unoffending employers" have been embroiled in a
"controversy not their own" as a result of union action which "rea-
sonably could be expected" to threaten a neutral party with ruin or
substantial loss.
201
The breadth of the holding calls into question whether concerted em-
ployee "political" protest of immigration policy, through engaging in
work stoppages, is significantly analogous to the "political" protest of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by the ILA to implicate the "secondary
boycott" provisions of the NLRA.2 °2
It is very clear that the Supreme Court would not find the facially
political nature of the immigration controversy to be an independently
sufficient basis for not applying the provisions.20 3 After all, the purpose
of the "political" immigration rallies was not to effectuate changes in the
terms and conditions of the "struck" employers. On the contrary, the
manifest object of the rallies was to apply pressure to all employers util-
izing immigrant labor in an attempt to compel the federal government
not to alter immigration policy. While it is tempting merely to observe
that the federal government is not a proper "primary" employer as that
term has come to be understood in secondary boycott jurisprudence, the
failure of the Court to find a "primary" employer in the ILA case did not
prevent it from finding injured "neutrals. ' 2°  Just as with the three em-
ployers in ILA, employers drawn into an immigration dispute may be
severely hampered or prevented from doing business with each other,
albeit temporarily. And although such rallies' object may not be to in-
200. Allied, 456 U.S. at 222.
201. Id. at 222 n.19 (quoting Allied Int'l Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368,
1377 (1st Cir. 1981)).
202. For purposes of this discussion, "secondary boycott provisions" will be synonymous with
"unoffending employer provisions" and will refer exclusively to Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(4)(D)
of the NLRA unless otherwise indicated.
203. "The legislative history does not indicate that political disputes should be excluded from
the scope of [Section] 8(b)(4). The prohibition was drafted broadly to protect neutral parties, 'the
helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all."' Allied, 456 U.S. at 225 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1947)).
204. While it might also be argued that the secondary boycott provisions were never intended
by Congress to be applied in a "primary-less" political situation, the Court in Allied had no difficulty
concluding that Congress intended the same provisions to apply to situations like union protests over
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. "By its exact terms the secondary boycott provisions of [Sec-
tion] 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA would appear to be aimed precisely at the sort of activity alleged in
this case." Allied, 456 U.S. at 218. The bare fact of injury to neutrals was sufficient for the Court to
find a violation of labor law.
20071
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jure neutral employers, the ILA opinion strongly suggests that the rea-
sonable forseeability of potential injury may be sufficient to sweep the
rallies within the ambit of secondary activity liability if other doctrinal
prerequisites and statutory criteria are met.
The doctrinal prerequisite for finding the existence of unlawful sec-
ondary activity is that it be engaged in by a "labor organization. 20 5 The
NLRA defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which em-
ployees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work., 20 6 The Su-
preme Court has upheld a broad construction of the definition as being in
accord with Congress's intention that a labor organization need not for-
mally "bargain" with an employer to fall within the statutory provi-
sion.20 7  The Court has also noted that the phrase "dealing with" is
broader than "bargaining," and extends to an employee organization's
mere proffering of recommendations and proposals regarding the condi-
tions of employment enumerated in Section 2(5), thereby applying to
interaction beyond "the usual concept of collective bargaining. '20 8
There are two types of conduct in which a labor organization may
engage that could establish a violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA if
it is coupled with a proscribed object.209 The first type of potentially
violative conduct essentially involves work stoppages of various types,
strikes, refusals to handle goods, etc., or the encouragement of other em-
ployees to engage in such conduct. 210  The second type of potentially
violative conduct involves threats, coercion, and restraint of employ-
ees.
2 1 1
One proscribed object designed to prevent enmeshment of neutral,
unoffending employers is the NLRA prohibition forbidding "a union
from inducing employees to refuse to handle goods with the object of
forcing any person to cease doing business with any other person. 212 In
ILA there was no evidence that the union's objective was to halt business
between the three involved neutral entities: Allied, the importer; Water-
205. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4) (2007).
206. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5) (2007).
207. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211 (1959); see also Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1158 (7th Cir. 1994).
208. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 214 (citing Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d
281, 285 (5th Cir. 1958)).
209. The statutory language has been set forth above. See supra note 194.
210. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(i) (2007).
211. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(ii). Both "employers" and "employees" are extremely broadly
defined in Section 8(b)(4), effectively discouraging esoteric argument regarding the status of actors
in secondary boycott scenarios.
212. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 212 (1982)
(citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(i)(4)(B)). This was the statutory provision at issue in Allied.
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man, the shipper; and Clark & Son, the stevedore; and the Court ap-
peared to assume for the sake of argument that the object of the boycott
against the Russian goods was "simply to free ILA members from the
morally repugnant duty of handling Russian goods. 21 3 Nonetheless, in
the critical passage of the case, the Court cited one of its prior opin-
ions, 21 4 concluding that "when a purely secondary boycott 'reasonably
can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss'.
. . the pressure on secondary parties must be viewed as at least one of the
objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be rendered
meaningless. 2 15  In other words, if the secondary activity of the union
results in "substantial loss",216 to the "neutral" employer, an unlawful
secondary object will simply be presumed.1 7
213. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224 (1982).
214. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union (Safeco.), 447 U.S. 607, 614 (1980). The Safeco
case involved "product picketing," a particular species of secondary activity in which a labor organi-
zation involved in a primary dispute with an employer follows the product of that employer to the
premises of a secondary, neutral employer in order to persuade customers of that employer not to
purchase the "primary" product. This conduct implicates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA, even
if a union makes no appeal to employees to cease working. The rationale for these findings is that
the union's appeal has a coercive "cease doing business object" when a large portion of the "neu-
tral's" business consists in offering the primary product for sale. See HENDERSON, supra note 83, at
573-74. The Court's reliance on product picketing cases throughout the ILA opinion is somewhat
awkward because those cases involved union picketing of a product that was directed at the general
public and consumers, which triggered analysis under the "publicity proviso" to Section 8(b)(4), and
also, as has been stated, Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Allied case did not involve the publicity proviso
and implicated 8(b)(4)(i)(B), a different provision of Section 8(b)(4), because the union was engag-
ing in a full blown work stoppage rather than picketing the product of a neutral employer. This
reinforces the notion that the Court was focusing exclusively on the injury to neutral employers in
finding a violation-it was discussing the wrong statutory conduct even as it was dispensing with the
necessity of a proscribed statutory object.
215. Allied, 456 U.S. at 224.
216. In an earlier case, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964),
the Court held that certain unions did not violate Section 8(b)(4) when they limited secondary pick-
eting of retail stores to appeals to customers not to buy the products of firms against which one of
the unions was on strike. The Court found that consumer picketing of the neutral retailer was per-
missible unless "employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer."
Id. at 72. The Safeco case, cited by the Court in Allied, altered the Tree Fruits rule by holding that
"[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substan-
tial loss simply does not square with the language of the purpose of [Section] 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."
Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614-15.
217. This interpretation reads the "object" requirement out of the statute entirely. The conclu-
sion begs the question of whether the injured employers are truly neutral because the Court failed to
identify any object on the part of the union to do injury to them, which is the statutory predicate.
The conclusion is actually the fruition of developments begun much earlier with cases focusing on
injuries to neutrals in the context of limited "object evidence." See, e.g., NLRB v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 407 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969) (though statute in fact requires cease doing business
object, objective to cause "serious disruption to of an existing business relationship" sufficient to
satisfy statutory requirement). In Allied, and as the union argued, there was not a "primary" at all, so
the primary-neutral distinction was completely collapsed, and reference to statutory "neutrals" was a
legal fiction. See Brief of Petitioner at 28-9, Allied, 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (No. 80-1663), 1981 WL
390100. While in mixed object scenarios a labor organization will be found to have engaged in
unlawful secondary activity where only one of its objects is proscribed by the NLRA, NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951), the courts have relaxed even that
forgiving standard by whittling away its predicate to a skeletal core requiring merely that the possi-
bility of the fruit of an unlawful object--even an unintended one-be foreseen.
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Another proscribed object designed to prevent enmeshment of neu-
tral, unoffending employers is the NLRA prohibition forbidding a labor
organization from forcing an employer to assign work to one labor or-
ganization, trade, or class of employees rather than to another labor or-
ganization, trade or class of employees by engaging in work stoppages,
as broadly defined, or by making threats or otherwise engaging in coer-
cion and restraint of employees.1 8 Section 10(k) of the NLRA empow-
ers the NLRB to conduct a hearing whenever a charge of this type has
been filed in order to resolve the dispute administratively by ordering an
award of the work to one of the competing claims for the work that is in
dispute.219 Significantly, it is not required that such a work assignment
dispute involve only groups of union-represented employees. An attempt
by a labor organization to compel a work assignment involving unrepre-
sented employees may equally implicate this proscription.22°
A violation of any of these unoffending employer provisions re-
quires a threshold finding that a labor organization has engaged in the
proscribed conduct. 221 In some instances, traditional labor organizations
appear to have been directly involved in organizing the immigration ral-
lies.22 In such cases there is no serious question whether the provisions
could apply. But a more difficult question is presented in the case of
nontraditional labor organizations. As discussed earlier, Professor Hyde
has concluded that there are "at least 133" immigrant work centers that
occasionally advocate with employers on behalf of individual workers,223
218. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(D) (2007); see Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition
Roofers v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 1419, 1421 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993).
219. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(k) (2007); see Local 30, 1 F.3d at 1421, n.4. A 10(k) hearing is gener-
ated whenever there is "reasonable cause to believe" that Section 8(b)(4)(D) has been violated.
Bricklayers Local 1 (Shelby Marble & Tile Co.), 188 N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1971). A violation need
not be proven, either to generate a hearing or to award work to one of the competing "groups" of
employees. Id.
220. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129 n.22 (1971). Section 10(1) of
the NLRA authorizes the NLRB to seek injunctive relief from Federal District courts whenever there
is an allegation that Section 8(b)(4) (A), (B), or (C) has been violated. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(1) (2007).
The quick conduct of a 10(k) hearing essentially obviates the need for interim injunctive relief from
the courts in Section 8(b)(4)(D) scenarios.
221. See infra text at 235 for statutory definition.
222. The website of the organization "We Are America Coalition," an avowed organizer of
southern California rallies occurring on April 10 and May 1, 2006, reflects as member organizations
Service Employees International Union Locals 99, 434B, 535, 660, and 1877. Other coalition mem-
bers include the Southern California District Council of Laborers, United Food and Commercial
Workers Union Local 324, United Healthcare Workers SEIU and UNITE-HERE. See We Are
America Coalition Members, http://todayweact.org/en/CoalitionMembers (last visited Sept. 4,
2007).
223. Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 177, at 397 (citing Janice Fine, Worker Centers.
Organizing Communities at the Edge of a Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417 (2005-2006)). Some
worker centers, like the one located in Pomona, California, are actually created in whole or part by
municipalities as a means to control day laborer issues. See Pomona Day Labor Center,
http://www.pomonadaylabor.org/PLC/ENGLISHIABOUT US/History.htm (last visited Aug. 12,
2007). The Pomona center has been in existence since 1998. Id. In 1998, the Center required
workers to pay fees of $20 per month and agree not to work for less than a wage specified by the
Center. Adriana Chavira, Pomona Labor Center Proves a Bonus for Day Workers, DAILY
BULLETIN (San Bernardino), Jan. 26, 1999, at A4, available at
2007] DAYS WITHOUT IMMIGRANTS
and that certain of these work centers "are quite likely to be statutory
labor organizations. 224 To the extent that any of these work centers are,
have been, or will be intimately involved in the coordination or direction
of immigration protest rallies, employers may argue that the statutory
predicate for finding a violation of the unoffending employer provisions
has been satisfied because a "labor organization" is implicated. The ar-
gument is enhanced by the formal affiliation in August 2006 between the
AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON),
which describes itself as "the nation's largest day laborer association. 225
Involvement by the NDLON in any future immigration rally 226 raises the
unoffending employer stakes. Affected employers may argue that
NDLON and similar organizations are statutory labor organizations, that
the NDLON is a labor organization by virtue of its affiliation with the
AFL-CIO,227 or that the NDLON is an agent of the AFL-CIO. 2 8
This is no airy conjecture. In a recent case decided by the NLRB's
General Counsel, Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Redeye
Grill; Firemen Hospitality Group Cafi Concepts; Restaurant Daniel),229
a group of employers argued that Restaurant Opportunities Center of
New York (ROC-NY) was a statutory labor organization that had en-
http://www.pomonadaylabor.org/PLC/ENGLISHIABOUTUS/Articles%20PDF/Article%2017.pdf.
The Center in some respects resembled a union hiring hall and appeared to be dealing with employ-
ers regarding starting rates of pay.
224. Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 177, at 408.
225. See NDLON, AFL-CIO & NDLON Enter Watershed Agreement to Improve Conditions
for Working Families: Landmark Partnership Marks New Chapter in American Social Justice
Movement, http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr08092006.cfm (last visited August 12,
2007). The press release also contends that "[w]orker centers operate as grass roots mediating
institutions providing support to communities of low wage workers .... the centers provide com-
munity spaces where employers and laborers can meet . . . to handle workplace violations." Id.
(emphasis added). This language appears to bring the worker centers perilously close to the statu-
tory definition for labor organizations, which turns on the requirement that an organization "deal
with" employers. Although the language displays a heroic attempt to color these interactions in
benign passivity, one suspects some level of involvement by the organization in these "meetings"
between employers and employees.
226. Approximately 75% of day laborers are unauthorized and 87% of day laborers were born
in either Mexico or Central America. See ABEL VALENZUELA, JR., ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATEs 4 (Jan. 2006), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_
files/Natl DayLabor-On theCornerl.pdf
227. The AFL-CIO has another "community affiliate" named "Working America" that it util-
izes to communicate with non-union employees. About Working America,
http://www.workingamerica.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). It does not engage in collective
bargaining on behalf of these employees and primarily utilizes the affiliation as a "get out the vote"
mechanism. Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 177, at 389. Pointing to other affiliations such as
these, the AFL-CIO may be able to persuasively argue that it has expertise in affiliating in a manner
that does not require it to "deal with" employers.
228. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 342 N.L.R.B. 740, 740 (2004) (one Electrical Workers
Local found jointly and severally liable for the unfair labor practices of another, including for a
Section 8(b)(4) violation on an agency and "joint venture" theory).
229. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Celeste Mattina,
Reg'l Dir., Region 2, NLRB, regarding Rest. Opportunities Ctr. of N.Y., Cases 2-CP-1067, 2-CP-
20643, 2-CP-1071, 2-CB-20705, 2-CP-1073, and 2-CB-20787 (Nov. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/Advice%20Memos/2006/2-CP-1067.pdf [hereinafter Kearney,
Rest. Opportunities]
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gaged in unlawful recognitional picketing. 230 The General Counsel
found that "most of ROC-NY's activities consist of social advocacy,
legal services and job support services that do not fall within the purview
of [labor organization status under the NLRA]." 23' While it is unclear
232 tnwhether the employers appealed this determination, the important
point is that they were fully prepared to argue that the theoretical statu-
tory labor organization was capable of violating the NLRA. The same
thought could easily occur to "unoffending employers" subject to immi-
gration rallies.
There are of course defenses to this line of argument. The ROC-NY
memorandum reveals, for example, one defense available to immigrant
work centers or similar organizations to the claim that they are in reality
statutory labor organizations. In the ROC-NY case, the NLRB's General
Counsel concluded that ROC-NY was not a labor organization in part
because its "conduct ha[d] not been shown to constitute a pattern or prac-
tice of dealing [with employers regarding terms and conditions of em-
ployment] over time.''233 Many nontraditional organizations of a similar
type may share this characteristic. It is likely that most of them have
existed for more than a decade, so it may be possible to show that they
have not behaved like traditional labor organizations over a substantial
period of time.234 There are a number of problems with this defense,
however.
First, an infirmity in the General Counsel's analysis is its focus on
the functional relationship between ROC-NY and the few employers
involved in specific cases rather than on ROC-NY's overall purpose.
Section 2(5) of the NLRA quite clearly defines a labor organization in
230. Section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA generally makes it an unlawful practice for a labor organiza-
tion
to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his em-
ployees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or se-
lect such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative,
unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of
such employees," when certain addition criteria have been met.
29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(7) (2007). The provision applies only to conduct engaged in by a labor organi-
zation.
231. This view is strikingly at odds with Professor Hyde's conclusion that ROC-NY likely is a
labor organization because it does "indeed raise grievances with particular employers on behalf of
particular employees . . . .activity that has been held to constitute . . .dealing with employers."
Hyde concludes that "it is hard to come up with any compelling policy reason why such groups
should be exempt from... restrictions ... that bind more traditional unions." Hyde, New Institu-
tions, supra note 177, at 408.
232. The General Counsel also concluded on factual grounds that even if ROC-NY was a labor
organization it would not have violated the NLRA in the manner alleged. Kearney, Rest. Opportuni-
ties, supra note 229. Thus, there may have been little point in appealing the more difficult theoreti-
cal legal issue.
233. Id.
234. Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 177, at 385.
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terms of purpose.235 Admittedly, employees must also participate in the
organization, and courts have often scrutinized the functional relation-
ship in a particular workplace between employees, a putative labor or-
ganization, and an employer. But that scrutiny is usually undertaken in
considering the question of whether an "organization" has been "domi-
nated" within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2).236 An organization's stated
purpose may be at odds with its actual activities, but because only one of
those activities need involve "dealing with" employers, the activities
threshold is typically met quite easily. The NLRB has repeatedly held
that "[t]he definition of labor organization is to be interpreted and ap-
plied broadly., 237 In the context of an "outside" employee organization,
which exists independently of a relationship with an employer, the ques-
tion becomes almost unimportant; there will necessarily be employee
participation in the organization. Thus, the primary consideration in as-
sessing such a labor organization's NLRA status would appear to revolve
around its purpose, which was not the General Counsel's focus in the
memorandum.
Consider the ROC-NY organization. Professor Hyde's argument
that ROC-NY is probably a statutory labor organization238 is consistent
with the manner in which it holds itself out to the public. A visit to the
ROC-NY web site reveals the organization's claim that in the prior two
years it had engaged in six campaigns against employers for back wages
and discrimination claims for food service workers; negotiated a settle-
ment for workers from a Brooklyn deli; and negotiated a settlement with
a "fancy uptown restaurant" involving "compensation for discrimination,
paid vacations, promotions, the firing of an abusive waiter, and a posting
in the restaurant guaranteeing workers the right to organize and the in-
volvement of ROC-NY in the case of any future discrimination., 23 9 Tell-
ingly, on the same website the group advises employees: "If you are a
restaurant worker who has problems with your employer, call us or come
by ROC-NY! ''240 Can there be serious doubt that ROC-NY "exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work?",2 4 ' Even if ROC-NY has only been engaged in this
235. A labor organization is one that "exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5) (2007).
236. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1161-67 (7th Cir. 1994) (focusing on man-
agement's participation in action committees (found to be Section 2(5) labor organizations) and its
effect on the employees).
237. Air Line Pilots Ass'n (ABX Air, Inc.), 345 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 2004-2005 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 16,992 (Aug. 27 2005).
238. Hyde, New Institutions, supra note 177, at 408.
239. Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, Big Victory for Restaurant Workers at Cite
and Park Ave. Caf4, of the Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group [hereinafter ROC-NY],
http://www.rocny.org/programs-corporatecampaigns.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
240. Id.
241. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5) (2007).
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type of endeavor for a limited period of time, the cited language demon-
strates that it intends to continue doing so and that that is its reason for
existing.
Second, accepting the NLRB's functional approach raises more
questions than it answers. The settlement agreement that ROC-NY ne-
gotiated with one of the employers admittedly contained provisions ad-
dressing terms and conditions of employment, including open-ended,
future-oriented terms concerning promotions, workplace language issues,
and a fully functional arbitration process.242 Although the NLRB's Gen-
eral Counsel grounded his determination in a finding that there would be
no further "back and forth" between the parties, 243 the ROC-NY website
indicates that its settlement with the "fancy uptown restaurant" included
a promise from the restaurant that workers had "the right to organize and
the involvement of ROC-NY in the case of any future discrimination.",
244
It is unclear to what settlement agreement the organization refers (there
are a number from which to choose), but it seems clear that the group has
no intention of disengaging from these types of activities.
Under the General Counsel's pattern and practice approach, ROC-
NY and similar organizations have no way of knowing when they may
have crossed the labor organization threshold. This is undoubtedly un-
settling (or should be) in contemplating possible civil court litigation
where courts may take a quite different view of the matter.
The better and more likely line of defense for a nontraditional labor
organization in the context of widespread immigration protest activity
would probably center on causation. It seems reasonably clear that the
immigration rallies were intensified through the involvement of media
outlets.245  At some point, the attribution of widespread rallies to any
particular union must be called into question. Could a particular union
reasonably have caused (or even foreseen the possibility of) hundreds of
thousands of rally participants (presumably unauthorized workers and
their supporters) failing to report to their respective workplaces? Such
an outcome might have been desirable to any given union, and this col-
lective motivation may have played a part in collectively initiating a
process. But to what extent is that vague collective aspiration susceptible
to any rational apportionment? If apportionment or uncoupling along
these lines is not feasible, it is difficult to see how liability could be im-
242. ROC-NY, supra note 239, at 3. It is ironic and perhaps instructive that unions formally
certified under the NLRA are frequently unable to achieve collective bargaining agreements of any
type, let alone agreements containing grievance-arbitration mechanisms.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Gillian Flaccus, Spanish-language Media Credited on Pro-Immigrant Rallies: Radio, TV





posed on any particular labor organization, especially one that is nontra-
ditional or inchoate. Nevertheless, it seems true that the more successful
immigration rallies become, the more tenuous this defense would be-
come because the forseeability of widespread work stoppages would be
easier to establish.
Assuming that the involvement of worker centers or similar organi-
zations in immigration rallies could be proven, and that those organiza-
tions were found by the NLRB or courts to be statutory labor organiza-
tions, employers might successfully argue that the rallies violated the
unoffending employer provisions of the NLRA. For example, regarding
the NLRA provision forbidding "a union from inducing employees to
refuse to handle goods with the object of forcing any person to cease
doing business with any other person," 246 the critical question is whether
it is foreseeable to an implicated labor organization that the rallies
"[could] reasonably be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial lOSS.,,247 This would be a vague and dangerous standard from
the perspective of the charged organizations. Presumably, it could be
met by a finding by the NLRB that an organization had an expectation
that some employers subject to work stoppages could be threatened with
substantial loss. But questions abound.
To begin with, the employers would have to be found "neutrals"
within the meaning of the NLRA. In ILA, the Court essentially ignored
the union's argument that logically there could be no neutral employer
without a primary "employer" by focusing almost exclusively on the
ensnarement and injury of presumed neutrals.248 It is hard to predict how
this problem would be resolved when the only conceivable "primary" is
the United States rather than the Soviet government, and the controversy
arguably assumes First Amendment dimensions.249 In that scenario an
absence of primary argument might take on renewed vigor.
246. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 222 (1982).
247. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 614 (1980).
248. , Allied, 456 U.S. at 223-25.
249. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982) (noting that pursu-
ant to the First Amendment, state law may not broadly proscribe peaceful political boycotts includ-
ing those involving picketing, or subject participants in such boycotts to civil damage awards by
virtue of their association with a group, in the absence of evidence that the group possessed unlawful
aims). The Allied Court's restatement of its consistent rule rejecting the claim that "secondary
picketing by labor unions in violation of NLRA § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First
Amendment," 456 U.S. at 226, presumed the existence of secondary activity without articulating a
reason for not requiring the existence of a primary. If the test the Court would apply is at bottom
premised on the effect that picketing has on "neutrals," and the picketing is directed at the U.S.
government, the situation would seem even more problematic than the one presented in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co. In Claiborne, the boycott was at least directed at the subjects of the boy-
cott, white merchants in Claiborne, Mississippi. 456 U.S. at 889. It is difficult to accept that the
Court would have reached a different outcome if the boycott in question, which involved a demand
for "racial equality and integration," Id., had been directed at the Government rather than at the
private merchants. Immigration protest represents a "mixed" dispute involving "political" and labor
questions just as the protest in Claiborne involved a mixed dispute of political and commercial trade
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It is also unclear what "forseeability" of "ruin or substantial loss"
would mean in this type of unoffending employer context. In the ILA
case, for example, the importer claimed that it had "lost the great bulk of
its twenty-five million dollar a year business of importing wood from
Russia. , 250 The Court did not indicate the actual financial loss suffered
by the employer, the percentage of the employer's business the loss rep-
resented, or the duration of continuing losses, if any; no litigant appears
to have questioned the substantiality of the loss. 251  And the opinion does
not indicate why it would have been reasonable for the labor organiza-
tion to anticipate any particular loss with respect to the neutral under
consideration.252 In contrast, in Safeco, a union picketed the product of
an employer, an insurance company, with whom it had a primary dispute,
at the premises of five "neutral" employers who were also engaged in the
insurance business.25 3 The NLRB found that dealing in the product of
the primary employer represented substantially all of the neutral em-
ployers' business, 254 such that the secondary picketing would necessarily
ruin the neutral employers. 5  The Court employed language of forsee-
ability in concluding that the union had a "cease doing business" object,
256as required to establish a violation of the statute. Quoting language
from the NLRB decision below, the Court stated that the union's secon-
dary appeal was "reasonably calculated to induce customers not to pa-
tronize the neutral parties at all., 257  There was little explanation of the
questions. In essence, painting with the broad brush utilized by the Court in Allied could mean that
any politically motivated boycott or work stoppage by a union resulting in the injury of a "neutral"
employer would be swept within the ambit of Section 8(b)(4). It is therefore difficult to believe that
the Court's First Amendment analysis would be as cursory in the context of a secondary boycott
analysis in which the U.S. government was the primary.
250. Brief for the Respondent at 4, Allied, (No. 80-1663), 456 U.S. at 212.
251. While these facts no doubt occurred in the context of settlement discussions surrounding
the Section 303 action, the existence of the losses appears plainly germane in the first instance to that
of liability. Allied, 456 U.S. at 223.
252. There is a fundamental problem with equating proof that a labor organization had the
object of enmeshing neutrals in a labor controversy by compelling them to cease doing business with
some third party with the foreseeability that such an outcome might result. It is one thing to say that
an inference of object, intent, or motive is permissibly made because direct evidence of "state of
mind" is rarely available. See State v. Gantt, 217 S.E.2d 3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975). It is quite an-
other thing to suspend the requirement of even indirect evidence of object, intent or motive. As
previously noted, in ILA the Court specifically found that the union did not have a cease doing
business object, and accepted as bona fide its political objective. Allied, 456 U.S. at 221-22. Thus,
the Court was not simply making an inference to satisfy a statutory predicate, but was, rather, elimi-
nating the predicate altogether, presumably for policy reasons. In the arena of tort law, Professor
Cardi has written about the tendency of courts to substitute judgments of "foreseeability" for
breaches of statutorily determined duties in order to surreptitiously satisfy policy objectives. See W.
Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Pro-
posed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739 (2005). Professor Cardi wrote, "[s]till, no
matter how attractive foreseeability may be, to the extent that it masks-or at the very least, distracts
from-courts' resolution of important policy concerns, it in fact endangers courts' legitimacy, rather
than protects it. Id. at 767. The observation resonates in this context.
253. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 609 (1980).
254. The court found that the primary product accounted for 90% of the neutrals' business. Id.
255. Id. at 610.
256. Id. at 615.
257. Id. (citing Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757 (1976)).
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basis for presuming that "calculation"; the Court simply cited a line of
cases arising in a variety of contexts as supporting the proposition that
"[t]he Union is responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its con-
duct., 258 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had rejected a finding of an 8(b)(4) violation in the case be-
low precisely because of what it termed the NLRB's "nebulous inferred
intent approach to [the operation of Section 8(b)(4)] .,,259 The Supreme
Court failed to explicitly address this fundamental objection. In Tree
Fruits, the seminal "product picketing" case preceding Safeco, "the
product picketed was but one item among the many that made up the
[primary's] trade., 260 The Safeco Court distinguished Tree Fruits in an
important footnote:
The picketing in Tree Fruits and the picketing in this case are rela-
tively extreme examples of the spectrum of conduct that the Board
and the courts will encounter in complaints charging violations of
[Section] 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If secondary picketing were directed against
a product representing a major portion of a neutral's business, but
significantly less than that represented by a single dominant product,
neither Tree Fruits nor today's decision necessarily would control.
The critical question would be whether, by encouraging customers to
reject the struck product, the secondary appeal is reasonably likely to
threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss. Resolution of
the question in each case will be entrusted to the Board's expertise.
261
In a scenario involving a series of immigration rallies resulting in
work stoppages, assuming a primary employer is presumed or deemed
not to be necessary to make out a violation of Section 8(b)(4) as a matter
of law, and further assuming that the involved secondary employers are
thereby rendered NLRA neutrals, the question is likely to come down to
where on the Tree Fruits-Safeco continuum the substantiality of the
forseeable loss is deemed to fall. Is it foreseeable that "substantially all"
of an employer's business will be impacted? Must that level of loss be
endured by an employer for some period of time before becoming ac-
tionable? This speculative quagmire is not rendered less nebulous by the
possibility that the NLRB or the courts could aggregate loss among em-
ployers for purposes of considering its substantiality.2 62 Thus, while on
any particular day the losses occasioned by an individual employer from
an immigrant protest work stoppage might be relatively small, losses on
that same day aggregated for all impacted employers, considered as a
group, could be considerable. Ultimately, in the absence of a limiting
principle for this vague doctrine of forseeability, actual and arguably
258. Id. at n.9.
259. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 1133, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
260. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 613 (citing Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 60).
261. Id at 615 n.11.
262. This is a speculative but conceivable finding.
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statutory labor organizations expose themselves to significant risk
through involvement in immigration rallies that can be characterized as
violating the unoffending employer provisions.263
In the interest of a complete discussion concerning unoffending em-
ployer issues264 in immigration protest scenarios, it should also be noted
that unoffending employers might allege that their ensnarement in immi-
gration issues by "labor organizations" violates the provision forbidding
a labor organization from coercing an employer to assign work to one
labor organization, trade, or class of employees, rather than to another
labor organization, trade or class of employees, by engaging in work
stoppages, as broadly defined, or by making threats or otherwise engag-
ing in coercion and restraint of employees. 265 A labor organization may
violate this provision by coercing an employer to assign work to its
members rather than to an unorganized group of employees.266 As is the
case with the other unoffending employer provisions, the provision could
not be triggered unless a statutory labor organization was found to be
involved in an immigration rally. Upon establishment of the labor or-
ganization predicate, however, the situation would become more com-
plex. It could be argued that a labor organization which engages in a
work stoppage protesting immigration reforms, or which "threatens" or
announces its intention to engage in such a stoppage, is attempting to
compel an employer to assign work to immigrants, whether authorized or
unauthorized, rather than to citizens. A work stoppage in furtherance of
that objective would appear to fall within this unoffending employer pro-
vision because it would represent an attempt to require an employer to
decide claims of competing "classes" of employees. Moreover, the dis-
pute could be characterized as either a demand by a labor organization
that an employer continue to assign certain work to one class of employ-
ees (immigrants), or as a demand that in the future an employer not re-
fuse to assign work to the same "class."
Typically, the NLRB will not find a violation of this provision if the
labor organization engaging in the putatively unlawful conduct has
263. That liability would play itself out in a Section 303 action which limits recovery for an
employer's losses arising from a violation of Section 8(b)(4) to "actual, compensatory damages."
Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964). The aggregation problem that could drag
an arguable statutory labor organization into a Section 303 proceeding could become a disaggrega-
tion problem for an employer in the same proceeding as it attempted to quantify the losses it sus-
tained as a result of any particular rally. Nonetheless, it would be relatively easy for a large em-
ployer suffering many lost employee hours to quantify the replacement value of those hours.
264. Section 8(b)(4) forbids certain "threats" and "work stoppages" directed by labor organiza-
tions against "neutrals" when motivated by four specified "objects." 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)
(2007). This article discusses only two of the objects, as incorporated in Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(b)(4)(D). Discussion of the remaining two objects, incorporated in Sections 8(b)(4)(A) and
8(b)(4)(C), respectively, has been omitted because it is not germane to the analysis.
265. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(D).
266. See, e.g., NLRB v. Plasterers' Local No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129 n.22 (1971); Plumbers
Local 195 [hereinafter GulfOil], 275 N.L.R.B. 484, 485 n.7 (1985).
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ic 267"work preservation" rather than "work acquisition" objectives. How-
ever, neither will the NLRB find that a labor organization has a work
preservation objective where the labor organization seeks to acquire
work not historically performed by "the claiming group of employ-
ees." 268 Although the NLRB's decisional law usually requires claims by
competing classes of employees, "the Board has held that employees
demonstrate a competing claim to disputed work by performing it."
269
Furthermore, the NLRB has made clear that this provision should be
interpreted broadly to protect all neutral employers swept up in a work
assignment dispute. "The Board has interpreted this language as show-
ing the 'clear intent of Congress to protect not only employers whose
work is in dispute from such strike activity, but any employer against
whom a union acts with such a purpose.'
270
The contours of a potential argument emerge from this introduction.
Employers could argue that undisputed or putative labor organizations'
sponsorship of immigration rallies that threaten or actually result in work
stoppages represents an attempt to coerce them to award work in the fu-
ture to immigrants, as opposed to citizens. Work preservation arguments
could be overcome by establishing the novelty of the presence of the
immigrant employee "class" within particular occupations. The compet-
ing claims requirement for establishment of disputed work could be
shown through the work stoppages themselves (on the part of labor or-
ganizations) and through the present performance of the disputed work
by the citizen "class" of employees.
Although these arguments are worth considering, there are three
main reasons employers are unlikely to proceed into this thicket. First, a
10(k) award271 cannot be obtained as quickly as either a preliminary in-
junction in connection with establishment of a Section 8(b)(4) violation,
and time would presumably be of the essence. Second, aside from the
issue of time, the 10(k) hearing required to obtain such an award could
be very large in scope and complex.272 Third, employers will likely con-
clude, contrary to their initial impulses, that there is good reason to think
that the NLRB would simply hold under Safeway Stores273 that the dis-
267. See Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local 107, 134 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1321 (1961).
268. Teamsters Local 174, 340 N.L.R.B. 137, 139 (2003) (citing Teamsters Local 107, 336
N.L.R.B. 518 (2001)).
269. Id. at 139 (citing GulfOil, 275 N.L.R.B. at 485 n.7).
270. Gulf Oil, 275 N.L.R.B. at 485 (quoting ILA Local 1911, 236 N.L.R.B. 1439, 1440
(1978)).
271. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 222, 224 (1982)
(relating that "when a purely secondary boycott 'reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral
parties with ruin or substantial loss' ... the pressure on secondary parties must be viewed as at least
one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be rendered meaningless.").
272. In theory, each violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D) could generate a 10(k) hearing. 29
U.S.C.A. 160(k) (2007). If many immigration rallies in a short time frame generate a correspond-
ingly large number of 10(k) hearings, one can imagine a large, complex and nationally coordinated
proceeding addressing the similar issues at play.
273. Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local 107, 134 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1323 (1961).
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pute is not of the type Congress meant to address in enacting the provi-
sion.
Immigration rallies are probably protected concerted activity under
the NLRA. But if courts deem the rallies to be unlawful because they are
directed at unoffending employers, labor organizations face potential
liability. The difficult issue is whether courts would deem unoffending
employers NLRA neutrals in the absence of a cognizable primary. It is
also possible that courts could find the rallies primary with respect to
certain employers or industries but not with respect to all employers or
industries. It is difficult to discern limiting principles in this area. If the
ILA case27 4 is any guide, however, the courts may not hesitate to impose
liability, and labor organizations would be well-advised to proceed with
caution. If employers suffering work-stoppages in connection with im-
migration rallies are deemed to be unoffending, however, NLRA injunc-
tions offer protections that prudently guard against the spread of secon-
dary activity.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NLRA CLASSIFICATION OF THE RALLIES
This article has argued that in most scenarios in which immigration
rallies have arisen or are likely to arise, the underlying concerted conduct
arguably will be either protected or prohibited by the NLRA. This is not
to say that one cannot imagine immigration protests completely lacking a
work nexus. For example, an increase in the cost of filing a document
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service might be controversial
and generate protest, but it would have no apparent nexus to the work
relationship. However, if the cost were increased so substantially that a
worker would be forced to give up a job and return to the worker's home
country, it could take on a new dimension. If the worker were dis-
charged by his or her employer in retaliation for engaging in a concerted
protest over the increase in cost, it might be arguable that the discharge
violated the NLRA.
Often, the purpose of classifying labor activity is to address reme-
dial consequences flowing from a particular violation of the NLRA. In
this regard, the unavailability of back pay under the NLRA for unauthor-
ized workers unlawfully discharged for engaging in union activity has
been widely discussed and criticized.275 But much of this criticism fails
to take fully into account the now familiar reality that NLRA remedies
are often ineffective in deterring employer unfair labor practices regard-
less of whether affected employees are fully entitled to back pay and
274. Allied, 456 U.S. 212.
275. See, e.g., Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Su-
preme Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW &
INEQ. 313, 332 (2003).
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reinstatement. 276 Viewed from this perspective, the actual damage occa-
sioned by the loss of these NLRA remedies is at least questionable,
though the psychological impact of stripping these remedies is signifi-
cant. The failure to provide NLRA remedies evinces on a deeper level a
general legal sense that unauthorized workers are not fully "persons"
deserving of legal protection.
But there is a structural aspect to federal labor law that reaches be-
yond case-specific remedies. As Professor Cynthia Estlund has noted,
the protection of employee concerted activity matters in part because
once subject to protection, the activity "cannot ordinarily be enjoined or
prosecuted either criminally or civilly. '277 Indeed, any state law purport-
ing to regulate conduct that is even arguably prohibited or protected by
the NLRA is broadly preempted under the Supreme Court's Garmon
278doctrine. Furthermore, if reviewing courts deem that Congress inten-
tionally left certain labor conduct unregulated, the conduct is typically
deemed not subject to regulation by the states-a judicial invention com-
monly known as the Machinists doctrine. 279 Together, the Garmon and
Machinists doctrines substantially remove states from the arena of labor
relations.28° Whether Congress actually intended to oust states from la-
bor relations this broadly defined is a matter of legitimate conjecture.281
But it is clear that broad preemption remains the operating reality of our
national labor policy. Legal issues surrounding preemption are not easy
to assess and often seem, to borrow the eloquent words of Justice Frank-
furter, "of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the
process of litigating elucidation., 282 To the present day, when litigants
attempt to break through this wall of presumptive state exclusion, they
are routinely met with aggressive, perhaps instinctive, opposition from
both the courts and the NLRB.2 83
276. See e.g., Michael Weiner, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices? Reassessing the
Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1579, 1584 (2005);
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1787-91 (1983).
277. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527,
1608 (2002).
278. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
279. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 427 U.S. 132,
153 (1972).
280. Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code
of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183, 190 (2003).
281. For a fascinating discussion along these lines, see Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking
Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 359 (1990).
282. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
283. For example, the NLRB's unusual intervention in a Ninth Circuit case addressing whether
a California "living wage" statute was preempted by the NLRA under the Machinists doctrine be-
cause it purported to dictate "labor peace." Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plain-
tiffs-Appellees and in Support of Affirmance, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer [hereinaf-
ter Chamber of Commerce], 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55166, 03-55169), 2003 WL
22330725. The bill stated, "[ilt is the policy of the state not to interfere with an employee's choice
about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union. For this reason, the state should not
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Against this backdrop of the decades-old, delicate federal-state bal-
ance in labor relations loom the storm clouds of the immigration protest
controversy. The issue is fairly simply stated. If unauthorized workers
are statutory employees within the meaning of the NLRA, as the Su-
preme Court clearly held in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,284 arguably pro-
tected activity in which they engage, including work-related concerted
protests over immigration policy, should be insulated from state regula-
tion under the Garmon preemption doctrine. In a similar vein, if those
same protests are arguably unlawful secondary activity, Garmon should
control. Even if the protests are not arguably protected or prohibited, as
in the case of intermittent but primary work stoppages, they are neverthe-
less likely to be labor disputes within the meaning of the NLRA. In that
event, the Machinists doctrine285 may operate to preempt state regulation.
Thus, unless there is some underlying context of violence or another
element implicating state prerogative,286 the states would seem precluded
as a matter of law from regulating or enjoining these rallies.
If peaceful immigration protests are "labor disputes, 287 they are
generally immune from federal court injunctions except in cases impli-
cating a narrow class of injunctions specifically authorized under the
NLRA.288 Thus, if in a particular immigration dispute the controversy is
deemed to be both related to work and involving a primary employer,
precedent dictates that the dispute is beyond the reach of federal injunc-
subsidize efforts by an employer to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. It is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this act to prohibit an employer from using state funds and facilities for the
purpose of influencing employees to support or oppose unionization[.]" [the so-called market par-
ticipation exception]. Cal. Legis. Serv. 872, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). The NLRB argued
that the ordinance was preempted and the Ninth Circuit substantially agreed. Chamber of Com-
merce, 364 F.3d at 1159, rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Lockyer, 408 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2005). Though the high-level litigation over the market participa-
tion exception continues, the debate underscores the continuing subtlety and relevance of preemption
doctrine. See, e.g., Healthcare Ass'n of N.Y. State v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2006)
(remanding the case for consideration of applicability of Machinists preemption to "market partici-
pant" regulation).
284. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893-94.
285. See supra text accompanying note 283.
286. See San Diego Bldg Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959) (noting that
under labor preemption principles, States retain the right to regulate conduct falling within their
historic police powers).
287. Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a "labor dispute" as "any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." 29 U.S.C.A. § 113(c) (2007). The NLRA defines "labor dispute" in precisely the
same manner except that "tenure" is added to "terms or conditions" of employment as being among
the types of controversy taken cognizance of (the NLRA also deletes "or not" from the terms
"whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.") 29 U.S.C.A. §
152(9) (2007). Immediate deportation would appear to implicate "tenure" of employment.
288. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 440-44 (1987).
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tion. Indeed, in the non-NLRA context the dispute would be beyond
federal injunctive authority even if secondary. 8 9
Peaceful immigration rallies and similar protest conduct appear, ac-
cordingly, not to be subject to injunction by either the states or by the
federal government, and appear further not subject to criminalization by
the states.
Immigration policy, traditionally a federal sphere of authority, is
also increasingly being enforced by state and local law enforcement ac-
tors29 ° as a result of congressional delegation of federal immigration en-
forcement to the states.29' While clashes between federal labor and em-
ployment law and federal immigration policy have generally invited
scrutiny, 292 the dual enforcement of immigration law by federal and state
actors may create unique kinds of problems that are likely to generate
difficult preemption questions. For example, in a non-immigration con-
text, state interference with an employee rally protected under the NLRA
could be enjoined at the request of the NLRB.293 Assessing whether state
law enforcement agents could lawfully interfere with work-related immi-
gration rallies that are arguably protected by the NLRA would be a com-
plex undertaking.
The expanded presence of federal immigration enforcement in pri-
vate workplaces makes the prospect of a larger role for state law en-
forcement in workplace immigration matters more likely. A recent
widely-reported immigration raid highlights the problem. In December
2006, federal agents of the Department of Homeland Security's Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement division (the ICE) conducted raids at
289. Id. at 440. But see Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Association of Flight Attendants, 349 B.R. 338,
344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that in limited instances under the Railway Labor Act, Federal injunc-
tion may issue to enjoin strike by union against bankrupt air carrier).
290. See HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTUTUTE, BLURRING THE LINES: A
PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LA w USING THE NA TIONAL
CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002-2004, at 4 (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/MPI report BlurringtheLines 120805.pdf (last visited August 26, 2007).
291. For example, H.R. 4437, passed by the House but not the Senate in the 109th Congress,
sought to expand the utilization of State and Local authorities by suspending the requirement under
current law that local enforcement be undertaken only after a formal memorandum of understanding
between the Federal government and Local law enforcement agency has been executed. Border
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. §
222 (2006). While the ultimate fate of the bill-including its local enforcement features-is uncer-
tain in light of changed political realities, the concept of local involvement in immigration matters
has been on the ascendancy in Congress since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996.
292. See Katherine E. Seitz, Enter at Your Own Risk. The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds v. National Labor Relations Board on the Undocumented Worker, 82 N.C. L. REv. 366, 406-
10(2003).
293. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971). The NLRB enjoys implied authority
to enjoin state action where its Federal power preempts the field. The purpose of the NLRA is to
obtain uniform application of substantive rules and to avoid conflicts likely to result from Local
procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies.
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meatpacking plants in six states. 29 4 The multi-city sweep by 1000 agents
appeared solely associated with a discrete federal enforcement action
directed at identity fraud.295 ICE arrested 1282 "suspected illegal immi-
grants" in connection with the raids, which apparently represented 18
percent of the entire morning shift of the targeted work group. 296  The
employer whose employees were the subjects of the sweep, Swift & Co.,
had filed an action in a federal district court in advance of the sweep
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent it from going for-
ward.29 7 Swift argued that its participation in the upcoming mass re-
moval of unauthorized workers pursuant to a "Basic Pilot Program" of
the federal government could subject it to criminal or civil liability.
298
Swift could have avoided the raids altogether by simply agreeing to hand
over its workers' documents to the federal government en masse under
the ICE's "Mutual Agreement between Government and Employers"
program, known under the acronym IMAGE, so that the Government
could itself review the documents for fraudulent information.
299
The existence of the Basic Pilot Project demonstrates widespread
federal government enforcement efforts within the workplace. But the
federal government cannot enforce or even monitor such far flung pro-
grams by itself. Outside of the workplace setting, about 600,000 illegal
immigrants have completely ignored actual deportation orders, and a
major ICE push to arrest these most flagrant of immigration law violators
has netted only about 13,000 arrests since June 2006.300 The Swift raids
required 1000 agents to arrest 1282 alleged unauthorized workers.
301
This may seem like a large number of arrests, but the ratios of arrests to
potential "targets" should compel rational cynicism as to the ability of
the federal government to effectively pursue or prosecute apparent im-
migration violations. This practical inability of federal-only enforcement
was the obvious reason for the initial congressional authorization for
294. Spencer S. Hsu & Krissah Williams, Illegal Workers Arrested in 6-State ID Theft Sweep,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/12/AR2006121200525.html.
295. Id.
296. Spencer S. Hsu, ICE Sweep Was Largest Ever Against One Firm, WASH. POST, Dec. 14,
2006, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/13/
AR2006121301947.html.
297. Swift & Co. v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 2:06-CV-314-J (N.D. Tex. Dec.
7, 2006) (Order Denying Preliminary Injunction).
298. Id. at 2. According to the court's order Swift had previously agreed to participate in the
Basic Pilot Project, which the court described as "a program designed to permit employers to deter-
mine whether newly hired employees are legally authorized to work in the United States."
299. Darryl Fears & Krissah Williams, In Exchange for Records, Fewer Immigration Raids:
Businesses Skeptical of New Federal Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2007, at A3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/28/AR2007012801172.html.
300. Gillian Flaccus, Immigration Sweep Yields 761 Arrests, CBS NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/23/ap/national/mainD8MR6PROO.shtml.
301. Hsu & Williams, supra note 294.
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local involvement in immigration enforcement, pursuant to Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
30 2
The plausible and even likely outcome of federal government man-
power limitations for immigration enforcement will be increased state
and local involvement in the workplace and, quite possibly, in enforce-
ment actions impinging on conduct arguably falling under the jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB. It is not, for example, difficult to imagine state agents
descending upon large immigration rallies protesting working conditions
pursuant to powers ostensibly delegated to the agents by the federal gov-
ernment. °3 A raid of that type would raise at least the risk that a court
would conclude that the rally was protected under federal labor law and
therefore outside of state jurisdiction, and that the state agents were in
any event acting outside of the scope of their limited federal mandate.
Because of these kinds of risks, it seems difficult to presume that Con-
gress intended its limited delegation of federal immigration enforcement
authority to extend to arguable NLRA activity.
In addition to preemption problems occasioned by situational
clashes of federal labor law and state enforcement of immigration laws,
there is also the better appreciated direct clash of the federal policies
underlying these laws. Notwithstanding Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB,3 °4 Congress obviously did not intend that this conflict ex-
ist. As the Eleventh Circuit showed in Patel v. Quality Inn South, °5 and
as Justice Breyer emphasized in his dissent in Hoffman,30 6 it is unusually
evident from the congressional record that the most recent incarnation of
the immigration law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA),307 was not meant to interfere in any respect with the enforce-
ment authority of federal or state agencies administering almost all major
workplace laws:
In addition, the [Education and Labor] committee does not intend
that any provision of this Act would limit the powers of State or Fed-
eral labor standards agencies such as the Occupational Safety and
302. James Jay Carafano, Build on Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to
Boost State and Local Immigration Enforcement, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.heritage.org/ResearchImmigration/wml2l2.cfm.
303. "On the April 10 [2006] edition of Fox News' Your World With Neil Cavuto, during a
discussion of nationwide protests of proposed immigration legislation, guest host David Asman
wondered: 'with so many illegals hitting the streets, is this the perfect time to round up these law-
breakers and ship them out?' As Asman spoke, the onscreen text read 'round them up?' Throughout
the following segment ... the onscreen text read: 'perfect chance to arrest illegal immigrants?,"'
Posting of B.A. to Media Matters for America, http://mediamatters.org/items/200604110002 (Apr.
17, 2006, 10:48 EST). It is unclear whether there was any discussion as to how the rally participants
could be arrested.
304. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
305. 846 F.2d 700, 704 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
306. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 157 (2002) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
307. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codi-
fied as 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2007)).
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Health Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, or Labor arbitrators, in conformity
with existing law, to remedy unfair practices committed against un-
documented employees for exercising their rights before such agen-
cies or for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do
otherwise would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the hir-
ing of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on work-
ing conditions caused by their employment.
308
Nevertheless, the Hoffman Court found conflict between awarding
NLRA remedies and the intent of Congress in passing the IRCA.309 Be-
cause the basis of that finding is so resoundingly out of step with mani-
fest congressional intent and is therefore a principle of uncertain origin,
understandable confusion has descended on, in particular, the labor law
regime. Still, it is important to remember what the Court did not say. It
did not say that unauthorized workers are presumptively not statutory
workers, and how could it honestly do so? Even Axis prisoners of war at
the height of World War II were found to be statutory employees under
federal law.310 The Court also did not say that any aspect of the NLRA
beyond eligibility for reinstatement and back pay is inapplicable to unau-
thorized workers. Thus, under Hoffman, unauthorized workers retain the
right to form and join unions and to engage in protected concerted activ-
ity without a union, even if violation of that right has no obvious reme-
dial consequence.
Looking at the situation honestly, it must be acknowledged that nei-
ther the immigration nor labor regime speaks precisely to the issue of
how to manage a labor system that is to an unprecedented extent popu-
lated by unauthorized workers. Hoffman merely brought to the fore the
expanding collision of these policies that can no longer be ignored: there
are millions of unauthorized workers in our economy and, when all is
said and done, they are statutory workers. The Hoffman Court essen-
tially recognized these deep tensions and responded irrationally by fail-
ing to honestly address the labor law landscape as it actually existed-
one in which unauthorized workers are fully covered by the NLRA. This
honest conclusion would have presented Congress with a choice. In re-
sponse to such an opinion, Congress might have exempted unauthorized
workers from NLRA coverage entirely, or it might have modified the
statute partially or conditionally.
CONCLUSION
The immigration rallies in early 2006 glaringly revealed the depth
of "the immigration problem." The sheer enormity of the rallies has ex-
308. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758.
309. Hoffman Plastics, 535 U.S. at 149-50.
310. Patel, 846 F.2d at 703.
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plicitly exposed conflicts between labor and immigration law that the
courts have probably tacitly understood for some time. In this new envi-
ronment, mass immigration protests over potential loss of work from
increased criminalization and deportation of unauthorized workers
strongly resemble "traditional" collective workplace actions.
We could choose one of two avenues for contending with mass pro-
test phenomena. On the one hand, assuming the rallies were primarily
attended by unauthorized workers, we could simply attempt to arrest and
deport rally participants. While in some respects this is not as daunting a
prospect as arresting and deporting all unauthorized workers and un-
documented immigrants present in the country, in other respects it is
more daunting-hundreds of thousands of such workers could be subject
to arrest in very short windows of time. This raises, among other things,
the specter of completely inadequate detention facilities; the Government
has already proven unable to house arrestees from much more limited
ICE actions.3 1 Aside from the impracticality of the idea, it would be a
spectacularly bad policy choice, one reminiscent of early American so-
cietal responses to collective activity by citizen-workers, which the gov-
ernment wisely abandoned by the middle of the nineteenth century. 12
If we wish to make decisions worthy of the twenty-first century, we
should take as our point of departure successful twentieth, rather than
unsuccessful nineteenth, century ideas. Thus, in the short term we can
try to maintain the integrity of the present, twentieth century system.
First, it should remain the case that the states have the right to protect
their citizens from violence arising out of concerted immigration protests
(or out of any other form of mass protest). Second, immigration protest
activity that is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA should be
immune from state regulation, in accord with present preemption doc-
trine; and, in the event states attempt such regulation, including the use
of injunctions, the NLRB should intervene to suspend the regulation pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's Nash Finch doctrine.31 3 Third, immigration
rallies falling within the broad definition of "labor dispute" under both
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA should be immune from federal
injunction, in accord with present labor law.314 Fourth, the NLRB should
afford NLRA protection where it is due. It is understandable that the
Hoffman opinion may have generated general reluctance on the part of
311. Spenser S. Hsu & Sylvia Moreno, Border Policy's Success Strains Resources: Tent City
in Texas Among Immigrant Holding Sites Drawing Criticism, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/01/AR20070
20102238.
312. COX ETAL.,supra note 183, at 8.
313. If the NLRB is willing to extend its Nash-Finch resources to block the effectuation of
"labor peace provisions" attendant to local "living wage" laws, see supra text accompanying note
283, surely it should be willing to take the same action when, as here, the potential for real industrial
strife exists.
314. See supra note 287.
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the NLRB to extend NLRA protection to unauthorized workers because
traditional back pay and reinstatement remedies are unavailable. But
NLRB findings of NLRA violations in mass protest scenarios could
prove quite effective in maintaining industrial peace even in the absence
of traditional NLRA remedies. Employers and state and local govern-
mental actors may be less likely to act impulsively in an NLRA statutory
environment.3'5 Fifth, the NLRB should pursue appropriate injunctions
to promptly enforce secondary boycott law under the NLRA. Such in-
junctive actions will act as a brake on state and local law enforcement's
unwarranted and uninformed interference with protected concerted activ-
ity. Experience shows that the allowance of such activity within pre-
scribed boundaries prevents a bad situation from becoming worse.
The designers of the labor law paradigm intended to obviate the
need for industrial war and to regulate mass agitation in a manner that
was protective of interstate commerce.316 Can the immigration regime
make the same claim? That regime offers the language and policy of
concrete enforcement actions as the only appropriate societal response to
the widespread presence of unauthorized workers in the national econ-
omy. Immigration law enforcement addresses whether particular work-
ers ought to be arrested and deported. Those kinds of actions cannot
address (and were not designed to address) the consequences for the
economy of mass arrest and deportation of immigrant labor. The societal
responses to concerted labor protest should draw heavily on national
industrial expertise.- It is easy to say, "Arrest everybody., 3 17  What
comes next?
Congress must act soon 318 to address in good faith the many ten-
sions and fissures in the labor-immigration amalgam. That might be
315. Anyone doubting the potential for Local law enforcement miscalculating in its attempts to
manage immigration rallies would be well served to review the chaos surrounding an immigration
rally of only 25,000 held in Los Angeles on May 1, 2007. During that rally, the Los Angeles police
allegedly used "batons and more than 200 rounds of rubber bullets to clear out a park where immi-
gration rights activists were rallying," a number of journalists were apparently injured, and eight
police officers were hurt. Post-Rally Furor Grows in L.A.: City's Mayor Cuts Short Trip to Mexico
To Deal With Fallout Over Cops' Use Of Force, CBS NEWS, May 4, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/04/national/main2762612.shtml. One wonders what could
have transpired if similar clashes had broken out during the previous year's rally in L.A. of 500,000
people.
316. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937).
317. "Arrest and deportation" is the narrow and overriding policy of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; see,
e.g., § 303, 110 Stat. at 585-87.
318. As this article is being prepared for publication, it is widely assumed that Congress will
not be in a position to attempt immigration reform until 2009. See, e.g., Will Sullivan, This Bargain
Wouldn't Sell: Everyone Found Something to Dislike About the 'Grand Compromise "on Immigra-
tion, So the Deal Collapsed and a Dysfunctional Status Quo Endures, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 18, 2007, at 22, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070610/
18immigration.htm?scid-rss:18immigration.htm. The assumption may be based on a very narrow




accomplished by major amendments to either or both regimes. Or, as
Professor Jennifer Gordon has argued, perhaps the idea that legal tinker-
ing can have any real impact on macro-migration trends is pure fan-
tasy.319 Coping with macro-migration may require the creation of a
"transnational" model which addresses these hybrid problems in an en-
tirely different way by creating a new form of "labor citizenship. 320
Until Congress acts in some fashion, however, it is unprincipled to pre-
tend that existing labor law fails to address familiar labor relations prob-
lems. Undoubtedly, it will be politically unpopular in some quarters to
extend the protections and prohibitions of labor law to immigration pro-
test activity. Indeed, little else can explain the Hoffman opinion. Yet it
is precisely when we are in the midst of societal challenge that we should
not enervate our better angels; we should reach out and adhere to the rule
of law.
319. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 561-62
(2007).
320. Id. at 563.
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CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF
JUDGE AND JURY
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, a wave of sentencing reform has spread
across the country and revolutionized state sentencing laws. State legis-
latures and sentencing commissions from Alaska to Arkansas have re-
placed discretionary sentencing laws with an assortment of structuralized
guidelines and systems that seek to increase uniformity and fairness in
sentence decision making.' One preeminent commentator noted that
"[t]he field of sentencing, once rightly accused of being lawless, is now
replete with law.",2 Yet recent United States Supreme Court cases have
placed the sustainability of modem sentencing laws in jeopardy. In its
latest blow to determinate sentencing, the United States Supreme Court
held in Cunningham v. California3 that California's determinate sentenc-
ing law violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge rather than a
jury to find facts exposing a defendant to a lengthier sentence. 4 By in-
validating California's sentencing scheme, Cunningham raises the fore-
most question in sentencing philosophy: is justice better served through
judges or juries?
An investigation into recent United States Supreme Court cases re-
veals conflicting answers to this question. In the seminal case Apprendi
v. New Jersey,5 the Supreme Court established the principle that any fac-
tor, other than a prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the
statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.6
In 2005, the Court applied the Apprendi principle in United States v.
Booker7 to override the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 8 However, the
two majority opinions delivered in Booker left the future of determinate
sentencing in a conceptual and pragmatic morass. While the first opinion
concentrated on the constitutional problems with the Guidelines' reliance
on judicial fact-finding, 9 the remedial opinion rendered the Guidelines
wholly advisory, 10 giving judges more discretion than they held previ-
1. See Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 9-10 (2005); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Les-
sons for State and Federal Reformers, 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 123, 123 (1993), available at 1993 WL
613746.
2. Berman, supra note 1, at 1.
3. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
4. Id. at 860.
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Id. at 490.
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8. Id. at 244.
9. See id. at 226, 234, 244.
10. Id. at 246.
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ously. This surprising remedy endorsed a vision of sentencing where
judges reigned supreme over juries.
Cunningham recalibrated the balance between judge and jury. The
opinion reaffirmed the central holding of Apprendi while retreating from
Booker's broad vision of judicial discretion. Because Cunningham
marks the most recent development in a growing body of United States
Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence, it provides a unique window
into a longstanding tension in sentencing philosophy and an important
opportunity to evaluate the future course of sentencing reform. Part I of
this comment explains the background of sentencing reform and contex-
tualizes Cunningham within the backdrop of modem sentencing reform
and contemporary Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence. Part II ana-
lyzes the majority opinion in Cunningham and the two dissenting opin-
ions. Part III examines how the majority opinion reflects a split in the
sentencing community over whether to entrust sentencing power to
judges or juries. After Cunningham, states are left with diametrically
opposed options for sentencing reform: (1) a sentencing system that calls
upon juries-either at trial or in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding-to
find the facts necessary to increase sentences above a statutory maxi-
mum; or (2) a system that gives judges broad discretion to individualize
sentences within a statutory range. To provide states with some guid-
ance, this comment argues that a system of jury fact-finding is a better
choice for states that rarely employ enhanced sentences; however, for
states that employ such sentences on a regular basis, a discretionary sys-
tem is more appropriate. Ultimately, the comment concludes that the
lack of direction offered by the Court in Cunningham leaves state legisla-
tures with the task of choosing the superior system without the guidance
of our nation's highest court.
I. BACKGROUND
Since the late 1970s, the United States has gone through a remark-
able period of sentencing reform and innovation." Concerned about
sentencing disparity, judicial inconsistency, and rising crime rates, states
began to switch from indeterminate to determinate sentencing systems.
12
Instead of allowing judges broad discretion in sentencing, as they were
afforded under indeterminate systems, determinate sentencing systems
established sentencing guidelines that prescribed presumptive sentences
a judge must impose for ordinary crimes. 13 A handful of recent Supreme
Court cases, however, have challenged the constitutionality of these sen-
tencing laws. These cases set a strong precedent for the holding in Cun-
ningham and demonstrate the Court's ongoing concern for judicial fact-
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finding that elevates a defendant's sentence beyond a maximum statutory
period.
A. Modern Sentencing Reform
In the first seventy years of the twentieth century, states afforded
judges "nearly unfettered discretion" to decide an appropriate sentence
for defendants.' 4 Most states employed this discretionary or indetermi-
nate approach to sentencing and grounded the approach in the rehabilita-
tive model of criminal punishment.' 5 According to this model, "sen-
tences [should] be tailored to the rehabilitation prospects and progress of
each individual offender."' 6 Judges were thought to have superior exper-
tise and insight into the length of sentence that would best suit the reha-
bilitative needs of each offender.' 7 In turn, they had broad authority to
determine a defendant's sentence within a prescribed statutory range.18
However, this highly discretionary approach led to unpredictability
and judicial inconsistency in sentencing.' 9 Evidence of sentencing dis-
parity emerged during the 1960s and 1970s as studies began to suggest
that sociological characteristics such as race, gender, and economic
status influenced the sentencing outcomes of certain offenders.20 In addi-
tion, with crime rates rising, support for the rehabilitative model began to
wane.2 1 Critics and legal scholars began to propose reforms that could
22
lead to greater uniformity and predictability in sentencing. Many
criminal justice scholars, led by the influential Judge Marvin Frankel,
14. Id. at 3; see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (Oxford University Press
1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (commenting on the wide discretion
given to federal judges to impose sentences during this time).
15. Berman, supra note 1, at 3; see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 5-7 (1981) (discussing the domi-
nance of the rehabilitative ideal in the United States until the 1970s).
16. Berman, supra note 1, at 3; see also Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's
Functions, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (1987) ("[w]ide discretion was
ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges and parole officers familiar with the
case to choose a disposition tailored to the offender's need for treatment.").
17. Berman, supra note 1, at 4; see also Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED.
SENT'G REP. 83, 84 (2002) (discussing the view of the judge as sentencing expert in rehabilitative
sentencing systems).
18. See Berman, supra note 1, at 4; see also Hirsch, supra note 16, at 3.
19. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (dis-
cussing studies showing unwarranted sentencing disparities); Norval Morris, Towards Principled
Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REv. 267, 272-74 (1977) (reviewing data ofjudicial sentencing disparity).
20. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R.
Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Dis-
parity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 358-62 (1991); Nagel, supra note 19, at 895.
21. Berman, supra note 1, at 8; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENTS 3-34, 59-123 (Hill & Wang 1976); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
169 (Basic Books 1975); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 3-72 (Basic Books 1975).
22. Berman, supra note 1, at 9.
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came to propose some form of sentencing guidelines. 23 Reformers used
sentencing guidelines to form determinate systems wherein criminal sen-
tences were mandated according to specialized procedures and judicial
findings of aggravating or mitigating facts.24
The federal government joined the sentencing reform movement by
passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.25 The legislation created
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a determinate sentencing
scheme upon the federal courts.26 Liberals favored federal sentencing
reform because of concerns about judges who discriminated on the basis
of race, class, and gender; conservatives supported sentencing reform
because of concerns about judges being too lenient on criminals.27 This
bipartisan distrust of judges led to an overhaul of the federal system and
the replacement of discretionary sentencing with a set of mechanical
formulas and rules.28
States followed in the footsteps of the federal government by creat-
ing sentencing commissions and adopting determinate sentencing
schemes that prescribed presumptive sentencing ranges for various of-
fenses. 29 Although the structure and form of these sentencing systems
varied, it was clear the "sentencing revolution" made an enormous im-
pact on state sentencing laws.30  Meanwhile, the ongoing tension be-
tween judge and jury remained. While the overall power of judges de-
creased under determinate sentencing laws, the laws required judges to
make sentencing determinations based upon judicial findings of fact. As
a result, the role of fact-finder shifted from jury to judge. This shift
forced the Supreme Court to confiont the issue of whether determinate
sentencing laws violated the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial.
23. Id. at 8; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988); Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1988).
24. See Berman, supra note 1, at 9-10.
25. Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1361 (1999)
(reviewing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1998)).
26. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 77.
27. Wright, supra note 25, at 1361.
28. The Guidelines established a mathematical system of calculating the proper punishment,
taking into account factors such as offense level and prior criminal conduct. The Guidelines re-
placed individualized moral judgment with "complex quantitative calculations that convey the im-
pression of scientific precision and objectivity." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 82, 84-85.
29. See Berman, supra note 1, at 9-10.
30. See id. at 11.
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B. Background Cases
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey
31
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
penalty enhancements imposed by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence violated the Sixth Amendment.3 1 The defendant in Apprendi
pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful pur-
pose, a second-degree offense under New Jersey law punishable by five
to ten years imprisonment. 33 However, a separate hate-crime statute al-
lowed the sentencing judge to provide for an "extended term" of impris-
onment based on the judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the crime was committed with "racial animus." 34 The trial judge in
Apprendi applied the enhancement statute and increased the defendant's
sentence to twelve years.3 5 The Supreme Court found that this sentence
enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment because, "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.,
36
Apprendi initiated the trend of using the Sixth Amendment as a tool
to limit judicial fact-finding in sentencing. Professor Erwin Chemerin-
sky argues that Apprendi stands for a simple principle: "Under the Sixth
Amendment, it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and sentence
that person for another. 3 7 The trial judge in Apprendi violated this prin-
ciple because the jury convicted the defendant of possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose, and yet the judge sentenced him for this offense
and a separate offense under the hate-crime statute for a crime involving
racial animus.38 The Court reasoned in Apprendi that the New Jersey
legislature could not hide behind the label of "sentencing enhancement"
to mask a determination concerning an element of the crime that needs to
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.39 Justice Stevens de-
scribed the ruling as a matter of "simple justice," and a basic extension of
previous legal precedents guaranteeing due process of law and the right
to trial by jury.40
31. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
32. Id. at 469.
33. Id. at 468-69.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 471.
36. Id. at 490.
37. Erwin Chemerinsky, Sentencing Guideline Law and Practice in a Post-Booker World:
The Road to Booker: Making Sense ofApprendi and lts Progeny, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 531, 532
(2006).
38. Id. at 534.
39. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
40. ld.
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In contrast, the dissent in Apprendi regarded the case as "watershed
change in constitutional law' '41 and anything but an extension of previous
legal precedents.42 The Court split five to four in Apprendi, with Justices
O'Connor and Breyer writing contentious dissents.43 Justice O'Connor
argued that the Sixth Amendment did not require the majority rule in
Apprendi and warned that "in light of the adoption of determinate-
sentencing schemes by many States and the Federal Government," the
consequences of the majority's opinion would be severe. 44  Justice
Breyer stressed the practical and administrative reasons why judges,
rather than juries, traditionally assessed sentencing factors. 45  He ex-
plained that in the sentencing process there are "far too many potentially
relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of
them to a jury.' 6 Furthermore, he argued, the Constitution does not em-
body such a requirement 47 and the Apprendi rule would impede legisla-
tive efforts to provide guidance and consistency in sentencing.
48
2. Blakely v. Washington
49
Blakely extended Apprendi's holding to penalty enhancements oc-
curring within a maximum statutory range. In 1998, Washington resi-
dent Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., was convicted of kidnapping his es-
tranged wife.50 Under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, the stan-
dard sentence for second-degree kidnapping was fifty-three months.
5 1
However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that Blakely
committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty," and increased the penalty
to ninety months.5 2 Blakely's elevated sentence was within Washing-
ton's statutory maximum for second-degree kidnapping and allowed un-
der the state's sentencing guidelines, which provided that sentencing
judges could impose higher sentences if they found "substantial and
compelling reasons justifying ... exceptional sentence[s].'
In another five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that Wash-
ington's guidelines were unconstitutional because they violated
Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 54 Justice Scalia ex-
plained that "the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sen-
tence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maxi-
41. Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 525.
43. Id. at 468, 523, 555.
44. Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 555-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 557.
47. Id. at 555.
48. Id. at 565.
49. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
50. Id. at 298.
51. Id. at 300.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 299.
54. Id. at 298, 314, 326, 328.
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mum he may impose without any additional findings." 55 By finding that
Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty," the trial judge in Blakely did not
determine a sentencing factor, but rather an element of the offense that
needed to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.56 The
Blakely majority supported Apprendi's dramatic vindication of the role
of the jury, and Justice Scalia concluded the opinion by stating: "every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all
facts legally essential to the punishment.,
57
In contrast, the dissent in Blakely denounced the majority opinion as
an unneeded encumbrance upon sentencing. Justice O'Connor predicted
that the ruling would trigger the end of "[o]ver 20 years of sentencing
reform," and that "tens of thousands of criminal judgments" would be
placed in jeopardy.58 Justice Kennedy argued that the holding would
force states to "scrap everything and start over." 59 Similarly, Justice
Breyer concluded that states would be left with a narrow range of options
for sentencing reform and argued that Apprendi's holding should have
been limited to prevent the dismantling of sentencing reform efforts.
60
Like the other dissenting justices, Justice Breyer expressed concern over
how the decision in Blakely would affect the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 61 This question would soon be answered by United States v.
Booker.
62
3. United States v. Booker63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Booker only six weeks af-
ter it decided Blakely.64 Like Washington state's sentencing guidelines,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines employed judicial fact-finding in or-
der to boost sentences into a higher guideline range.65 Not surprisingly,
the same five justices who comprised the majorities in Apprendi and
Blakely found that there was "no distinction of constitutional significance
between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington proce-
dures at issue in [Blakely].' 66 In a five to four decision, the Court held
that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges to
make additional findings of fact in order to compute increases in appli-
cable sentencing ranges. 67 The majority opinion authored by Justice Ste-
55. Id. at 303-04.
56. Id. at 301, 303-04.
57. Id. at 313.
58. Id. at 326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 330, 346 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 346-47.
62. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
63. Id
64. Berman, supra note 1, at 38.
65. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id. at 225-26, 234-37, 244.
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vens reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."
68
In a separate opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court fash-
ioned a remedy for Justice Stevens's majority ruling.69 Instead of en-
grafting a Sixth Amendment jury trial right onto the Guidelines (as sug-
gested by the dissent), Justice Breyer chose to render the Guidelines
wholly advisory. 7° By severing and excising certain provisions of the
federal sentencing statute that made the Guidelines mandatory, the
Breyer majority held that the statute "[fell] outside the scope of Ap-
prendi's requirement.",71 Justice Breyer reasoned that this remedy was in
line with congressional intent and that an engrafted jury system was "far
more complex than Congress could have intended., 72 Last, the Court
instituted a "reasonableness" standard for appellate review of federal
sentences.73
Critics denounce Booker for its incoherence and inconsistency.74
The Breyer remedy seemed to bear no relation to the Sixth Amendment
violation or to past precedent. 75 One scholar astutely noted that "to cul-
minate a jurisprudence that previously seemed interested in vindicating
the role of the jury in modem sentencing systems, Booker devised a rem-
edy for the federal system that granted federal judges more sentencing
power than they had ever wielded previously., 76 Booker's surprising
remedy for judicial infringement upon the province of the jury was to
give judges more power than they held in the past. In the wake of
Booker, federal judges gained discretionary muscle while the power of
the jury's verdict remained the same.
II. CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
7 7
The trio of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker raised questions about
the permissible scope of judicial fact-finding under a variety of state sen-
tencing schemes.78 Before Cunningham, the Court had not addressed
whether a sentencing system like California's-which employed a triad
system of upper, middle, and lower-term sentencing-was constitutional
68. 1d at 244.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 259.
72. Id. at 254.
73. Id. at 261.
74. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665, 677 (2006).
75. Id.
76. Berman, supra note 1, at 39.
77. 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
78. See People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 542 (Cal. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
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under the Sixth Amendment. 79 Cunningham solidified the views of Ap-
prendi and Blakely while retreating from Booker's surprising endorse-
ment of judicial discretion. In doing so, it readjusted the balance be-
tween judge and jury and realigned the trajectory of modern sentencing
jurisprudence.
A. Facts
Petitioner John Cunningham was convicted under California state
law of continuous sexual abuse of a child.s0 California's determinate
sentencing law (DSL) made the offense punishable by a lower term sen-
tence of six years, a middle term sentence of twelve years, or an upper
term sentence of sixteen years.8 1 In particular, the DSL required the "im-
position of the middle term, unless there [were] circumstances in aggra-
vation or mitigation of the crime." 82 It allowed a judge to impose the
upper term only if, after considering all of the relevant facts, "the cir-
cumstances in aggravation outweigh[ed] the circumstances in mitiga-
tion. 83  California's sentencing rules provided a nonexclusive list of
aggravating circumstances, including "facts relating to the crime" and
"facts relating to the defendant. 84  In addition, the DSL permitted a
judge to consider any "additional criteria reasonably related to the deci-
sion being made., 85 However, under the DSL, "a fact that is an element
of the crime . . . [could] not be used to impose the upper term. 86 In
Cunningham's case, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence six aggravating circumstances and one circumstance in
mitigation.87 The judge concluded that Cunningham's aggravators out-
weighed the lone mitigating factor, and imposed an upper-term sentence
of sixteen years.88
B. Procedural History
A panel of the California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of
the sentencing judge. 89 The California Supreme Court denied review of
the case, 90 but in People v. Black,9' an earlier decision, it held that the
DSL did not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.92 One justice dissented in Black, arguing that the DSL only sur-
79. See id. at 542-43.
80. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 861.
83. Id. at 863 n.9.
84. Id. at 863.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 860-61.
88. Id. at 861.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
92. Id. at 547-49.
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vived Sixth Amendment inspection if: "(1) a jury has made a finding on
the aggravating fact, (2) the defendant has admitted the aggravating fact,
(3) the defendant has validly waived the right to a jury trial on the aggra-
vating fact, or (4) the aggravating fact relates to the defendant's criminal
record.. .
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cunningham
and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.94
C. Majority Opinion
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that
California's DSL violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.95
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas
joined in the majority opinion.96 Adhering to precedent, the majority
found that the DSL violated Apprendi's "bright-line rule" that "any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."97 Specifically, the majority found the DSL violated Apprendi
because it allowed a judge to find facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, elevating a defendant's sentence to an upper term.
98
The majority in Cunningham ruled that the middle term, and not the
upper term, as interpreted by the court in Black, was the relevant statu-
tory maximum for constitutional analysis.99 The majority concluded that
the "statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 00  Under this rule, the DSL's
statutory maximum was the middle term because the upper term required
judicial fact-finding of aggravating factors.'
0'
Even though the DSL gave judges broad discretion to identify ag-
gravating factors, the majority reasoned that the jury verdict did not re-
flect these factors and thus the DSL did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment
requirement.1 2 Justice Ginsburg quickly dismissed the Black court's
arguments that the DSL survived Sixth Amendment inspection because it
reduced penalties over the prior indeterminate system and required sen-
tence "enhancements," as opposed to sentence elevations, to be charged
in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.0 3 She
93. Black, 113 P.3d at 550 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
94. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871.
95. Id. at 860.
96. Id. at 859.
97. Id. at 868.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 871.
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 869.
103. Id.
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explained that Apprendi's "bright-line rule" does not exclude sentencing
systems that allow for the submission of some facts to judges and some
facts to juries.'0 4 Under Apprendi and Blakely, all facts essential to pun-
ishment (other than the fact of a prior conviction) must be submitted to
the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'0 5
In addition, the Cunningham majority found the Black court's com-
parison between the DSL and the post-Booker federal system unpersua-
sive.' 06 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "California's DSL does not re-
semble the advisory system the Booker Court had in view" because
"judges are not free to exercise their discretion to select a specific sen-
tence within a defined range."' 07 Cunningham's sentencing judge did not
have the discretion to choose a sentence within a range of six to sixteen
years, but rather was required to select the twelve-year sentence if he did
not find any circumstances in aggravation or mitigation.'0 8 Further, the
DSL's requirement that judge-determined sentences be reasonable did
not make it immune to Sixth Amendment inspection. 0 9 Justice Ginsburg
held that "[t]he reasonableness requirement Booker anticipated for the
federal system operates within the Sixth Amendment constraints deline-
ated in our precedent, not as a substitute for those constraints."" 0 By
rejecting the Black court's comparison to the federal system, the Court
reaffirmed the important role of the Sixth Amendment in sentencing ju-
risprudence. "' Cunningham departed from Booker's broad vision of




Justice Kennedy's dissent stressed the practical reasons why judges
rather than juries should hold authority in deciding sentences." 2 "Judges
and sentencing officials have a broad view and long-term commitment to
correctional systems," Justice Kennedy wrote. "Juries do not."' 1 3 Justice
Kennedy argued that the Apprendi principle could be limited by distin-
guishing between sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the
offense and sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the of-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 870.
107. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis in original).
111. See id. at 876 ("Booker's remedy for the Federal Guidelines, in short, is not a recipe for
rendering our Sixth Amendment case law toothless.") (emphasis omitted).
112. Id. at 872 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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fender.1 14 The Apprendi rule would be applied to the former and not to
the latter. 15 Under the offense/offender distinction, juries would be re-
quired to find facts relating to the nature of the offense, for instance if a
weapon was used, while judges could continue to find facts relating to
the nature of the offender, for instance the offender's lack of remorse. 
16
The majority had rejected this distinction, holding that "Apprendi itself..
. leaves no room for the bifurcated approach Justice Kennedy pro-
poses."' 17
2. Justice Alito
Justice Alito argued that California's DSL was indistinguishable
from the post-Booker federal system. 18 First, both systems granted sen-
tencing judges "considerable discretion in sentencing."' 19 Like the fed-
eral advisory system, California's DSL granted trial judges wide discre-
tion to choose from a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating
factors.' 20 A California trial judge could also consider "[g]eneral objec-
tives of sentencing ' 2 1 and any "additional criteria reasonably related to
the decision being made."' 122 The DSL "recognize[d] that a sentencing
judge must have the ability to look at all the relevant facts-even those
outside the trial record and jury verdict-in exercising his or her discre-
tion." 123 Second, like the federal system, the DSL required that judicial
discretion be exercised reasonably. 24  Even when a judge decided to
impose the standard middle term, his or her decision was reviewable for
reasonableness. 25  Justice Alito argued that these two factors-broad
judicial discretion and a reasonableness standard of review-satisfied the
requirements for constitutionality outlined by the Court in Booker.
126
Additionally, Justice Alito contended that aggravating circum-
stances do not necessarily need to be adjudicative facts. 27 He found that
California judges possess the power "to take into account the full pano-
ply of factual and policy considerations that have traditionally been con-
sidered by judges operating under fully discretionary sentencing re-
gimes.' ' 128 Even if the California system did require judges to find some
aggravating facts, judicial fact-finding was not fully inconsistent with
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 872-73.
117. Id. at 869 n.14 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 877.
121. Id. (quoting Cal. Rule of Court (Criminal Cases) 4.410(a)).
122. Id. (quoting Cal. Rule of Court (Criminal Cases) 4.408(a)).
123. Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 873.
127. Id. at 879.
128. Id.
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Booker.129 Justice Alito argued that "Booker's reasonableness review
necessarily supposes that some sentences will be unreasonable in the
absence of additional facts justifying them.' 30 In order for judges to
support their choices of higher or lower sentences, they must reference
some facts.' 3 ' Therefore, Justice Alito reasoned, "it is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment for the imposition of an enhanced sentence to be con-
ditioned on a factual finding made by a sentencing judge and not a
jury.
' 32
The majority rejected Justice Alito's argument on the ground that
"under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a
greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge." 133 In
what might prove to be Cunningham's most enduring line, Justice Gins-
burg declared: "Booker's remedy for the Federal Guidelines, in short, is
not a recipe for rendering our Sixth Amendment case law toothless."'
' 34
In the end, the Court split into two camps. The majority praised the role
of the jury while the dissent clung to Booker's endorsement of judicial
discretion. These conflicting opinions would be reflected in the Court's
disparate proposals for reform.
III. ANALYSIS
Cunningham struck a blow to sentencing reform. Under Cunning-
ham, states can essentially choose between two options: (1) a sentencing
system that calls upon juries-either at trial or in a bifurcated sentencing
proceeding-to find the facts necessary to increase sentences above a
statutory maximum; or (2) a system that gives judges broad discretion to
individualize sentences within a statutory range. 135 The majority did not
impose a specific remedy on California, but rather left California free to
choose between converse schemes. 1 36 As a result, Cunningham raises the
question: why are decision makers left with such contradictory proposals
for reform?
This comment argues that the Court's divergent proposals mirror a
split in the sentencing community over whether to entrust sentencing
power to judges or juries. As the most recent outgrowth of the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases, Cunningham presents an excellent opportunity to
explore the tension in sentencing philosophy and its implications for the
future of sentencing reform. In the end, Cunningham gave states little
guidance on which of the two sentencing systems is better suited to
129. Id. at 879-80.
130. Id. at 880.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 863-64 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 870.
135. Id. at 871.
136. See id.
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achieve the interests of justice. Accordingly, the latter parts of this sec-
tion examine Cunningham's two systems in detail and advise states on
the best options for reform. For states that rarely impose enhanced sen-
tences, a system of jury fact-finding, particularly a bifurcated jury sys-
tem, is the better choice. For states that regularly impose enhanced sen-
tences, however, a discretionary system of advisory guidelines is more
appropriate.
A. Judge or Jury: Conflicting Proposals for Reform
The sentencing community stands divided on whether to entrust
sentencing power to judges or juries. Supporters of judicial discretion
believe that judges are able to individualize sentences in a way that can-
not be accomplished by a mechanical set of rules or procedures. 3 7 Some
have argued that: "[g]enuine judgment, in the sense of moral reckoning,
cannot be inscribed in a table of offense levels and criminal history cate-
gories."'1 38 Judges possess the ability to look at a host of unique factors
and impose case-specific sentencing judgments. 139 Also, they are able to
combine their insights about individual cases with an understanding of
the criminal justice system as a whole. 140 Because judges sentence regu-
larly, they have the opportunity to improve their sentencing methodology
and become more consistent in their sentencing practices.
14'
Critics of judicial sentencing charge that judicial discretion leads to
"unwarranted sentencing disparity."'142 Unwarranted sentencing disparity
results when judges impose different sentences in cases that are alike in
relevant ways. 143 A large amount of literature discusses racial discrimi-
nation in sentencing outcomes, with considerable scrutiny applied to the
disparate treatment of African Americans.'" Even today, when there is
more diversity in the leadership of the courts, young black and Latino
males are subject to particularly harsh sentences as compared to other
offender populations. 145 This disparity goes against the ideal of equal
treatment under the law and principles of social justice.
137. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 82.
138. Id.
139. See William W. Schwarzer, Commentary, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED.
SENT'G. REP. 339, 339 (1991).
140. Wright, supra note 25, at 1373.
141. Id. at 1378.
142. Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 241-44
(1999).
143. Wright, supra note 25, at 1361; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2007).
144. See TUSHAR KANSAL, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 4-6 (Marc Mauer ed., The Sentencing Project 2005); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentenc-
ing, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 733, 733 (2001).
145. KANSAL, supra note 144, at 1-2, 7-10.
[Vol. 85:1
2007] THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF JUDGE AND JURY 167
Distrust of judicial discretion also developed out of concern that
judges are especially susceptible to corruption. Scandals involving cor-
rupt judges are not uncommon in the United States and throughout the
world.' 46 For instance, in 1996, a California court found three California
Superior Court judges and an attorney guilty of corruption. 47 The attor-
ney had given the judges a total of $100,000 in gifts in return for favor-
able assistance. 48  In the end, two judges resigned and one was re-
moved.149 As can be expected, scandals of this magnitude led to negative
public perceptions of judges. In an early 2005 Harris Poll, only a small
percentage (22%) of one thousand adults surveyed had a "great deal" of
confidence in the judiciary.' 50 About sixty percent had "only some" con-
fidence and twenty percent had "hardly any" confidence. 15' Over the
past decade, fears of overt judicial bias (i.e. judicial corruption) intensi-
fied public distrust of the judiciary and contributed to various calls for
sentencing reform. 
5 2
Disparity in sentencing, mistrust of the judiciary, and the elevation
of the role of the jury by the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases have led
some scholars to propose enacting jury sentencing in non-capital cases. 1
53
In 2003, Professor Jenia Iontcheva argued that the reintroduction of jury
sentencing is "the final logical step suggested by the Apprendi line of
decisions."' 154  She contended that jury sentencing would lead to more
legitimate sentencing practices. 155 Juries possess a more democratic and
diverse composition than the ranks of state judges, and deliberation
among jurors is likely to transform individual biases.' 56 Juries are also
better able to represent "the conscience of the community" and reflect
146. J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial Independ-




150. Harris Interactive, Overall Confidence in Leaders of Major Institutions Declines Slightly
(Harris Poll #21, March 17, 2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=550
(last visited September 12, 2007).
151. Id.
152. For instance, in South Dakota in 1996, a small but disgruntled minority campaigned for a
Judicial Accountability Initiative Law ("J.A.I.L.") which would have allowed litigants to sue judges
for various kinds of misconduct. The J.A.I.L. website stated that its supporters aimed "to end the
rampant and pervasive judicial corruption in the legal system of the United States." The site also
guaranteed that J.A.I.L. would do away with the widespread problem of "arbitrary decision-making
by judges." Leita Walker, Protecting Judges from White's Aftermath: How the Public-Employee
Speech Doctrine Might Help Judges and the Courts in Which They Work, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
371, 383 (2007). The initiative ultimately failed to pass. Id.
153. Vikram David Amar, Implementing an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age ofAdminis-
trative Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 294 (2005); Jenia lontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases. An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775,
1776 (1999).
154. lontcheva, supra note 153, at 314.
155. Id. at 344.
156. Id at 363-64.
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public outrage at the transgression of community standards. 57 The pub-
lic perceives juries to be fairer than the judicial system in general, and
increased juror participation in sentencing would likely increase these
positive attitudes. 5 8  Juries could render individualized judgments and
bring fresh perspectives to the process of sentencing. 1
59
However, opponents of jury sentencing charge that juries are not
capable of making consistent sentencing decisions. Two studies from
Texas found greater variability in jury sentencing than in judicial sen-
tencing.160 As one scholar has noted: "Unable to situate the case before
them within the larger sentencing framework, juries ... render disparate
judgments in similar cases in violation of the basic principle of equality
before the law."'16 1 Critics of jury sentencing believe that juries do not
possess the expertise to deal effectively with complicated issues. 62 For
instance, in In Re Japanese Electric Products Antitrust Litigation,163 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that juries
are ill-equipped to hear cases involving complex civil issues and that in
those cases the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the right to a
jury trial1 64 Jurors, like judges, possess subjective biases, but may be
less inclined than judges to adhere to the principles of the law. Critics
accuse jurors of basing their verdicts on irrelevant factors, such as a de-
fendant's or counsel's appearance, or even the defendant's race or eth-
nicity. 165 Several extensive studies of capital juries found that racial dis-
crimination played a role in juries' decisions to impose the death pen-
alty.' 66 While juries have a more democratic make-up than the ranks of
state judges, they may be just as susceptible to unconscious biases. 1
67
In the end, there is no clear consensus on whether to entrust judges
or juries with sentencing power. Accordingly, the disparate proposals in
157. Lanni, supra note 153, at 1782.
158. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 348-49.
159. Id. at 350, 353.
160. Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 30-32 (1994); Charles W. Webster, Jury
Sentencing- Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221,226 (1960).
161. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 356.
162. See Wright, supra note 25, at 1378; Weninger, supra note 160, at 5; Charles 0. Betts, Jury
Sentencing, 2 NAT'L PROB. AND PAROLE ASS'N J. 369, 372 (1956).
163. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (7th Cir. 1980).
164. Id.
165. H.M. LaFont, Assessment of Punishment - A Judge or Jury Function?, 38 TEX. L. REV.
835, 842 (1959-1960).
166. David C. Baldus ET AL., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1679 (1998) (finding that in Philadelphia, defendants convicted of killing white victims
were more likely to be sentenced to death); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death
Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trial: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes, 7 JUST. Q. 189, 189
(1990) (finding that, in Kentucky, blacks accused of killing whites were more likely to be charged
with a capital crime and sentenced to die than homicide offenders); William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ.
563, 593-628 (1980).
167. Iontcheva, supra note 153, at 363.
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Cunningham reflect the inability of sentencing scholars to agree on the
appropriate method of sentencing reform. Both judge- and jury-centered
sentencing systems possess inherent strengths and weaknesses. Judges
bring training and expertise while juries bring inclusiveness and democ-
ratic deliberation. The Cunningham opinion neglected to give state leg-
islatures guidance on which system to impose, instead leaving the choice
to individual states. Perhaps the only unifying principle from Cunning-
ham is that state legislatures will no longer be able to give weight to spe-
cific aggravating factors and require judges to find the presence of those
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.'
68
To retain the structure of their determinate systems, state legisla-
tures can either give more power to juries by moving toward a bifurcated
jury system, or they can give more power to judges by moving toward an
indeterminate sentencing regime. To paraphrase the words of Justice
Breyer: "The ball now lies in [each state's] court."' 69
B. Jury Systems
The first option for state legislatures under Cunningham is to pre-
serve the basic makeup of determinate sentencing, but add a new twist of
jury fact-finding. 7 States essentially have two alternatives in this re-
gard: (1) a complicated charge system where aggravating factors are en-
compassed within the elements of the crime; or (2) a bifurcated jury sys-
tem where juries decide in an after-trial proceeding whether aggravating
factors are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' 71 In the first system, ju-
ries would need to render special verdicts stating not only whether the
elements of the crime were met, but also whether aggravating factors
were present. 72 In the second system, one jury would determine if a
defendant was guilty and a bifurcated jury would decide beyond a rea-
sonable doubt any fact (other than a prior conviction) that raises a defen-
dant's sentence beyond a maximum statutory period.
73
1. Charge Systems
In charge systems, all crimes would have a complex set of elements
in order to encompass the facts that would increase the sentence of a
criminal offender. 174 Each crime would be defined by a multitude of
factors, including, for example, the presence of violence, the type of
weapon involved, the degree of injury to the victim, or the amount of
drugs possessed or distributed. 175 Thus, a robbery statute might increase
168. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 868 (2007).
169. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220, 265 (2005).
170. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871.
171. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 334, 336 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 334.
173. ld. at 336.
174. Id. at 334.
175. Id.
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punishment based upon the following factors: the nature of the institution
robbed; the presence of a firearm; any serious bodily injury to the vic-
tims; or any large property loss. 176 The charge system requires only a
single jury, but necessitates that the jury render a special verdict based
upon the aggravating factors for each offense.1
77
As noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Apprendi, the charge
system puts defendants in a difficult position of denying guilt while of-
fering proof about how they committed a crime.17 8 For example, a de-
fendant could be put in the position of saying, "I did not sell drugs, but I
sold no more than 500 grams."'179 Also, prosecutors in the charge system
would control both the charge and the punishment.' 80 Prosecutors could
use this power to engage in so-called "charge bargaining" and indict
similar defendants with different aggravating factors for the same real
criminal conduct.18' Additionally, the charge system would force prose-
cutors to "charge all relevant facts about the way the crime was commit-
ted before a pre-sentence investigation examines the criminal conduct,
perhaps before the trial itself."' 182 This system would require a prosecutor
to decide which elements of the crime to charge the defendant with be-
fore discovering and evaluating all the evidence.
183
For these reasons, it is easy to dismiss the charge system as an ineq-
uitable method of sentencing reform.
2. Bifurcated Jury Systems
Bifurcated jury systems cure many of the problems associated with
charge systems, but they come with administrative costs. 184 Bifurcated
trials cost states more money, add complexity to sentencing enterprises,
and require additional judicial resources. 85 Like charge systems, bifur-
cated jury systems might also increase prosecutorial power. 8 6  Some
defendants in a bifurcated jury system might become more hesitant to go
to trial and risk two jury decisions.' 87 However, some defendants might
benefit from the system if the increased cost of trial "makes prosecutors
176. Id.
177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-56 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 557.
179. Id.
180. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id.; Joy Anne Boyd, Commentary, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of
Justice's Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 595 (2004) (defining "charge bargaining" as a form of
plea bargaining in which the prosecutor would agree to drop certain charges if the defendant agrees
to plead guilty to other charges).
182. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 336.
185. Id.
186. Jd. at 334, 338.
187. Id. at 337.
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more willing to cede certain sentencing issues to the defense."' 88 Under
a bifurcated jury system, a defendant could bargain with a prosecutor in
order to avoid a lengthy trial and a drawn-out sentencing proceeding.'
89
Most states favor adopting the bifurcated jury system. 90 Such a
system allows them "to continue to adhere to the principles on which
their [determinate] systems were based and to do so with minimal
changes to sentencing procedures."' 9 1 Many states are confident in the
ability of determinate sentencing systems to reduce sentencing disparity
and increase sentencing predictability.' 92 Currently, four states employ a
bifurcated jury system. 193 Most of these states utilize bifurcated juries
only when evidence in support of an aggravated sentence is inadmissible
at trial. 194 When such evidence is admissible, however, the states use a
charge system and juries render special verdicts on aggravating fac-
tors. 195 The split system reduces administrative costs, but does not ad-
dress the previously discussed problems with charge systems.
States considering a pure bifurcated jury system may be encouraged
by the success of a workable model already in place in Kansas.' 96 Under
the Kansas system, a judge decides what facts to introduce at trial and
what facts to introduce at sentencing. 97 A post-trial jury-usually the
same jury as used in the trial phase-determines beyond a reasonable
doubt any aggravating factors which may increase the defendant's sen-
tence. 198 If a jury finds aggravating factors present in a specific case, the
judge may impose an elevated sentence, but is under no obligation to do
so. 199
The Kansas model is successful for a number of reasons. 200 First,
enhanced sentences "have been a historical rarity in Kansas. ' 2°  Either
prosecutors do not tend to seek enhanced sentences or most sentences
fall within the standard range. Similarly, most criminal sentences in
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to
Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 7, 2 (2005).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5.
193. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4716(b), 21-4718(b) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2005); 2005
Or. Laws ch. 463, §§ 3(1), 4(1); S.B. 5312, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 377, sec. 10 (Wash. 2007);
H.B. 2070, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 205, sec. 2 (Wash. 2007). These are the states that use juries to
find sentencing factors, not the states that employ so-called "jury sentencing" where juries decide
and impose the actual sentence.
194. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10 subsec. 5; Or. Laws ch. 463, §§ 3(1), 4(1); S.B. 5312, 60th
Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 377, sec. 10; H.B. 2070,60th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 205, sec. 2.
195. Id.
196. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 2.
197. Katie M. McVoy, Note, "What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come to Pass ": Blakely,
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1637 (2005).
198. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 2.
199. McVoy, supra note 197, at 1637.
200. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 3.
201. Id.
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Kansas are determined through plea bargains which do not require addi-
tional jury fact-finding. 20 2 Defendants admit to the presence of certain
facts in order to receive negotiated sentences. Third, anecdotal evidence
suggests that post-verdict sentencing juries are rarely employed and that
when they are, the use of such juries "does not create significant addi-
tional burdens on the system. 2 °3
The flaw in the Kansas system is that judges retain the discretion to
use the jury-determined factors as they please. Judges can use the jury-
determined factors to sentence a defendant beyond a presumptive range,
or they can ignore the factors and sentence the defendant within the stan-
dard range. 204 Bifurcated juries are of no value if a judge can simply
nullify the jury's conclusions. Uniformity also suffers if judges possess
the discretion to decide if and when to use the jury-determined factors.2 °5
Judges operating under indeterminate sentencing schemes possess the
same freedom to ignore or utilize relevant sentencing factors, but such
systems do not require the added costs of bifurcated juries.
Nevertheless, the success of the Kansas model provides support for
the proposition that a bifurcated jury system is the best approach for
states that rarely impose enhanced sentences. Such an approach allows
states to preserve the basic structure of their determinate sentencing sys-
tems while rendering these systems Cunningham-compliant. If a state's
use of jury fact-finding in sentencing is minimal, the evidence from Kan-
sas suggests that the two-tiered jury system will not impose significant
burdens on the criminal justice system and will not add large administra-
tive costs. 206 The reality of criminal justice today is that most sentences
are reached through plea bargaining, a process that decreases the need for
jury fact-finding. 20 7 In addition, jury fact-finding is not needed when
judges impose aggravated sentences on the basis of past criminal con-
duct.
20 8
To improve upon the Kansas system, states should require judges to
adhere to the jury's factual findings. Allowing a judge to nullify the
jury's factual conclusions only undercuts the legitimacy of a bifurcated
jury system. A system that uses the structure of the Kansas model, but
actually gives weight to the decisions of the jury, would better promote
the goals of uniformity and consistency in sentencing. Such a system is
the best option for states that rarely impose enhanced sentences because
it allows them to retain the structure of their determinate sentencing sys-
tems without a large increase in administrative costs. States can continue
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2.
205. See McVoy, supra note 197, at 1629.
206. See id. at 1640-41.
207. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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to mandate sentences according to the presence of aggravating and miti-
gating factors because these factors are determined by a bifurcated jury.
By adding a new twist of jury fact-finding, states can continue to sen-
tence offenders according to the principles and procedures of determinate
sentencing without a large increase in cost and complexity.
3. Indeterminate Sentencing Systems
However, if states impose enhanced sentences on a regular basis, a
bifurcated jury system will likely add significant costs and complexity to
state sentencing enterprises. States prescribing enhanced sentences fre-
quently would be wise to consider implementing indeterminate sentenc-
ing systems. Fortunately, the second option under Cunningham is to
allow judges broad discretion to individualize sentences within a statu-
tory range.209 The Supreme Court has consistently found that such a
system "encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal."2t0  In Booker, the
Breyer majority created a remedy for the federal system that allowed
judges wide power to sentence criminal defendants according to indi-
vidualized notions of justice.211 The majority found that such a remedy
"falls outside of the Apprendi requirement.,
212
a. Pure Indeterminate Systems
Pure indeterminate systems give judges wide leverage to determine
sentencing factors.213 Judges could take into account both offense and
offender characteristics in order to individualize sentences to specific
offenders. 1 4 They could consider the charged conduct, the offender's
life circumstances, and the offender's prospects for rehabilitation.1 5
Under a pure indeterminate system, judges would also be able to use
their expertise and knowledge to situate sentences within the framework
of the criminal justice system as a whole.216 They could rely on their
experience and knowledge to improve sentencing practices and adjust
their sentencing according to the best practices and available research. 17
Indeterminate systems are not without flaws, though.21 8  A purely
indeterminate system could lead to the same sentencing disparities that
209. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).
210. Id.
211. McConnell, supra note 74, at 666.
212. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
213. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 37, 53 (2006).
214. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) ("We should be clear that nothing in
this history suggests that it is impermissible for judge to exercise discretion-taking into considera-
tion various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing judgment within the range
prescribed by statute.").
215. Berman, supra note 1, at 3-4.
216. Wright, supra note 25, at 1373.
217. Id. at 1378.
218. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314-16 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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determinate sentencing systems were created to counteract.21 9 Justice
Breyer noted in his Blakely dissent that under discretionary systems,
"[t]he length of time a person spent in prison appear[ed] to depend on
'what the judge ate for breakfast' on the day of sentencing, on which
judge you got, or on other factors that should not have made a difference
to the length of the sentence. 220  If history is any indication, judges
could return to the same sentencing practices that led to disparities in
sentencing based on sociological factors like race, gender, and economic
status.2 2 1 This type of system would neither promote uniformity nor fair-
ness in decision-making.
b. Advisory Guideline Systems
A more nuanced version of indeterminate sentencing would allow
for the employment of advisory sentencing guidelines.222 Judges would
be advised to take certain factors into account and would be required to
justify departures from a set of advisory sentencing guidelines. 223 Guide-
lines could provide information about statistical averages, codify best
practices, and provide "mental anchors or benchmarks that exert gravita-
tional pull [upon judges]. 22 4  Recent studies suggest that voluntary
guidelines reduce inter-judge disparity because judges follow the guide-
lines out of concern for their reputations or apprehension about being
labeled deviant. 225
An advisory guidelines system is closely in line with the remedy
fashioned in Booker, and provides states with a viable alternative to jury
fact-finding. This system is more appropriate for states that employ sen-
tence enhancements on a regular basis because it is less costly and less
complicated than a bifurcated jury system. 226 So far, three states-
Indiana, Tennessee, and now, California--employ advisory guidelines.227
Concerns about the costs and burdens of jury fact-finding may have
driven the choices of both Indiana and Tennessee.228 A Tennessee task
force on sentencing reported that jury fact-finding would "increase ser-
vice time of jurors, increase jury trial time on the court docket, impose
increased burdens on public defenders and district attorneys and other-
wise increase the costs of the administration of justice. 2 29 Evidence
219. Seeid. at 318.
220. Id. at 332 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See Berman, supra note 1, at 8.
222. Berman & Bibas, supra note 213, at 70.
223. Id at 71.
224. Id. at 69.
225. Id.
226. See Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 190, at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN
CRIMINAL SENTENCING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT
FACTORS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 3 (2005)).
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from Tennessee and Indiana suggests that for states with a higher than
average rate of imposing enhanced sentences, switching to a voluntary
system is a "more practically appropriate reaction than the creation of
jury fact-finding.
2 30
To improve upon a system of advisory guidelines, states should im-
plement a reasonableness standard of appellate review. Implementing a
reasonableness standard of review within an advisory guideline system
would promote consistency and guide appellate courts "in determining
whether a sentence 'is unreasonable' . . ..,,23 Douglas Berman and
Stephanos Bibas argue that the standard of appellate review for sentenc-
ing decisions should be "reasoned judgment. 232 In other words, judges
should conform to the presumptive guidelines range when there is good
reason to conform and depart from the range when there are specific rea-
sons for doing so.233 A specific method for promoting "reasoned judg-
ment" is to require sentencing judges to adhere to procedural steps. 34
These steps would require judges to "find guidelines facts, calculate
guidelines ranges, consider departures and statutory factors, recognize
that the guidelines are not mandatory, and give reasoned explanations for
sentences whether they fall within or outside the presumptive range. ''235
"Appellate courts [would] reverse sentences that do not comply with
[the] procedures and presume reasonable . .. those sentences that do
comply. '236 This system of review gives judges room to depart from
sentencing guidelines when necessary, but encourages judges to comply
with the guidelines in ordinary cases.237
To curb judicial bias in sentencing, states should promote judicial
education and awareness-raising. Judges cannot overcome biases if they
are not aware of them.238 To educate judges on sentencing disparity,
states could offer judicial courses about different forms of race, gender,
and ethnic discrimination. Judges would be required to attend at least
one of these courses per calendar year. During the courses, judges could
do a self-inventory of potential biases and assess how these biases might
affect judicial decision making.239 Judges could then make a conscious
effort to set those biases aside in order to render fairer and more impar-
tial decisions.240 The work of bar associations to develop sections de-
voted to women and minorities and the efforts of these sections to edu-
230. Id. at 6.
231. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994
ed.)).
232. Berman & Bibas, supra note 213, at 70.
233. Id. at 70-71.
234. Id. at 71.
235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994).
239. Id. at 58-59.
240. Id. at 58.
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cate the legal public about myths related to biases should also be empha-
sized in order to eradicate prejudice within the legal system.24" '
Finally, to promote consistency in sentencing, states could set up a
computer database that would allow judges access to information con-
cerning average sentences for specific crimes. Court administrators in
Scotland developed such a system in order to help judges recognize rele-
vant sentencing patterns.242 Scottish judges tap into the system by de-
termining the "aspects of the case. .. 'relevant' for purposes of compari-
son." 243  Judges select the category of the crime (such as theft or sexual
assault), offense characteristics (type of weapon, victim, etc.), and of-
fender characteristics (criminal history, sex, age, etc.) from the computer
software.244 The database then yields information about sentences im-
posed in past cases, including a complete distribution of the ranges of
sentences imposed.245 This system allows judges to conform their sen-
tences to past cases and draw on the guidance of relevant sentencing pat-
terns.246 States could implement such a system by using their own statis-
tical sentencing data or data from the federal system.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Cunningham, the state of
California choose to implement a system of advisory guidelines.247 Sen-
ate Bill 40, authored by Senator Gloria Romero, modified the DSL to
afford judges the discretion to decide whether to sentence a defendant to
a low, middle, or upper term.2 48 The bill stated that the choice of the
appropriate term will "rest within the sound discretion of the court., 2 49 It
required judges to state their reasons for choosing a certain sentence
length, but allowed judges the discretion to choose amongst the three
sentencing ranges. Such a system is the best option for states that
regularly impose enhanced sentences because it is less costly and com-
plicated than a bifurcated jury system. This system allows states to re-
tain the basic framework of their sentencing guidelines but converts these
guidelines into advisory procedures. To improve upon a system of advi-
sory guidelines, states should also provide for judicial education and
technological assistance. This modified system would represent the most
equitable method of indeterminate sentencing reform.
241. See id.





247. Governor Signs Bill Changing California Sentencing Laws, U.S. STATE NEWS, April 2,
2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 6349945; see also Millie Lapidario, Defense Bar Split on Bill's
Answer to Cunningham, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 13, 2007, at 1.




2007] THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF JUDGE AND JURY 177
CONCLUSION
The proverbial sentencing reform ball is now in the court of the
states.25' The Cunningham decision hardened the central holdings of
Apprendi and Blakely while retreating from Booker's broad vision of
judicial discretion. / Cunningham left states with two divergent propos-
als for reform: (1) a sentencing system that calls upon juries-either at
trial or in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding-to find the facts necessary
to increase sentences above a statutory maximum; or (2) a system that
gives judges broad discretion to individualize sentences within a statu-
tory range.253
The diametrically different proposals offered by the Court in Cun-
ningham reflect a spilt in the sentencing community over whether to en-
trust sentencing power to judges or to juries. Judges possess the exper-
tise and knowledge to craft sentences that accurately reflect the circum-
stances of the offense and the offender. However, unlimited judicial
discretion can led to sentencing disparity. As Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson pithily expressed: "It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of
justice that the judgment meted out to an offender should depend in large
part on a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the personality of the
particular judge before whom the case happens to come for disposi-
tion., 254 In response, some sentencing scholars have suggested employ-
ing jury sentencing. Juries have a more democratic makeup than the
ranks of state judges and can better express community outrage. On the
other hand, jurors possess subjective biases and may lack the expertise to
handle complicated criminal cases. The sentencing community remains
conflicted on the judge-jury issue and will likely remain so in the years
to come.
In the near future, states affected by Cunningham will need to re-
form their determinate sentencing schemes. States infrequently imposing
enhanced sentences would be wise to switch to a bifurcated jury system,
specifically a system that requires judges to adhere to the jury's recom-
mendations. On the other hand, states imposing enhanced sentences on a
regular basis may find an indeterminate system more appropriate. By
implementing advisory guidelines, a reasonableness standard of review,
and judicial training and education within an indeterminate system, states
can reduce sentencing disparity. Regardless of which system states
choose, at the heart of the sentencing struggle will remain the tension
between judge and jury, and the difficulty of harmonizing the objectives
251. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007).
252. See id. at 860, 871.
253. Id. at 871.
254. James A. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Smith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing
Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 275 (1999)
(citation omitted).
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of individualized justice and fairness with the goals of uniformity and
consistency.
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THE NEW DUE PROCESS LIMITATION IN PHILIP MoRRIS: A
CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE RULE BASED ON PRIOR
ADJUDICATION
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Supreme Court continued its current trend of ratcheting
up the constraints on punitive damages awards.' In Philip Morris USA v.
Williams,2 the Court considered whether the Due Process Clause permits
a jury to base its punitive damages award on the defendant's harm to
third parties not named in the suit. The Court held that punitive damages
cannot punish a defendant for injuries inflicted upon strangers to the liti-
gation.3 The majority opinion softened the effect of this rule in dicta,
however. It stated that a plaintiff can present evidence of the defendant's
harm to nonparties when it demonstrates reprehensibility.4 In effect, the
Court allows a jury to consider indirectly the defendant's harm to third-
parties (i.e., when it speaks to reprehensibility) but forbids a more direct
link (i.e., punishing a defendant for similar wrongful acts against others).
As this comment presents, the distinction the Court drew is illusory
and problematic. The Court identified a fundamental problem in allow-
ing a plaintiff to present evidence about the defendant's behavior toward
non-litigants: third-parties can and should bring claims on their own and
the defendant should have every opportunity to refute those claims.5 The
court's solution, however, created a flawed standard that will spawn fu-
ture problems.
Part I of this comment summarizes the history of punitive damages
leading up to the conflict in Philip Morris. Part II discusses the specifics
of the case, including the facts, procedural history, and majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part III analyzes the majority opinion and points out
the potential problems of the decision. It concludes with a suggested rule
which is less confusing and yet balances the competing interests.
1. Nathan Seth Chapman, Punishment by the People: Rethinking the Jury's Political Role in
Assigning Punitive Damages, 56 DuKE L.J. 1119, 1144 (2007) (noting that the Court began "adding
some muscle and flesh" to the Due Process Clause for restricting punitive damages in 1996).
2. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
3. Id. at 1063.
4. Id. at 1064.
5. Id. at 1063; see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 654-55 (2003); see
also Rachel M. Janutis, Fair Apportionment of Multiple Punitive Damages, 75 Miss. L.J. 367, 373-
74 (2006).
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I. BACKGROUND OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Foundation of and Justifications for Punitive Damages
Ancient civilizations incorporated primitive forms of punitive dam-
ages in their legal frameworks. 6 Historically, no distinction existed be-
tween criminal and civil law; therefore, the origin of punitive damages is
partly rooted in criminal sanctions.7 Punitive damages became a civil
remedy in English common law during the 18th century.8 New Jersey
was the first state to recognize the doctrine in 1791, and the Supreme
Court declared it "a well established principle of common law" in 1851.9
The concept of punitive damages has two main justifications, but
only one is operative today. First, punitive damages developed as a form
of retribution for non-tangible losses, such as embarrassment, humilia-
tion, or mental anguish.'0 This "compensatory" rationale no longer holds
weight because American courts now recognize damages for psychologi-
cal injuries.1 The second justification for punitive damages is punish-
ment and deterrence. 12  The Supreme Court "has long made clear that
'punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legiti-
mate interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion.", 1 3  Several commentators assert that punitive damages do not
achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence,' 4 and others argue for
stricter constitutional constraints on punitive damages.' 5 Questions about
whether punitive damages are theoretically sound or constitutional are
6. Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 104-05
(1995).
7. George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Makram B. Jaber, Further Progress in Defining Constitu-
tional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punishments, 61 Bus. LAW. 517, 521
n.21 (2006).
8. Calnan, supra note 6, at 106.
9. Id. at 108-09.
10. Id. at 108.
11. Id. at 116-17.
12. Id. at 116.
13. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
14. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 336 (1998) ("Punitive damages generate no
statistically significant deterrent effects, but the unpredictable chance of catastrophic losses can
generate substantial harm."); Calnan, supra note 6, at 110-16.
15. See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application
of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 667, 677 (1988) (arguing that punitive dam-
age awards which are disproportionate to the injury violate the Excessive Fines Clause); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 140
(1986) (contending that repeated punitive awards for one harm contravene the Excessive Fines
Clause); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Proce-
dures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 272-73 (1983) (contending that punitive damages should be constrained
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments).
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beyond the scope of the present article, though the topic generates much
scholarly discussion. 16
B. Precedents from the Supreme Court Regarding Punitive Damages
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to punitive damages or
prohibit their imposition.' 7  The Eighth Amendment restricts the gov-
ernment from imposing "excessive fines," but this clause does not apply
to punitive damages.' 8 In Ingraham v. Wright,19 "the Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment does not limit non-criminal punishments, 20
and in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelko Disposal, Inc.,21 the Court
held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not constrain awards in cases
between private parties.22 Because punitive damages are inherently a
punishment and not subject to the same constraints as criminal sanctions,
the imposition of punitive damages "increases [the Court's] concerns
over the imprecise manner in which punitive damage systems are admin-
istered. 23
As a result, the Court recently turned to the Fourteenth Amendment
to rein in punitive damage awards using both procedural and substantive
limits. 24 The restriction of punitive damage awards is a relatively new
phenomenon. Before 1994, the Court held only one punitive damage
award to be excessive.25 It gave deference to jury awards unless they
were "the product of bias or passion" or "lack[ed] the basic elements of
fundamental fairness., 26 After 1994, the Rehnquist Court began inter-
preting the Due Process Clause to restrict punitive damage awards.27
These interpretations make judicial review of punitive damages awards
obligatory, 28 and that review must be de novo.29 Justice Scalia and com-
mentators criticize this level of review because it does not accord enough
deference to the traditional functions of the jury.30 Regardless, the juris-
16. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REv.
957, 983 (2007); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 passim
(2005).
17. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII; Chapman, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
19. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
20. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143 (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667-68).
21. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
22. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 275).
23. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
24. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062-63 (2007) ("[T]his Court has found
that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive
damages and to amounts forbidden as 'grossly excessive."').
25. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1144.
26. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 276).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,432 (1994).
29. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001).
30. Id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("And I was of the view that we should review for
abuse of discretion (rather than de novo) .... ); see, e.g., Chapman, supra note 1, at 1149-56 (argu-
ing that judicial review for punitive damage awards should be stricter than de novo).
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prudence over the last two decades has increased the scrutiny on punitive
damage awards through procedural due process protections.
The Court also imposed substantive due process limitations when an
award was "grossly excessive" in relation to the state's interest. 31 In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,32 the majority opinion fashioned
three guideposts to determine when an award is "grossly excessive": (1)
the degree of reprehensibility [of the conduct]; (2) the disparity between
the harm or potential harm and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties in
comparable cases.33 The Court further elaborated on these guideposts in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.34 It empha-
sized that the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is the
most important guidepost.35 In determining reprehensibility, a jury can-
not consider "lawful out-of-state conduct" when determining punish-
ment;3 6 however, the Court hinted such conduct would be admissible if it
"demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's ac-
tion in the State where it is tortious" and has a "nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff., 37 The Court added that punitive damages
should not be based on "dissimilar acts," but rather on "conduct that
harmed the plaintiff., 38 Further, in reference to the second guidepost, the
Court stated single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with the
Due Process Clause.39
C. Foreshadowing the Dispute in Philip Morris
In State Farm, the Court prohibited a punitive damage award when
based on the defendant's "lawful out-of-state conduct" or "dissimilar
acts. ' 4° The case left open the possibility, however, that the defendant
could be assessed punitive damages for similar acts done against others
within the same jurisdiction. The Court recognized in BMW that "re-
peated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance.'"4 The damage calculation in BMW lends additional sup-
port for including third-party harm in a punitive damage award. The
majority opinion hinted in a footnote that a proper calculation would be
the multiplication of damages per vehicle with the number of occur-
rences within that jurisdiction (i.e., Alabama).42  By inference, a jury
31. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
32. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
33. Id. at 576.
34. 538 U.S. 408, 419-29 (2003).
35. Id. at 419.
36. Id. at 422.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 422-23.
39. Id. at 425.
40. Id. at 422.
41. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996).
42. Id. at 567 n. 11.
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could base its award on similar actions against third parties within the
same jurisdiction.4
This inference is at odds with the dicta in State Farm. There, the
Court stated: "Due Process does not permit courts, in calculation of puni-
tive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of a reprehensibility
analysis .... ," The question becomes how to treat third-party harm in a
punitive damage calculation. One notion is that a jury can consider simi-
lar reprehensible conduct within the same jurisdiction. The competing
notion is that allowing the jury to consider third-party harm would vio-
late the defendant's due process rights.
II. PHILIP MORRIS USA v. WILLIAMS
A. Facts
Mayola Williams, on behalf of her deceased husband, sued Philip
Morris on negligence and deceit claims.45 Mr. Williams was a heavy
cigarette smoker, and he favored Marlboro cigarettes, a brand manufac-
tured by Philip Morris. 46 A jury found that: smoking caused William's
death; Williams smoked partly because he thought it was safe to do so;
and Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that it was
safe to smoke.47 With regard to the deceit claim, the jury awarded
$821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive dam-
ages.48
B. Procedural Posture
After reviewing the jury verdict, the trial judge decreased the puni-
tive damage award because it was "excessive." 49 The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed the trial judge's decision and reinstated the jury ver-
dict. 50 Philip Morris appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, which de-
clined to hear the case, and then Philip Morris sought review in the U.S.
Supreme Court.51 Certiorari was granted, and a short opinion remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of State Farm (which imposed new
constraints on punitive damage awards, especially ones which involve
greater than single-digit multipliers of the compensatory damages).52 On
remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals kept the jury verdict intact even
43. Id.
44. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
45. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
46. Id.





52. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003); see State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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though the punitive damage award was nearly 100 times the compensa-
tory damage award.53 Philip Morris then successfully petitioned the Ore-
gon Supreme Court for certiorari.54
The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed two issues: (1) the trial
court's rejection of a jury instruction about third-party harm;55 and (2)
the overall constitutionality of the size of the punitive damage award.56
Regarding the first issue, Philip Morris argued that it was reversible error
to reject the jury instruction, which explained that punitive damages can-
not punish the defendant for alleged misconduct to others. 7 This jury
instruction would have countered the plaintiffs argument, which asked
jurors:
[T]o "think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years
there have been .... In Oregon, how many people do we see out-
side, driving home ... smoking cigarettes? .... Cigarettes ... are
going to kill ten [of every hundred]. [And] the market share of Marl-
boros is one-third."
58
The second issue was whether the punitive damage award was
"grossly excessive" in light of the recent due process limitations an-
nounced in State Farm.59 The punitive damages award was about 100
times greater than the compensatory damages. 60 An award with this ratio
triggered heightened scrutiny because of due process concerns. 6 1 The
Oregon Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the punitive damage award
because, in its opinion, it comported with the existing due process limita-
tions.62
53. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
54. Id.
55. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171-72 (Or. 2006). The Oregon Supreme
Court phrased the first issue: "Is a defendant entitled to have the jury instructed that any award of
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the plaintiff and that
punitive damages cannot be imposed for alleged harm to non-parties?" Id.
56. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court phrased the second issue: "Are the punitive damages
assessed in this case unconstitutionally excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?" Id.
57. Id. at 1175. The tendered jury instruction stated:
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to
Jesse Williams by the defendant's punishable misconduct. Although you may consider
the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable relationship is,
you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other per-
sons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims
and award punitive damages for those harms, as such other juries see fit.
Id.
58. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061 (alteration in original).
59. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1171-72.
60. Id. at 1171.
61. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (holding there is a
presumption against a 145-to-i ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages).
62. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1182.
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C. Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on essentially the same
issues the Oregon Supreme Court addressed.63 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Breyer, started its analysis by reaffirming the validity
of punitive damages.6 4 Also, it reviewed the substantive and procedural
limits in recent history, including the three BMW guideposts.65 In finding
for Philip Morris, the Court created a new due process limit to punitive
66damages. The majority opinion held "the Constitution's Due Process
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a de-
fendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties .... ,,67
The rule had three rationales. First, the Due Process Clause "pro-
hibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that
individual with 'an opportunity to present every available defense."' 68 A
defendant, despite its unsavory actions in one suit, retains the right to
challenge other claims as they arise.69 In other suits, it is possible that
Philip Morris would be less culpable (e.g., plaintiff knew smoking was
dangerous but continued anyway) or would have caused a lower degree
of harm (e.g., a chronic disease as opposed to death).
The second rationale was that "to permit punishment for injuring a
nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damage equation. ' '70 In essence, the plaintiffs position would lead to
speculation about the number of victims, the magnitude of harm, and the
circumstances surrounding other cases. A jury would be forced to specu-
late about third-party cases, magnifying the risks of arbitrariness, uncer-
tainty, and lack of notice.7
Finally, the Court could not find any precedent supporting the use
of punitive damages for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harm-
ing others. 72 No Supreme Court case had explicitly recognized this prin-
ciple.73 Some lower courts, however, had incorporated the "total harm
principle" into decisions and allowed a punitive damage award to be
based on the "impact of [the defendant's conduct] on the whole of soci-
ety.' 74  The Court did not recognize these lower court decisions and
63. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
64. Id. at 1062.
65. Id. at 1062-63.
66. Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, 43 TRIAL 72, 72 (2007).
67. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (emphasis omitted).




72. Id. But see id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Colby, supra note 5, at 650 (alteration in original) (quoting Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974)).
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treated punitive damages as an individual rather than a collective pun-
ishment.75
If the majority opinion stopped there, the rule would have been rela-
tively straightforward. The opinion went on to hold, nonetheless, that
"[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff ... was particularly reprehensible ....
Thus, evidence regarding a defendant's harm to nonparties can indirectly
enter the damage calculation if it speaks to the reprehensibility of the
defendant's actions.
The inquiry then becomes whether the jury is properly guided. The
Due Process Clause requires the courts to provide "assurance" that juries
are not asking the wrong question.77 If a judge does not properly steer
the jury away from punishing a defendant for harm caused to strangers,
the judgment could be overturned.78 The Court did not provide guidance
regarding what "assurance" would be sufficient. Instead, it left that issue
to the state courts and legislatures.79 Thus, the Court handed off the task
of fleshing out this new principle of law to the "laboratory of the
,,80states.
D. Dissenting Opinions
Three dissenting opinions expressed a wide range of disagreement
with the 5-4 majority decision.81  First, Justice Thomas adhered to his
longstanding view that "the Constitution does not constrain the size of
punitive damage awards. 82 He maintained that no due process limita-
tions ever existed to circumscribe the jury's discretion to impose punitive
damages. 83 For support, Justice Thomas cited Justice Scalia's dissent in
BMW, which suggested the phrase "due process of law" in the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates customary English common law procedures
including, presumably, jury-assessed punitive damages. 84 In previous
cases, both Justices Thomas and Scalia expressed "originalist" interpreta-
75. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
76. Id. at 1064.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1065.
79. Id.
80. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country."); see David C. Mangan, Gonzales v. Raich: The "States as Laboratories" Principle
of Federalism Supports Prolonging California 's Experiment, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 521, 543 (2007)
(applying the "states as laboratories" principle in a Commerce Clause context).
81. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065-69.
82. Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 1067-68.
84. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599-600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia 's Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdic-
tion. The Illusion ofAdjudication without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 992 (1992).
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tions of the Due Process Clause.8 5 Conspicuously, Justice Scalia chose
not to add his voice to Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion, which sug-
gests he is giving stare decisis effect to the court's decisions in Gore and
State Farm. 
86
Justice Ginsburg's opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined, challenged the application of the Supreme Court's new rule. She
argued that the Court could find no support that the jury inappropriately
considered third-party harm. 7 She would have deferred to the Oregon
Supreme Court's judgment that "the jury, in assessing the reprehensibil-
ity of Philip Morris 's actions, could consider evidence of similar harm to
other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct. 88 The
majority opinion identified no evidence or instruction that suggested the
jury considered third-party harm beyond the scope of reprehensibility.89
Further, she chided the majority for not discussing the propriety of Philip
Morris's alternative jury instruction.9" In her opinion, a well-meaning
judge would resist giving the jury instruction because it is confusing. 91
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens would permit pu-
nitive damages to punish the defendant for the total public harm caused
rather than for the reprehensible conduct in an individualized case.9 2 He
emphasized that punitive damages, much like criminal sanctions, are a
punishment for the public harm caused by the defendant. 93 Additionally,
he disapproved of the majority's distinction between appropriate and
inappropriate usage of third-party evidence. To him, taking into account
third-party harm to assess reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
amounts to the same as punishing the defendant "directly.,
94
III. ANALYSIS
Philip Morris represents another effort by the Court to constrain
substantial punitive damage awards. Justice Scalia called the Court's
recent jurisprudence on punitive damages "insusceptible of principled
application." 95 This latest expansion of Due Process to punitive damages
is along the same lines. The majority opinion identified two key ideas
that must be reconciled. First, harm to others shows a higher degree of
85. See, e.g., BMWofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Jeff Bleich ET AL., Smoke Signals: Philip Morris Provides Yet Another Chapter in the
Ongoing Saga of Punitive Damages in the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 OR. ST. BAR. BULLETIN. 24, 28
(2007). But see Greenberger, supra note 84, at 992.
87. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177 (Or. 2006) (emphasis added).
89. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court identifies no
evidence introduced and no charge delivered inconsistent with that inquiry.").
90. Id. at 1068-69.
91. Id. at 1069.
92. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1067.
95. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reprehensible conduct and warrants a stiffer penalty.96 At the same time,
that punitive damage awards cannot repeatedly punish the defendant for
the same instance of misconduct. 97  In balancing these two concepts,
Justice Breyer created a distinction 98 that breaks down in practice. 99 Fur-
thermore, the majority's ruling will likely confuse the lower courts and
does not fully solve the problems the Court attempted to address. A
much better rule would allow evidence of the defendant's harm to third-
parties only if the behavior has been fully litigated. Such a rule would
allow a defendant to challenge each individual claim on the merits and
would eliminate the need for drawing confusing distinctions about how
such evidence is used.
A. The Court Attempts to Balance Two Competing Principles
As in the criminal law context, the Court here identified two com-
peting concepts for determining punishment. First, repeated offenses
merit tougher punishment. 1 ° This concept has its roots in criminal
law.0 Repeated misconduct is inherently worse than the initial offense
because the defendant continued the illegal conduct despite being previ-
ously punished; therefore, a stiffer sentence is necessary to deter the
criminal behavior. Thus, the sentencing court may consider the defen-
dant's prior wrongful acts 1 2 for the purpose of determining the reprehen-
sibility of the charged crime.10 3 Following this principle, a heightened
punishment for repeated offenses is not unconstitutional on double jeop-
ardy grounds. Recidivism statutes can take into account other instances
of misconduct by the criminal defendant. 0 4 Consideration of repeated
misconduct does not impose an additional penalty, but is rather a stiff-
ened penalty for the latest crime. 0 5 In a punitive damages context, the
Court has recognized the principle that "repeated misconduct is more
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."'
10 6
96. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
97. Id. at 1065.
98. Id. at 1064 (stating it is permissible to use third-party harm to determine reprehensibility,
but not permissible to base an award on it).
99. Bleich ET. AL., supra note 86, at 27 ("The Court drew [a] slender line as follows: a plain-
tiff can use evidence of actual harm to non-parties to help 'show that the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehen-
sible,' but could not use that evidence to 'punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is al-
leged to have visited on nonparties."').
100. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400
(1995)).
101. Freeman & Jaber, supra note 7, at 521 n.21.
102. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (citing Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 244-52 (1949)).
103. Witte, 515 U.S. at 400.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996).
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A second principle holds that a defendant once punished for an ille-
gal act should not suffer additional retribution for that conduct.'0 7 Since
there is no double jeopardy equivalent in punitive damages,'0 8 the Court
was aware of the possibility that a punitive damage award could "double
count."'1 9 The Court provided some protection for this contingency: "A
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff,
not for being an unsavory individual or business." 110 The Court appro-
priately raised a concern that defendants should not repeatedly pay for a
particular instance of tortious behavior.11' If a company pays the total
damages it owes to society repeatedly, the company overcompensates
society for the actual damages.
1 12
B. In Balancing These Principles, the Court Adopts a Senseless Rule
The dilemma in Philip Morris captures the tension between stiff-
ened penalties for repeated misconduct and double punishment concerns.
As a solution, the majority opinion attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween appropriate and inappropriate treatment of a defendant's harm to
third-parties. 1 13 The Court considered Philip Morris's behavior towards
other smokers as relevant to a punitive damage calculation when it dem-
onstrated reprehensibility. 14 In other words, a jury could find repeated
misbehavior more deserving of punishment than a fluke incident. In
contrast, a court cannot justify a punishment solely or partly on Philip
Morris's actions to third parties because each claim should be litigated
independently to avoid double punishment.
This distinction breaks down in practice. Justice Stevens criticized
this distinction using an example in criminal law:
A murderer who kills his victim by throwing a bomb that injures
dozens of bystanders should be punished more severely than one who
harms no one other than his intended victim. Similarly, there is no
reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging
in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and addictive sub-
stance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide should not include
consideration of the harm to those "bystanders" as well as the harm
to the individual plaintiff. 
115
107. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007).
108. Colby, supra note 5, at 597 (discussing res judicata as the seemingly equivalent to double
jeopardy but not applying in punitive damage situations because it can only bind litigants that were
actually parties to the prior dispute).
109. BMW, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,423 (2003) (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. See Colby, supra note 5, at 660.
113. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This argument emphasizes that harm to third parties is inextricably
linked to reprehensibility. Thus, it is illogical to draw a distinction be-
tween directly punishing the defendant for harm to third parties and indi-
rectly considering such harm in a reprehensibility analysis.
This logical breakdown can be seen in another way, through the
eyes of jurors. After a jury decides that the defendant deserves a punitive
sanction, many factors will enter the equation about what amount is ap-
propriate. Jurors will likely consider the factors identified in BMW, 16
such as the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. When a jury
considers these factors, it makes little difference whether evidence of
third-party harm enters the equation under the guise of reprehensibility.
Once that evidence is in the jury's hands, jurors will do whatever they
want with it; the bell cannot be rung. In effect, the Court removes one
avenue to consider such evidence (i.e., it would lead a jury to punish the
defendant for harm to nonparties) while leaving another passageway
wide open (i.e., it shows reprehensible conduct). It only matters how the
lawyer frames the argument to make the evidence admissible.
C. The Philip Morris Rule Will Be Difficult to Apply
The majority opinion provided no guidance regarding how a court
can prevent a jury from improperly punishing a defendant for harm to
nonparties. The Court indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
states "to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong ques-
tion."' 1 7 This standard is vague. The Court gave no suggestion about
what assurances would be permissible. 1 8 Certainly, a jury instruction
like the one Philip Morris submitted might be appropriate. But, as the
dissent pointed out, "[t]he Court ventures no opinion on the propriety of
the charge proposed by Philip Morris . . ,,119 Even if the judge issued
instructions that correctly explained the proper treatment of third-party
harm, the jury is unlikely to heed the instructions. Empirical evidence
suggests juries have a low level of comprehension, recall, and application
of the judge's instructions in punitive damage scenarios.
120
Additionally, jury instructions that are in accordance with Philip
Morris may confuse the jury and lead to erroneous verdicts. The purpose
of jury instructions, in part, is to elucidate the applicable law. The Ore-
116. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996).
117. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
118. Id. at 1065 ("Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of proce-
dures they will implement, federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protec-
tion in appropriate cases.").
119. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 223 (2002) ("Our
empirical studies demonstrate that jury instruction do not play a governing role in jurors' decisions
concerning liability for punitive damages."). Cf John L. Kane, Giving Trials a Second Look, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 738, 739 (jury instructions have become increasingly useless because appellate
courts emphasize legally precise pronouncements over frank, natural language) (drawing, in part,
from LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 399 (2d ed. 1985) (1973)).
[Vol. 85:1
DUE PROCESS AND PHILIP MORRIS
gon Supreme Court correctly criticized Philip Morris's jury instructions:
"it is unclear to us how a jury could 'consider' harm to others, yet with-
hold that consideration from the punishment calculus."' 12' The seemingly
contradictory jury instructions could induce jurors to come to opposite
conclusions.
Justice Breyer's answer to this criticism creates a perplexing stan-
dard of review for jury instructions. He reasons that although a court
cannot ultimately determine if the instructions confused the jury, it must
prevent "procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of
any such confusion occurring.' 2 2  This statement does not clarify how
this principle would operate in practice. Because the Court declined to
analyze what jury instructions would be constitutionally permissible,
"the ruling will engender enormous confusion in the lower
courts . . ,,12' Additionally, if the jury is perplexed, it might refrain
from considering the defendant's harm to others altogether, which would
be an incorrect application of the law since the jury can consider repre-
hensibility as a component of the damage award.
124
D. An Alternative Rule: A Jury May Consider Third-Party Harm Only
from Previously-Litigated Cases
In Philip Morris, the Court struck down a punitive damage amount
"based not on what the jury had awarded, but how the jury had reached
its decision."' 125 Traditionally, a jury possessed broad discretion to award
punitive damages and courts did not peer into the jury's "black box" to
determine how the decisions were made.' 26 This virtually unlimited dis-
cretion, however, must yield to constitutional concerns about decision
makers' caprice. 127  Justice Breyer cautioned against allowing an un-
elected jury with little experience to essentially create its own public
policy in awarding punitive damages. 28 If jurors are not to act as policy
makers, the next questions are whether and how a court can ensure a jury
applies the law. Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that jury
instructions have a low impact on how juries compute punitive damage
awards. 129 This research suggests it is much less effective to direct a jury
on how to use certain evidence than it is to prevent the jury from hearing
121. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
122. Id.
123. Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 74.
124. See id.
125. Bleich ET AL., supra note 86, at 26.
126. See generally Chapman, supra note 1, at 1122-32.
127. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[O]ne cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators
through the ballot box; nor can one expect those jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within
a discipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and
application of the law. Yet here Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or
judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy .... ").
129. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 223 ("The empirical findings demonstrate the low
level of comprehension, recall, and application of the judge's instruction by both jurors and juries.").
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that evidence altogether. With that concern in mind, this section formu-
lates a rule about how a court should treat evidence relating to third-party
harm in punitive damage cases. This rule focuses on the defendant's
conduct towards the plaintiff, yet also allows a jury to consider limited
evidence about harm to third parties when addressing reprehensibility.
1. A Suggestion for Considering Third-Party Harm: The Prior Ad-
judication Rule
The Prior Adjudication Rule holds that trial courts should allow evi-
dence of a defendant's similar harm to third parties in the same jurisdic-
tion if that conduct has been adjudicated to its conclusion with a finding
against the defendant.
A plaintiffs evidence must satisfy three requirements to warrant
jury consideration: (1) the conduct towards a third party was a "similar
harm;" (2) it occurred in the "same jurisdiction;" and (3) the claim has
been "adjudicated to its completion against the defendant." Each of
these components is based on the Supreme Court's recent punitive dam-
age jurisprudence or analogous aspects of the law.
130
"Similar harm" is a critical component because it allows a jury to
factor recidivism into a punitive damage award. Among other factors,
31
recidivism justifies a higher punitive damage award because it speaks to
reprehensibility. 132 To justify punishment based on recidivism, "courts
must ensure the conduct in question replicates the prior transgres-
sions."' 33 As an example of how this principle would operate in Philip
Morris, the punitive damage award from another case would be admissi-
ble where the plaintiff developed emphysema because of the company's
misrepresentation of the dangers from smoking. Inherently, this standard
will require the discretion of the trial judge based on the circumstances of
each case.
130. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (prohibiting a state
from imposing punitive damages without first providing an opportunity to provide every available
defense); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that states do
not have legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct outside its jurisdiction); BMW of N. Am.,
517 U.S. at 576-77 (finding that repeated actions are more reprehensible than isolated incident);
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 438 (1995) (permitting evidence of related criminal conduct to
enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime).
131. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 409 ("We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility
of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.").
132. BMW ofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 577 ("Our holdings that a recidivist may be punished more
severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an
individual instance of malfeasance.").
133. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
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The "same jurisdiction" criterion avoids the state sovereignty con-
cerns expressed in State Farm. In that case, the Court, as a general rule,
declared that "the State [does not] have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed
outside of the State's jurisdiction."'' 34 The best reading of this language
is that the principle of state sovereignty provides an independent consti-
tutional constraint on punitive damage awards. 135  Although this rule
allows for exceptions, 136 the safer course to be within constitutional
bounds it is to exclude any consideration of illegal conduct in other juris-
dictions. Note that, under the proposed rule, the same jurisdiction re-
striction applies only to a defendant's harm to third parties, not to its
general course of conduct. The Philip Morris Court indicated that
"[l]awful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberativeness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State
where it is tortious .... Therefore, the proposed rule permits a plain-
tiff to present evidence about a company's general practices to establish
whether a tortious act occurred, but the plaintiff cannot allege that those
practices harmed any other individual besides herself unless the other
requirements are met.
The final criterion is that the third-party harm "be adjudicated to its
completion against the defendant.' 38 Punitive damages require that the
plaintiff satisfy the underlying cause of action for compensatory dam-
ages. 139 Each individual's claim may fail for a number of reasons (e.g.,
the absence of causation, contributory negligence, or the statute of limita-
tions); therefore, it would violate due process if the defendant did not
have the opportunity to refute each individual claim.1 40  Even in class
action lawsuits, the jury must still determine for each class member
whether he or she was injured, and, if so, whether the defendant caused
that injury. 14 1 The concept of punitive damages cannot be unmoored
from its tradition as a punishment for private rather than public wrongs.
Justice Breyer raised this concern in Philip Morris: a defendant should
have an opportunity to present every available defense in each individual
action.1 42 The proposed rule addresses this concern. In previously adju-
134. Id. at 421.
135. Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2004).
136. The language "as a general rule" suggests that exceptions may exist. See State Farm, 538
U.S. at 421; see also Allen, supra note 135, at 27 ("[T]he Court did not adopt a bright-line rule that a
state can never have a constitutionally legitimate interest in punishing a defendant for or deterring it
from engaging in unlawful acts done outside that state. Instead, the Court described its decision in
this regard as a 'general rule.' The Court does not tell us what situation might justify an exception to
the general rule.").
137. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
138. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).
139. Colby, supra note 5, at 652-63.
140. ld. at 651-52.
141. Id. at 655.
142. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
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dicated cases, the defendant had an opportunity to assert the applicable
defenses, thus satisfying due process considerations. 1
43
2. Comparison of the Prior Adjudication Rule to the Supreme Court
Rule
a. Consideration of Recidivism in Reprehensibility Analysis
The Prior Adjudication Rule requires a stronger connection between
third-party harm and recidivism before the jury may consider such evi-
dence. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, a plaintiff may present evi-
dence of third-party harm only if it meets the requirements of similar
harm, same jurisdiction, and prior adjudication.144  These requirements
are a heavy burden because they address a compilation of the due process
concerns in State Farm, BMW, and Philip Morris.145  Combined, these
requirements strengthen the likelihood that a jury is considering evidence
that speaks to recidivism and, by extension, a higher degree of reprehen-
sibility. 146  The Supreme Court's rule is more inclusive of third-party
evidence but lends itself to a greater chance of a jury misusing that evi-
dence. 147 For example, the Court would allow a plaintiff to present the
defendant's harm to nonparties in order to show that the conduct posed a
substantial risk to the general public.148 In contrast, the Prior Adjudica-
tion Rule would ban such evidence. 149  Because the Supreme Court's
threshold for admitting third-party evidence is lower, the jury will have
more opportunities to consider allegations rather than court-certified
findings of previous misconduct.
b. Protecting Defendants from a Jury's Reliance on Unproven
Misconduct
With regard to the policy goal of protecting defendants from a
jury's reliance on unproven misconduct, the Prior Adjudication Rule
provides additional safeguards. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, the
143. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934) ("It is enough that all available
defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax and before the com-
mand of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable.").
144. See supra Part III.D. 1.
145. Id.
146. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996) ("Our holdings that a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.") (citing Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728,
732 (1948)).
147. See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063-64 ("Respondent argues that she is free to show
harm to other victims because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional
equation, namely, reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.
Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate
reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was
particularly reprehensible . .
148. Id.
149. See supra Part III.D. 1.
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defendant would necessarily have an opportunity to assert the applicable
defenses either in previous cases or the case at bar. 150 By definition, a
past adjudication provides some measure of protection that the defen-
dants had an opportunity to present every available defense. 151 In con-
trast, the Supreme Court's rule is weaker. The jury may still consider
third-party evidence so long as the judge properly directs the jury.'
52
Under the Supreme Court's ruling, a jury could still rely on evidence
where the defendant has not received an opportunity to address the mer-
its of the third-party claim.'53
c. Practical Considerations
The Prior Adjudication Rule and the Supreme Court's ruling differ
in the ease of administration and the impact on future litigation. The
Supreme Court's ruling is unclear about which procedural protections
would ensure that the jury is not punishing a defendant for harm to non-
litigants. 54 As a result, the majority's opinion will foster litigation to
flesh out this new principle of law.155 In comparison, the Prior Adjudica-
tion Rule shifts the question from what procedures adequately protect a
defendant to whether third-party harm is admissible. The Prior Adjudi-
cation Rule relies heavily on factual inquiries, which are easier to deter-
mine than an amorphous inquiry into whether a procedure "create[s] an
unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring."',
56
Further, the Prior Adjudication Rule will discourage litigation because a
defendant may be more likely to settle knowing that a punitive damage
award would be admissible in later lawsuits.
3. Potential Drawbacks of the Prior Adjudication Rule
a. The Rule Raises the Evidentiary Threshold Higher than a
Criminal Proceeding
A curious consequence of the Prior Adjudication Rule is that it
would restrict evidence in punitive damage cases further than a criminal
sentencing proceeding. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, a plaintiff
could present third-party harm evidence only if a court previously found
150. See id.
151. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934).
152. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 ("Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned,
it is constitutionally important for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right ques-
tion, not the wrong one.").
153. See id. at 1065. The Supreme Court would allow evidence where the defendant has not
asserted defenses to individual claims: "we recognize that conduct that risks harm to many is likely
more reprehensible that conduct that risks harm to only a few. And a jury consequently may take
this fact into account in determining reprehensibility." Id.
154. See id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court ventures no opinion on the propriety
of the charge proposed by Philip Morris ....").
155. Cf Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 74 ("The decision [in Philip Morris] is sufficiently
unclear that it is difficult to figure out what it means.").
156. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
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the defendant liable for similar conduct.' 57  In stark contrast, criminal
courts may consider previously uncharged conduct"' and even conduct
for which the defendant was acquitted in a sentencing proceeding.1 59 A
foreseeable criticism of the Prior Adjudication Rule is that it places a
higher emphasis on a court's findings than does the criminal law, where
a person's life or liberty is at stake.
A response to this criticism maintains that punitive damages operate
similarly to criminal sanctions, and the law should make no distinction
between procedural protections for monetary and non-monetary sanc-
tions. Justice O'Connor referred to punitive damages as "quasi-criminal"
and suggested that heightened procedural safeguards are therefore appli-
cable:
[P]unitive damages are quasi-criminal punishment. Unlike compen-
satory damages, which serve to allocate an existing loss between two
parties, punitive damages are specifically designed to exact punish-
ment in excess of actual harm to make clear that the defendant's mis-
conduct was especially reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma at-
tached to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a
purely compensatory award. The punitive character of punitive dam-
ages means that there is more than just money at stake. This factor
militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.
160
Because punitive damages involve a public expression of condemnation
and the goals of punishment/deterrence, they should be subject to the
same procedural safeguards as criminal sanctions.161 Strikingly, the due
process concerns the Court raises in Philip Morris have not taken root in
the criminal context. 162 Many commentators criticize the current level of
procedural protections for defendants at sentencing because it allows for
the possibility that an innocent person may serve enhanced sentences for
157. See supra Part IID. 1.
158. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1995).
159. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997).
160. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2006) ("Exemplary damages ... shall only
be awarded in a civil action when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the
commission of a wrong..."); Cf Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death Is Different, '" Is Money Different?
Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 217, 272 (2003) ("Unless there are compelling
reasons for distinguishing among the sanctions of death, terms of imprisonment, forfeitures, and
punitive damages awards, the method for evaluating their excessiveness or disproportionality should
be consistent.").
162, See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the
Subsequent Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 733-34 (1994) ("Even though facts
found at sentencing are of great importance to the defendant, sentencing hearings remain informal
events conducted with little regard for procedural fairness or accuracy. Sentencing facts need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Con-
frontation Clause apply. And although defendants technically have a due process right to be sen-
tenced only upon reliable information, offenders are routinely condemned to spend years behind bars
on the basis of double or triple hearsay and questionable drug quantity estimates.").
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crimes, which are uncharged or dismissed. 63 Therefore, the Prior Adju-
dication Rule may not only provide fairness in a punitive damage sce-
nario, but it could also be extended to criminal cases to prevent defen-
dants from serving enhanced sentences for uncharged conduct.
b. Juries Might Still Inappropriately Consider Third-Party
Evidence
The Prior Adjudication Rule decreases, but does not eliminate the
possibility that a jury will punish the defendant for harm to third parties.
Conduct towards third parties speaks not only to how much the defendant
should be punished but also to whether the defendant committed a tort in
the first place. 164 For example, in Philip Morris, if Williams proved the
company engaged in a massive campaign that deceived the public and
that the campaign affected the deceased, the company would have com-
mitted a tort against him.1 65 Third-party evidence might still be relevant
for the "guilt-level" phase of the trial, even though a jury could poten-
tially use that evidence inappropriately at the "sentencing" phase.'66 As a
result, the trial judge must still issue an instruction about how to appro-
priately use the third-party evidence.' 67  Thus, the Prior Adjudication
Rule might be less effective in practice because third-party evidence will
still enter the jury's consideration.
In response to this criticism, the courts could turn to other rules of
evidence to prevent a jury from inappropriately considering third-party
harm. For example, Rule 404(b) would limit evidence of prior wrongs to
show propensity to commit a similar wrong.' 68 Courts have not relied on
163. Id at 764 n.31 ("The literature attacking the procedures at sentencing is extensive.")
(citing Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1994); Joseph P. Sargent, Comment, The Standard of Proof Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Raising the Standard to Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 463 (1993); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-
Finding under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 323-43 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 208-25 (1991)).
164. See Janutis, supra note 5, at 415 ("[A]n apportionment system would limit consideration
of third-party activities to only those third-party activities that bear on the defendant's state of mind
in connection with the activities directed at the injured party before the court.").
165. Syllogism: Philip Morris deceived the public; Williams is a member of the public; there-
fore, Philip Morris deceived Williams.
166. The terms "guilt-phase" and "sentencing-phase" relate to two separate aspects of a crimi-
nal case, but the model has been incorporated into civil cases. See Donald M. Houser, Reconciling
Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for
Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 352-53 (2007) (explaining that the current structure of a
capital case is bifurcated into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase). See generally State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) ("At State Farm's request the trial court bifurcated
the trial into two phases conducted before different juries. In the first phase the jury determined that
State Farm's decision not to settle was unreasonable because there was a substantial likelihood of an
excess verdict .... The second phase addressed State Farm's liability for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.").
167. See Janutis, supra note 5, at 414.
168. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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Rule 404(b) to a great extent in civil cases. 169 By its language, Rule
404(b) would seem to apply equally to both criminal and civil cases,
since "the rule is entitled 'Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts,' not simply
'Other Crimes."' 170 Regardless, the Prior Adjudication Rule stands not
just on its own, but operates within the context of other evidentiary rules
to protect a jury from misusing the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The only clear conclusion from Philip Morris is that the Supreme
Court's struggle with punitive damages will continue in the future.
171
The Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to forbid the use of puni-
tive damages to punish a defendant for an injury it inflicts upon third-
parties.' 72 This relatively simple principle becomes complicated in prac-
tice, since a plaintiff may still show the defendant's harm to third parties
demonstrates reprehensibility. 173 The Court has blocked off the highway,
but left open the scenic route. Though a jury may not "directly" punish
the defendant for harm to third parties, such evidence can indirectly enter
the equation through a backdoor reprehensibility analysis. The distinc-
tion the Court draws is likely to, at best, make little difference or, at
worst, confuse the jury. So long as the jury may consider third-party
harm, there is no guarantee it will refrain from punishing the defendant
based on the defendant's harm to nonparties, even if the judge issues a
cautionary instruction.
The future debate will likely center around what measures will sat-
isfy the due process concerns raised in Philip Morris, since the majority
opinion gave little indication. As a consequence, the Court left it to the
"laboratory of the states" to carve out this new due process protection.
174
The Prior Adjudication Rule proposed herein presents a potential solu-
tion for state legislatures and courts in their efforts to adhere to the Su-
preme Court's concerns in Philip Morris. Under the rule, a plaintiff may
present third-party harm evidence only if it is of a similar nature, in the
same jurisdiction, and following a prior adjudication. The rule balances
the competing ideas that recidivism is more reprehensible 175 and that a
plaintiff deserves the opportunity to refute each separate allegation of
misconduct.
176
169. John Gardner, Comment, Help Me Doc! Theories of Admissibility of Other Act Evidence
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 981, 984 (2004).
170. Id.
171. Bleich ET AL., supra note 86, at 28.
172. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).
173. Id. at 1064.
174. Palmer v. Asarco Inc., No. 03-CV-0498-CVE-PJC, 2007 WL 666592, at *1 (N.D. Okla.
Feb. 27, 2007) ("As Constitutional rights evolve, so does a state's perception of the interests of its
citizens").
175. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996).
176. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
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Regardless, state courts and legislatures will have to change the ex-
isting procedures to accommodate the Court's ruling. It remains an open
question how strongly the courts will enforce this new due process pro-
tection. The next series of litigation will likely focus on how to incorpo-
rate the principles of Philip Morris in a courtroom context.
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